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In this thesis, the question is asked whether, in the light of the ‘more economic 
approach’ adopted in recent years, it is correct to classify metal-neutral revenue-
sharing airline alliances as restrictive of competition by object and interpret this 
concept in a wider sense under Article 101(1) TFEU. By relying on the example and 
analysis of airline alliances and in particular metal-neutral revenue-sharing alliances, 
the thesis argues that the ‘orthodox’ or wider interpretation of restriction by object is 
correct and, as such, does not contradict the idea behind the more economic 
approach of EU competition law. However, the analysis of restriction by object has 
to take into account the effects of Article 101 TFEU as a whole, including Article 
101(3) TFEU. Therefore this wider interpretation of object restrictions must be 
complemented by a realistic application of Article 101(3) TFEU, in order to achieve 
the desired outcome of an administrable and efficient enforcement regime that 
minimises error costs. This is a legal thesis. It will review the EU competition law 
approach to airline alliances and use the example of airline alliances to explore the 
issue of restriction by object and its interaction with Article 101(3) TFEU. The thesis 
examines both from an economic and legal point of view all those aspects of 
strategic alliances, air transport and strategic airline alliances that are essential for a 
thorough understanding of their characteristics when analysed under Article 101(1) 
and 101(3) TFEU. The research question concentrates on the dichotomy of Article 
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1.1 Background of the research and the thesis question 
In his 2005 book,1 Okeoghene Odudu makes reference to a speech delivered by 
Richard Whish at a conference in June 19972 where he declared that ‘the debate 
about what is meant by a restriction of competition under Article [101(1) TFEU] has 
been with us for 30 years, but I do not believe we are any closer to an acceptable 
solution to this central conundrum of competition law’.3 In 2012, Whish made the 
same statement at the ‘New Frontiers of Antitrust’ conference in Paris; the only 
difference being the number of years mentioned. Remarkably, after nearly 50 years 
of jurisprudence, EU competition law dwells more than ever on the meaning of 
‘restriction of competition’ and the definitions of ‘restriction by object’ and 
‘restriction by effect’.  
In order to be caught by the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),4 an agreement must have ‘as [its] 
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
[internal market]’.5 It is settled case law that the alternative nature of that 
requirement, indicated by the conjunction ‘or’, leads, first, to the need to consider the 
precise purpose of the agreement in the economic context in which it is to be applied. 
‘Where, however, an analysis of the clauses of that agreement does not reveal the 
effect on competition to be sufficiently deleterious, its consequences should then be 
considered and for it to be caught by the prohibition it is necessary to find that those 
factors are present which show that competition has in fact been prevented or 
restricted or distorted to an appreciable extent’.6 
In recent years the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court of Justice) has 
                                                
1  O Odudu, The boundries of EC compeition law – the scope of Article 81 (OUP 2006) 97. 
2  The Second Workshop on European Competition Law in Florence June 1997. 
3  C-D Ehlermann and L Laudati (eds), European Competition Law Annual - no. 2 European 
Competition Law Annual 1997 - Objectives of Competition Policy (Hart Publishing 1997) 461. 
4  OJ [2008] C 115/47; With effect from 1 December 2009, Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty 
have become Articles 101 and, respectively, 102 of the TFEU. The two sets of provisions are in 
substance identical. For the purposes of this thesis references to Articles 101 and 102 of the 
TFEU should be understood as references to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty when 
applicable. 
5  Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235, 249. 
6  See eg case C-209/07 Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd [2008] 
ECR I-8637 (Beef Industry) para 15. 
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handed down a series of judgments that have tried to shed more light on the issues of 
restriction by object7 yet these problems remain prominent in the legal literature.8 
Some commentators urge9 that under the ‘more economic approach’, EU 
competition law should also change with regard to the meaning of object restrictions. 
Further, the concept of restriction by object should be interpreted in a very narrow 
sense, limited to truly hard-core restrictions without any redeeming virtues. The 
more economic approach implies a strengthened role for economic analysis, thus a 
shift in emphasis from the legalistic, form-based assessment to an effects-based 
economic approach with an increased focus on consumer welfare. Accordingly, it is 
                                                
7  Case C-551/03 P General Motors v Commission [2006] ECR I-3173; Beef Industry (n 6); case 
C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands [2009] ECR I-4529; case C-501/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services 
Unlimited v Commission [2009] ECR I-9291; case C-439/09 Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique 
SAS [2011] ECR not yet reported; cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier 
League [2011] ECR not yet reported. 
8  O Odudu, ‘Interpreting Article 81(1): object as subjective intention’ (2001) 26 European Law 
Review 60; O Odudu, ‘Interpreting Article 81(1): the object requirement revisited’ (2001) 26 
European Law Review 379; A Jones, ‘Analysis of agreements under U.S. and EC antitrust law – 
Convergence or divergence?’ (2006) 51 The Antitrust Bulletin 691 (Jones 2006); O Kolstad, 
‘Object contra effect in Swedish and European competition law’ (2009) 
Uppdragsforskningsrapport 2009:3, available at:  
<www.kkv.se/upload/Filer/Trycksaker/Rapporter/uppdragsforskning/forsk_rap_2009-
3_object_contra_effect.pdf> accessed 31 December 2012; O Odudu, ‘Restriction of competition 
by object – What’s the beef?’ (2009) 8(1) Competition Law Journal 11; V Cerulli Irelli, ‘Article 
81(1) EC: some remarks on the notion of restriction of competition’ (2009) 20 European 
Business Law Review 287; A Jones, ‘Left behind by modernisation? Restrictions by object 
under Article 101(1)’ (2010) 6 European Competition Journal 649 (Jones 2010); A Jones, ‘The 
journey towards an effects-based approach under Article 101 TFEU – the case of hardcore 
restraints’ (2010) 55 The Antitrust Bulletin 783 (Jones 2010 Antitrust Bulletin); A Gerbrandy, 
‘Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands BV, KPN Mobile NV, Orange Nederland NV, Vodafone 
Libertel NV v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, Judgment of the 
Court of Justice (Third Chamber) of 4 June 2009’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 
1199; E Loozen, ‘The application of a more economic approach to restrictions by object: No 
revolution after all (T-Mobile Netherlands (C-8/08))’ (2010) 31 European Competition Law 
Review 146; A Andreangeli, ‘From Mobile Phones to Cattle: How the Court of Justice is 
Reframing the Approach to Article 101 (Formerly 81 EC Treaty) of the EU Treaty’ (2011) 34 
World Competition 215; S King, ‘The object box: law, policy or myth?’ (2011) 7 European 
Competition Journal 269; L Kjølbye, ‘Escaping effects analysis: the Commission’s new 
approach to restrictions by object’ (2011) CPI Antitrust Journal 2 (Kjølbye 2011); D Bailey, 
‘Restrictions of competition by object under Article 101 TFEU’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law 
Review 559 (Bailey 2012); MR Mahtani, ‘Thinking outside the object box: an EU and UK 
perspective’ (2012) 8 European Competition Journal 1. 
9  See, for example, Jones 2010 (n 8); Jones 2010 Antitrust Bulletin (n 8); Jones 2006 (n 8); 
Nazzini 2006 (n 8); Kjølbye 2011 (n 8); AP Reindl, ‘Resale Price Maintenance and Article 101: 
developing a more sensible analytical approach’ (2011) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 
1300; D Gerard, ‘Effect-based enforcement of Article 101 TFEU: the “object paradox”’ (Kluwer 
Competition Law Blog, 17 February 2012) available at: 
<http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2012/02/17/effects-based-enforcement-of-article-101-
tfeu-the-%E2%80%9Cobject-paradox%E2%80%9D/> accessed 31 December 2012; D Gerard, 
‘The effects-based approach under Article 101 TFEU and its paradoxes: modernisation at war 
with itself?’ (Ten years of the effects-based approach in EU competition law, Brussels, 27-28 
October 2011); H Zenger, ‘Theories of harm: Conception, reliability and selection’ (Ten years of 
the effects-based approach in EU competition law, Brussels, 27-28 October 2011). 
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argued that EU competition law should move away from the extensive use and wide 
interpretation of restriction by object and rely more on the insights provided by 
current economic thinking and effect analysis through restrictions by effect. This 
should enhance the efficiency of the European enforcement regime and decrease its 
error costs.  
However, in an era where Regulation 1/200310 introduced a system of legal 
exception, self-assessment and the decentralised application of Article 101 TFEU in 
its entirety, one might also argue that the legal distinctions of restriction by object or 
effect and the separate roles of Articles 101(1) and 101(3) TFEU have lost much of 
their significance. Undertakings are, or at least should be, well aware of the cartel 
prohibition due to its straightforward nature; and should know that this is the main 
priority of all competition authorities. As regards other relationships, eg horizontal 
cooperations, undertakings are indifferent to the legal qualification of their conduct; 
all they care about is the antitrust risk it represents and how this can be handled 
swiftly. Nevertheless, these seemingly theoretical questions can be decisive from an 
enforcement efficiency point of view due to the allocation of the burden of proof in 
competition cases and the bifurcated nature of Article 101 TFEU. Under Article 2 of 
Regulation 1/2003, the burden of proving an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU is 
on the party or authority alleging the infringement, while the other side must prove 
the benefit of Article 101(3) TFEU if it wants to argue the inapplicability of the 
general prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU. 
In theory, decision-makers can commit two types of error (administrative 
inefficiency) when examining the conduct of market participants. Firstly, they can 
prohibit behaviour that is pro-competitive and beneficial for consumers. This is 
known as a ‘false positive’, or ‘type I’ error (over-enforcement). Secondly, they can 
erroneously permit behaviour that produces harmful effects on the market, which is 
called a ‘false negative’ or ‘type II’ error (under-enforcement). Each jurisdiction tries 
to minimise the possibility of false positives or false negatives. As Frank 
Easterbrook puts it: ‘the legal system should be designed to minimize the total costs 
of (1) anticompetitive practices that escape condemnation; (2) competitive practices 
                                                
10  Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1. 
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that are condemned or deterred; and (3) the system itself’.11 Although opinions can 
differ as to which error is most undesirable,12 ideally both should be avoided at low 
administrative costs. 
Depending on the scope of Articles 101(1) and 101(3) TFEU and how their 
respective elements, such as restriction by object, are interpreted, the administrative 
burden arising out of their application may contribute to administrative errors. The 
risk of type I errors, or false positives, increases if the conditions of Article 101(1) 
TFEU can be proven easily, that is to say where the scope of object restrictions are 
interpreted widely, while Article 101(3) TFEU requires a very high standard of proof 
for an efficiency defence to succeed. In contrast, type II errors (or false negatives) 
can occur when Article 101(1) TFEU becomes the centre of discussion. This can 
lead to situations when competition authorities become lost in endless debates on the 
economic models of the theory of harm. The latter scenario also means that Article 
101(3) TFEU plays a less important role in the assessment. The correct interpretation 
of a restriction by object, as one of the elements of Article 101(1) TFEU, plays an 
important role in this equation and one always needs to keep in mind the overall 
costs and the effects of each element on the effectiveness of the enforcement regime 
of Article 101 TFEU. 
In 2010, the European Commission adopted a commitment decision in its 
investigation of British Airways, American Airlines and Iberia. The cooperation of 
these oneworld alliance parties was found to be a restriction of competition by object 
in the preliminary assessment.13 In the 2004 investigation of Air France/Alitalia 
which preceded the oneworld decision, the Commission had also concluded that the 
agreement had the object of restricting competition although applied the power it 
then had to grant an individual exemption to the cooperation.14 Both agreements had 
potential for efficiencies that can be acknowledged under Article 101(3) TFEU. The 
airlines’ cooperation clearly went beyond simple naked restrictions that have no 
positive effects, ie the concept of restriction by object was widely interpreted. Critics 
                                                
11  FH Easterbrook, ‘The limits of Antitrust’ (1984) 63(1) Texas Law Review 1, 16. 
12  See R Whish and D Bailey, Competition Law (7th edn OUP 2012) 194 in relation to the 
preferability of type I or type II errors in unilateral conduct cases.  
13  BA/AA/IB (Case COMP/39.596) [2010] OJ C278/14 para 33. 
14  Air France/Alitalia (Case COMP/38.284/D2) Commission Decision 2004/841/EC [2004] OJ 
L362/17 paras 105-107 and 129. 
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argue that this approach makes the Commission’s life easier and creates increased 
uncertainty that could lead undertakings to a ‘suboptimal form of cooperation’,15 ie 
create inefficiencies due to fear of false positives. 
In this thesis, the question is asked whether, in the light of the more economic 
approach adopted in recent years, it is correct to classify these airline alliances as 
restrictive of competition by object and interpret this concept in a wider sense under 
Article 101(1) TFEU. By relying on the example and analysis of airline alliances and 
in particular metal-neutral revenue-sharing alliances, the thesis argues that the 
‘orthodox’16 or wider interpretation of restriction by object is correct and, as such, 
does not contradict the idea behind the more economic approach of EU competition 
law. However, the analysis of restriction by object has to take into account the 
effects of Article 101 TFEU as a whole, including Article 101(3) TFEU. Therefore 
this wider interpretation of object restrictions must be complemented by a realistic 
application of Article 101(3) TFEU, in order to achieve the desired outcome of an 
administrable and efficient enforcement regime that minimises error costs. 
1.2 Relevance of the thesis question 
As mentioned in the previous section, after nearly 50 years of jurisprudence, the 
meaning of restriction of competition and in particular restriction by object still 
generates considerable debate both in the literature and courtrooms. It is notable that 
there have hardly been any cases that would help understand how the Commission 
has approached these issues in the last eight years following the introduction of the 
self-assessment system where public enforcement capacities are mainly concentrated 
on the fight against hard-core cartels and serious abuses of a dominant position. 
Although the Commission has adopted several guidelines to provide ex ante 
assistance for undertakings, some degree of uncertainty remains in the absence of 
published decisions demonstrating in detail the current status of how these concepts 
are applied. In this regard, therefore, criticisms of the interpretation of EU 
                                                
15  Kjølbye 2011 (n 8) 6. 
16  R Whish, ‘Agreements that restrict competition by object: recent case-law’ (presentation at 
Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Budapest 23 March 2010); R Whish, ‘Recent Developments 
in EU and UK Competition Law’ (presentation at King’s College London, 8 October 2009). By 
‘orthodoxy’, Whish is referring to the strict application of the concept of object, without the 
possibility of considering any eventual positive effects of a restriction under Article 101(1) 
TFEU. 
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competition law may seem well-founded. This is especially true if certain elements 
of the guidelines seem to be in conflict with Court judgments.17 
Given the symbiotic relationship of the two main provisions of Article 101 TFEU, 
uncertainty concerning any element of it may ‘contaminate’ and distort the use of the 
other parts. In view of the abolition of exemption decisions under Article 101(3) 
TFEU, and the related perceived uncertainty regarding whether object restrictions 
may benefit from its application,18 there are arguments against object classification 
and its wider application in EU competition law. However, arguing against object 
restrictions would be a mistake considering the aspects of efficient enforcement of 
EU competition rules and the balanced allocation of administrative burdens.  
Many of the current views in competition law treat the issues of Article 101(1) and 
101(3) TFEU, or even the concepts of restriction by object or effect separately, 
without taking a holistic view of the interaction of these individual elements and 
keeping in mind the overall goal of optimal enforcement that realises the goals of 
competition law. 
By focusing on the example of airline alliances, this thesis demonstrates why the 
wider application of object restrictions seems to be correct and how it should interact 
with the application of Article 101(3) TFEU in order to achieve the goal of an 
optimal enforcement regime. Although the examples and explanations in this 
research are sector-specific and related to aviation, the conclusions can be interpreted 
in a more general sense, and are relevant to the general approach of EU competition 
law, thereby providing an answer to the critical voices. 
1.3 Scope and subject matter of the research 
This is a legal thesis based on the analysis of relevant treaties, legislation, case law, 
decisional practice of the EU Commission and related literature with regard to 
competition law and air transport law. The thesis will review the EU competition law 
                                                
17  SB Völcker, ‘Case law: Joined cases C-501, 513, 515 & 519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services 
Unlimited v Commission, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Third Chamber) of 6 October 2009, 
[ECR] I-9291’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 175, 185. 
18  Bailey 2012 (n 8) 598. See also R Whish, ‘How efficient are the EU competition rules at 
analysing efficiencies?’ (lecture at DG Competition, Brussels, 26 November 2012); Jones 2010 
(n 8). 
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approach to airline alliances and use these alliances as examples to explore the issue 
of restriction by object and its interaction with Article 101(3) TFEU. The research 
will concentrate on the dichotomy of Article 101 TFEU, and examine whether 
experience of the aviation industry supports the thesis, and how this fits with the 
more economic approach. However, the thesis does not intend to discuss, in great 
detail, the general literature of Articles 101(1) and 101(3) TFEU, nor the detailed 
specificities of an optimal enforcement regime. The thesis will approach these issues 
utilising the examples of airline alliances, and only consider them to the extent 
necessary. 
When analysing whether an agreement has as its object the restriction of 
competition, it is necessary to examine both its precise purpose and the legal and 
economic context in which it is to be applied. These latter aspects are also relevant 
for the assessment under Article 101(3) TFEU. Therefore the analysis will include an 
assessment of strategic alliances in general both from an economic and competition 
law point of view. The section on economic aspects aims to explain the definition of 
strategic alliance, the ideas behind alliance formation and the types of alliances. This 
section serves only to understand the topic for the purposes of applying competition 
law and is not intended to provide any economic analysis. In addition, the 
descriptions in Chapter 4 on the legal and economic background of air transport and 
in Chapter 5 on strategic alliances in the aviation industry again are intended only to 
familiarise the reader with the purpose and legal and economic context of these 
cooperations. It is necessary to include economic analyses, and a review of the 
economic literature in the thesis as these are highly relevant for understanding the 
particular reasons behind the legal conclusions. Nevertheless this does not change 
the legal nature of the thesis. 
Finally, this thesis also discusses the experience of other jurisdictions, in particular 
the US, Australia and certain individual EU Member States. However, the main 
focus of the thesis is EU competition law and concepts specific to EU competition 
rules. Any reference to the case law of other jurisdictions either illustrates issues that 
have not been yet examined in EU competition law or highlights similarities. In 
Chapter 6, the more detailed discussion of the US ‘per se’ and ‘rule of reason’ 
approaches proves important to provide useful insights for the purposes of analysing 
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the object and effect dichotomy in EU competition law.  
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis seeks to answer the question of whether, in the light of the more 
economic approach, it is correct to classify airline alliances as restrictions of 
competition by object under Article 101(1) TFEU. In providing an answer to this 
question, the thesis follows the structure below. 
This thesis comprises seven chapters. This first chapter is intended as a simple 
introduction to present the thesis question, explain its relevance and define the scope 
of the thesis according to the above-mentioned conditions. 
Chapters 2 to 5 describe both from an economic and legal point of view all those 
aspects of strategic alliances, air transport and strategic airline alliances that are 
essential for a thorough understanding of their characteristics when analysed under 
Article 101(1) and 101(3) TFEU. These chapters are necessary for the discussion in 
Chapter 6 which brings together all the relevant factors that need to be considered 
when concluding the competition law assessment of airline alliances. 
Chapter 2 introduces airline alliances as a form of cooperation by describing the 
history and current status of the largest airline alliances: Star, oneworld and 
SkyTeam. The aim of the chapter is to familiarise the reader with the real world 
phenomenon that is discussed throughout the thesis and to demonstrate the 
significance of airline alliances. 
Chapter 3 presents a general overview of strategic alliances from an economic and 
legal point of view. It will discuss what is meant by a strategic alliance, why 
companies choose to create such alliances, and the different types of alliances in 
operation. Emphasis will be placed on alliances between competitors, which are the 
most relevant to competition policy analysis. The competition law discussion will 
also briefly address the issue of whether strategic alliances represent something new 
or different for competition law or, alternatively, whether they can be handled by the 
traditional competition law concepts. 
Chapter 4 presents a suitably detailed overview of the most important legal and 
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economic issues of air transportation. This is because understanding strategic airline 
alliances also requires knowledge of the special legal and economic background that 
characterises the airline industry. This chapter discusses the fundamentals of 
international law relating to air transport before considering US deregulation and EU 
liberalisation of aviation and comparing the reasons, processes and effects of each. 
This thesis pays particular attention to the current regulatory regime operating within 
the EU and considers the common external EU aviation policy and its ability to 
achieve liberalisation on a global scale. The final part of the chapter will briefly 
consider the most important economic rules of air transport and explain them at a 
basic level. 
The discussion contained within Chapters 3 and 4 provides the necessary platform 
on which to consider strategic airline alliances. Chapter 5 will answer questions 
regarding the industry background of alliance creation, which airlines choose to 
create alliances and why, and what forms these alliances take. In this part this thesis 
classifies, explains and illustrates - with reference to real-life alliance examples - the 
evolution and motivations behind co-operations and the factors of their success. It 
will also include the current trends facing the airline industry which potentially have 
a serious impact on airline alliances. Low-cost airlines, for example, offer a different 
solution to the challenges of airline economics.  
Chapter 6 is dedicated to the analysis of airline alliances under EU competition law, 
which constitutes the main part of the thesis. Although this part takes the form of 
only one chapter, in terms of the extent of the discussion and the topics covered it is 
much more important. Chapter 6 begins with an overview of the issues of market 
definition that have a fundamental effect on both the assessment of competitive harm 
under Article 101(1) TFEU and the evaluation of potential efficiency benefits under 
Article 101(3) TFEU (section 6.1). This section also discusses the experience of both 
the antitrust and merger cases in the aviation industry. 
Section 6.2 discusses Article 101 TFEU. It first considers the individual conditions 
of Article 101(1) TFEU, such as agreement between undertakings and appreciability 
(sections 6.2.1-6.2.2). It then proceeds to examine restrictions of competition 
(section 6.2.3) by first describing the meaning and case law of restriction of 
competition followed by an overview of the relevant literature. The more economic 
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approach and its meaning for EU competition law is then introduced (section 
6.2.3.1). 
The part on administrability of efficient antitrust enforcement systems explains how 
the more economic approach is intended to contribute to the overall efficiency of 
competition law regimes and the goal of minimising error costs at affordable expense 
(section 6.2.3.2). It sets out the administrative errors that can arise from the 
inefficient design and application of competition rules, followed by a short overview 
of an ideal system. This part also presents the solutions offered by US antitrust law 
in achieving the aim of minimising administrative errors with the development of the 
per se versus rule of reason distinction. Although the US experience has limited 
direct relevance for the application of EU competition rules, it provides an excellent 
illustration of the most important factors and their interaction.  
The part on EU aspects analyses the structure and application of Article 101 TFEU 
in the light of general ideas on administrability and the rich US experience. This 
helps to identify and emphasise the peculiarities of Article 101 TFEU. It is suggested 
that the bifurcated nature of Article 101 TFEU and the dichotomy of object and 
effect restrictions satisfies the needs of an efficient and sufficiently flexible system 
saving administrative resources if appropriate. 
Section 6.2.4 ‘Legal and economic context of airline alliances’ uses the findings of 
Chapters 3 to 5 to set the framework for analysing airline alliances. It deals 
separately with the negative effects or possible theories of harm regarding airline 
alliances, explaining hub dominance, horizontal, vertical effects and multimarket 
contact issues. It also details the benefits of airline alliances, in particular the 
relevant supply-side and demand-side benefits. 
Section 6.2.5 explains why Article 101 TFEU is relevant for the assessment of 
airline alliances and why their examination should not take the form of a ‘quasi’ 
merger analysis within the framework of Article 101 TFEU. Section 6.2.6 concludes 
the whole analysis of Article 101(1) TFEU by emphasising that airline alliances 
should be classified as object restrictions which supports the more economic 
approach and contributes to minimising error costs at reasonable expense. However, 
this solution should be accompanied by a more realistic application of Article 101(3) 
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TFEU that takes into account the economic and legal context of the agreement and 
the sector in question. These arguments are considered in section 6.2.7 of the thesis. 
Chapter 7 draws conclusions from the thesis and provides a summary of the findings 
on the topic area. 
2 History and current state of global airline alliances 
Air Florida and British Island formed the first international alliance in 1986; 
although, airline cooperation on a regional basis had already existed before this 
time.1 The actual pioneer of today’s global alliances was the cooperation between 
Delta, Swissair and Singapore Airlines from the late 1980s. Since then, airline 
alliances have continued to develop to the present day, and they shall continue to 
evolve in the future. This chapter briefly describes the three global airline alliances 
in existence today: Star Alliance, oneworld and SkyTeam. 
This thesis examines whether, in the light of the more economic approach, it is 
correct to classify airline alliances as restrictions by object and interpret this concept 
in a wider sense under Article 101(1) TFEU. By exploring the example of airline 
alliances and in particular metal-neutral alliances, this thesis argues that the wider 
interpretation of object restrictions is correct and, therefore does not conflict with the 
more economic approach of EU competition law. In order to better understand the 
topic and to familiarise the reader with the examples of the discussion in this thesis 
of Article 101 TFEU, this chapter introduces the three global strategic airline 
alliances. 
2.1 Star Alliance 
In 1997, Air Canada, Lufthansa, SAS, Thai Airways and United Airlines established 
Star Alliance, the first global airline alliance. Since then, it has grown consistently 
into what is currently the largest airline alliance. In the year of Star’s foundation, 
Brazil's Varig also joined,2 followed by Ansett Australia,3 Air New Zealand and All 
Nippon Airways in 1999. The expansion continued in 2000 by luring the Austrian 
Airlines and Singapore Airlines from their partnership with Swissair. Star Alliance 
also pursued further strategic moves with Air Canada’s acquisition of Canadian 
Airlines (a founding member of oneworld) and in securing the second-largest slot 
holding at Heathrow Airport through British Midland’s (bmi) membership. 
                                                
1 TH Oum, J-H Park and A Zhang, Globalization and strategic alliances: the case of the airline 
industry (Pergamon 2000) 17. 
2 Ceased to be a member in 2007 due to its financial difficulties. 
3 Went bankrupt in 2002. 
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Mexicana entered the alliance in July 2000, only to leave a mere 4 years later. 
In 2003, Star Alliance further strengthened its Asian and East Central European 
network with the addition of Asiana from Korea and Polish national flag carrier 
LOT. SAS’ Spanish subsidiary, Spanair, became a member in 2003 and went 
bankrupt in early 2012, while US Airways joined in 2004. In the same year, Blue1, 
Adria Airways and Croatia Airlines joined the alliance as the first regional members. 
TAP of Portugal, added further coverage to the South American network of Star 
Alliance in 2005, while South African Airways has had the same effect in Africa 
since 2006. Following the takeover of Swiss by Lufthansa,4 it too became a member 
of the Star Alliance in 2006. Access to the dynamic growth market of China was 
secured with the acquired membership of Air China and Shanghai Airlines at the end 
of 2007.5 Turkish Airlines and Egyptair joined in 2008. One year later, the former 
SkyTeam member, Continental Airlines, became the 25th member of Star Alliance, 
followed by Lufthansa subsidiary Brussels Airlines. In 2010, Brazilian airline TAM 
joined the alliance to make up for the earlier loss of Varig, while Aegean Airlines 
provided a leading role in Greece. 
Recently added members of the alliance include Shenzhen Airlines, Ethiopian 
Airlines and airlines from Central and South America: AviancaTACA and Copa 
Airlines from 2012. EVA Air of Taiwan will join Star Alliance later in 2013. 
Prospective mergers in the aviation industry can further shape membership in Star 
Alliance. Lufthansa sold bmi to IAG at the end of 2011,6 while the merger of 
oneworld member LAN and Star Alliance member TAM will also result in changes, 
most likely in the form of TAM leaving Star Alliance and the new LATAM joining 
oneworld.7 
Some rather profound statistics can be attributed to the Star Alliance: it serves 1 329 
airports in 194 countries with a fleet of 4 570 aircraft, carrying 670.58 million 
                                                
4 See Lufthansa/Swiss (Case COMP/M.3770) [2005] OJ C204/3. 
5 Shanghai Airlines left the Star Alliance in 2010 following its merger with SkyTeam's China 
Southern Airlines. 
6  See IAG/bmi (Case COMP/M.6447) [2012] OJ C161/2. 
7  As of 31 December 2012, TAM is still a Star Alliance member. However choices of the new 
LATAM are limited most likely to oneworld, due to the decision of the Chilean competition 
tribunal (Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, TDLC) prescribing that they cannot be 
in the same alliance as AviancaTACA. See case NC-388-11, Decision Nº 37/2011 of the TDLC. 
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passengers annually, achieving USD 181.83 billion in revenue.8 The number of daily 
departures is 21 900 while the member airlines provide jobs to 448 926 employees.9 
Star alliance has a global market share of 24.8% based on global revenue passenger 
kilometre (RPK); thereby surpassing all rivals.10  
The basis of Star Alliance is formed by bi- or multi-lateral agreements between 
member airlines, some of which were concluded long before the formal 
establishment of Star Alliance itself. In 2008, Lufthansa, United, Air Canada and 
Continental, which had just left SkyTeam, decided to form a revenue-sharing joint 
venture for transatlantic services (A++ Agreement). There are also additional 
agreements between other members. The common feature of all cooperations is the 
aim of establishing a long-term strategic relationship between the parties, 
coordinating their commercial, marketing and operational activities while 
maintaining their distinct corporate identities. Coordination concerns, to varying 
intensities, the following areas: route and schedule planning; establishing and 
managing joint marketing, sales, advertising and distribution networks; travel agent 
commissions; co-branding; code-sharing; pricing, and revenue management; 
frequent flyer programmes; revenue-sharing; information systems; sharing airport 
facilities and services. The deepest form of cooperation is the core member's A++ 
Agreement, which represents a ‘metal-neutral’ joint venture that coordinates all 
important competition parameters between the parties. The cooperation aligns all the 
parties’ incentives with the aim of creating a joint route network where sales are 
made without any preference to any of the parties’ services. Parties should treat the 
services within the network as their own and sell seats accordingly. 
Besides these agreements, mergers and takeovers have further cemented the links 
between the Star Alliance members over recent years. Lufthansa acquired controlling 
stakes in Swiss, Austrian, and Brussels Airlines, while United merged with 
Continental.11 Core members of the Star Alliance enjoy antitrust immunity in the US 
                                                
8  <http://www.staralliance.com/en/about/member_airlines/> accessed 31 December 2012, data as 
of November 2012. 
9 ibid. 
10 Based on RPKs for 2011, see Airline Business (September 2012) 28. 
11 See Lufthansa/SN Airholding (Case COMP/M.5335) [2009] OJ C295/11; Lufthansa/bmi (Case 
COMP/M.5403) [2009] OJ C158/1; LufthansaAustrian Airlines (Case COMP/M.5440) [2010] 
OJ C16/11; United Air Lines/Continental Airlines (Case COMP/M.5889) [2010] OJ C225/1. 
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granted by the Department of Transportation (DOT)12 and, when it was available, 
received individual exemptions in the EU for a certain period of time for their 
respective agreements,13 enabling greater freedom in their co-operation possibilities. 
The Commission does, however, continue to investigate the latest A++ Agreement 
between United/Continental, Air Canada and Lufthansa.14 
Star Alliance claims to deliver upon a number of benefits, including:15 more flights 
to more places with better connections. A wider choice of flights with coordinated 
schedules makes travel smoother, more convenient and efficient. A participant in any 
member carrier’s frequent flyer programme (FFP) can accumulate and redeem air 
miles on any other member airline’s network. Star Alliance locates all services under 
one roof in dedicated terminal facilities at airports across the world. Star Alliance 
also offers new products enabling passengers to combine and plan routes through 
different networks within one product. 
                                                
12 eg United/Lufthansa (Docket OST-1996-1116), Order 96-5-27; United/Lufthansa/SAS (Docket 
OST-1996-1411), Order 96-11-1; United/Air Canada (Docket OST-1996-1434), Order 97-9-21; 
United/Air New Zealand (Docket OST-1999-6680), Order 2001-4-2; United/Austrian/Lufthansa/ 
SAS (Docket OST-2000-7828), Order 2001-1-19; United/bmi/Austrian/Lufthansa/SAS (Docket 
OST-2001-10575 and 11029), Order 2007-9-12; United/Asiana (Docket OST-2003-14202), 
Order 2003-5-18; United/Lufthansa/SAS/Austrian /bmi/LOT/Swiss/TAP/Air Canada (Docket 
OST-2005-22922), Order 2007-2-16; United/Brussels Airlines/Lufthansa/Air Canada/SAS/ 
Austrian/bmi/LOT/Swiss/TAP (Docket OST 2008-0234), Order 2009-7-10; United/ANA (Docket 
OST-2010-0059), Order 2010-11-10; See also the Australian ACCC’s authorisation A91036, 
A91037, A91038, A91039, A91040 of 18 July 2007 on Singapore Airlines’ application on 
behalf of Star Alliance; ACCC authorisation A30211, A30212, A30213 of 4 September 2003 on 
Air New Zealand’s application on behalf of Star Alliance; or ACCC authorisation A91300, 
A91301, A91302, A91303, A91304, A91305 & A91306 of 27 June 2012 on Air New Zealand’s 
application on behalf of Star Alliance. 
13 LH/SAS (Case COMP IV/35.545) Commission Decision 96/180/EC [1996] OJ L54/28; AuA/LH 
(Case COMP/37.730) Commission Decision 2002/746/EC [2002] OJ L242/25; see also 
LH/SAS/UA (Cases COMP/D-2/36.201, 36.076, 36.078) Commission notice concerning the 
alliance between Lufthansa, SAS and United Airlines [2002] OJ C181/2, see also C264/3; case 
CP/1535-01 of the Office of Fair Trading (UK) Notice of consultation issued pursuant to Rule 
8(1)(a) of Schedule 1 of the EC Competition Law (Articles 84 and 85) Enforcement Regulations 
2001 – 9 August 2002, Notification by British Midland and United Airlines of their Alliance 
Expansion Agreement. 
14  See AC/CO/LH/UA (Case COMP/39.595), Antitrust: Commission opens formal proceedings 
against certain members of Star and oneworld airline alliances MEMO/09/168 20/04/2009; see 
also pending case CT-2011-004 The Commissioner of Competition v Air Canada, United 
Continental Holdings Inc, United Airlines Inc, and Continental Airlines Inc in Canada on the 
United/Air Canada relation of Star Alliance. 
15 Star Alliance – Strategic alliances in aviation (April 2009) – PowerPoint presentations of the 
Star Alliance, available at:  
<http://www.staralliance.com/assets/doc/en/press/media-library/pdf/General_Presentation 
_APR09.pdf> accessed 31 December 2012. 
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2.2 oneworld 
oneworld was the second global alliance to come into existence and was officially 
established on 1 February 1999 by American Airlines, British Airways, Cathay 
Pacific, Canadian Airlines and Qantas. Finnair and Iberia joined oneworld later in 
1999, while LAN and Aer Lingus became member airlines in 2000. The 
aforementioned merger of Air Canada and Canadian Airlines meant the latter’s 
departure from the alliance in 2000, while Aer Lingus withdrew in 2007 after 
revising its corporate strategy. oneworld’s network was further extended when 
American Airlines absorbed the bankrupt TWA in 2001. In April 2007, Japan 
Airlines, Malév Hungarian Airlines16 and Royal Jordanian began to offer oneworld 
services as full members of the alliance. Mexicana and Russian carrier S7 were 
additions in 2009 and 2010 respectively, while Germany’s low fares airline Air 
Berlin finalised their membership in 2012. Malaysia Airlines started flying as part of 
the alliance from late-2012. In October 2012, Qatar Airways was announced as the 
newest airline to join oneworld. India’s Kingfisher is also a potential future member 
but its implementation has been put on hold to give it time to strengthen its financial 
position, if possible at all. 
Compared to the Star Alliance, oneworld serves only 810 destinations in 149 
countries by operating 2 381 aircraft. The number of daily departures reaches 8 627 
while the number of passengers travelling on member airlines is 324.43 million, 
producing an annual revenue of USD 105.51 billion.17 The number of member 
airlines’ employees is 277 500. The global market share of oneworld represents only 
15.1%, based on global RPK.18 
Similar to Star Alliance, oneworld also builds on a network of bi-, tri- or multi-
lateral agreements between its members. In 2010, the two European core members of 
oneworld, British Airways and Iberia merged and continue to operate as separate 
brands within the IAG holding group.19 
American Airlines and British Airways did not manage to get antitrust immunity for 
                                                
16  In February 2012, Malév went bankrupt. 
17  <http://www.oneworld.com/news-information/oneworld-fact-sheets/oneworld-at-a-glance/>  
accessed 31 December 2012, data as of 3 April 2012 (financial data as of 7 July 2012).  
18 Based on RPKs for 2011, see Airline Business (September 2012) 28. 
19 Iberia/British Airways (Case COMP/M.5747) [2010] OJ C241/1. 
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their cooperation until 2010, despite making their first application in 1997,20 
followed by a second in 2001.21 In 2008, American Airlines, British Airways and 
Iberia decided to form a transatlantic metal-neutral revenue-sharing joint venture 
which finally led to the authorisation by the DOT in 2010 and the commitment 
decision of the European Commission.22 In addition, several bilateral relationships 
within the alliance were immunised in the US, authorised in Australia or were earlier 
exempted in Europe.23 
The agreements themselves are similar in nature: their aim is to coordinate and 
ultimately integrate commercial and marketing strategies, as well as distribution 
channels. Elements of these agreements include code-sharing, coordination on 
pricing, planning, yield management, scheduling, FFPs, ground handling, etc. The 
deepest form of cooperation, as is the case with Star Alliance, is the cooperation of 
core members on transatlantic routes, which represent a metal-neutral joint venture 
that coordinates all important competition parameters between the parties. Similarly, 
the cooperation aligns all the parties’ incentives with aim of creating a joint route 
network where sales are made without any preference to any of the parties’ services. 
Parties should treat the services within the network as their own and sell seats 
accordingly. 
oneworld displays the same advantages as Star Alliance: namely, global coverage, 
the potential to earn and redeem miles for/from the FFPs on other airlines’ flights, 
smoother transfer opportunities and an increased availability of airport lounges. Not 
                                                
20 American/British Airways I (Docket OST-1997-2058), Order 99-7-22. 
21 American/British Airways II (Docket OST-2001-10387 and 11029), Order 2002-4-4. 
22 American/British Airways/Iberia/Finnair/Royal Jordanian (Docket OST-2008-0252), Order 
2010-7-8; BA/AA/IB (Case COMP/39.596) [2010] OJ C278/14. 
23 American/LAN (Docket OST-1997-3285), Order 99-9-9; American/Finnair (Docket OST-2002-
12063), Order 2002-7-30; American/LAN Peru/LAN Airlines (Docket OST-2004-19964), Order 
2005-10-8; American/Japan Airlines (Docket OST-2010-0034 consolidated in OST-2010-0059), 
Order 2010-11-10; American/Qantas (Docket OST 2011-0111), Order 2011-11-12 approving 
the agreement but not granting antitrust immunity; 
ACCC authorisation A30202 of 10 May 2000 on Qantas’ and British Airways’ application; 
ACCC authorisation A30226 and A30227 of 8 February 2005 on Qantas’ and British Airways’ 
application; ACCC authorisation A91195 and A91196 of 31 March 2010 on Qantas’ and British 
Airways’ application; ACCC authorisation A91265 and A91266 of 29 September 2011 on 
Qantas’ and British Airways’ application;  
British Airways/Iberia/GB Airways (Case COMP/D2/38.479) [2003], see press release 
IP/03/1703 of 10/12/2003: Commission approves alliance between BA and Iberia; the 
Commission also closed by comfort letter its investigations into agreements involving Aer 
Lingus and British Airways, Finnair and American Airlines. See XXXIIIrd Report on 
Competition Policy (2003) (European Commission 2004) 42, Brussels, 04/06/2004 SEC (2004) 
658 final. 
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surprisingly, oneworld also developed similar fare products, like the round-the-world 
fares allowing multi-sector flights on any oneworld carrier in a specific continent. 
2.3 SkyTeam 
SkyTeam was the latest of the three alliances to launch. Founding members Air 
France, Delta, Korean Air and Aeromexico revealed their plans concerning 
SkyTeam in mid-1999, but it was not until 2000 that the parties formally launched 
the alliance.24 The following year, CSA Czech Airlines entered the alliance to fill the 
network gap existing in Central and Eastern Europe, while the addition of Alitalia 
brought 869 additional daily flights to 21 new destinations in six additional 
countries. From the beginning, it was apparent that SkyTeam would need further 
strong partners from the main revenue generating geographic regions of world 
aviation (ie North America, Europe and Asia).  
In 2003, Air France initiated merger talks with KLM and received approval of the 
transaction in early 2004.25 Subsequently, the KLM/Northwest-led Wings alliance 
joined SkyTeam in September 2004. The alliance between KLM and Northwest was 
the oldest and the most closely integrated airline alliance of its time. The relationship 
between the two airlines dates back to 1989, while the cooperation as an alliance 
began in 1993 when they received antitrust immunity.26 Their joint venture on the 
North Atlantic routes served as a template for all subsequent alliances. Continental 
and Kenya Airways also chose to join SkyTeam due to their close ties with the 
earlier KLM/Northwest cooperation. As previously mentioned, Continental left 
SkyTeam in 2008. 
In 2006, Russia’s Aeroflot became a full member of SkyTeam, providing unrivalled 
coverage within the earlier CIS states, while in 2007 China Southern entered as 
SkyTeam’s first member from the Chinese market. In the same year, Air Europe of 
Spain, attained membership. In 2008, two SkyTeam members, Delta and Northwest 
                                                
24 Air France and Delta already had a loose agreement on code-sharing, FFPs, aligning of networks 
and ground handling – Commission notice concerning the alliance agreements between Air 
France and Continental (Case IV/36.314) and Air France and Delta Air Lines (Case IV/36.315) 
[1998] OJ C325/2. 
25 Air France/KLM (Case COMP/M.3280) [2004] OJ C60/5. 
26 Northwest Airlines/KLM (Docket 46371), Order 93-1-11. 
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merged to create the largest commercial airline in the world.27 Over recent years, 
SkyTeam has significantly increased its membership, with the addition of Romanian 
airline TAROM and Vietnam Airlines in 2010, followed by China Eastern, Shanghai 
Airlines and China Airlines in 2011 and, furthermore, Aerolinas Argentinas, Middle 
East Airlines from Lebanon, Saudi Arabian and Garuda Indonesia in 2012. 
SkyTeam serves 1 000 destinations in 187 countries with 4 137 aircraft, carrying 552 
million passengers annually.28 The number of daily departures has increased to 15 
465 and the number of employees now equates to 436 007.29 Its global market share 
amounts to 19.6% based on global RPK.30 
The bilateral or multilateral agreements between members include coordination on 
pricing, revenue management, seat inventory, network management and scheduling, 
marketing, sales and advertising, code-sharing, integration of FFPs, joint 
procurement, ground handling, airport facilities, ticketing, information technologies 
and distribution programs. In 2008 Delta, Air France/KLM and Alitalia created 
SkyTeam’s metal-neutral profit-sharing transatlantic joint venture, thereby 
integrating all their activities on the Europe/North America markets and aligning the 
incentives of its members. This cooperation is the deepest form of integration 
between airlines, just as in the case of the similar oneworld and Star Alliance joint 
ventures. A further similarity to Star and oneworld is that several relationships 
within the SkyTeam alliance have been the subject of regulatory review on both 
sides of the Atlantic.31 
SkyTeam accentuates in its publication on benefits the possibility of: earning and 
                                                
27 Delta Air Lines/Northwest Airlines (Case COMP/M.5181) [2008] OJ C281/3. 
28  <http://www.skyteam.com/en/About-us/Press/Facts-and-Figures/> accessed 31 December 2012, 
data as of 21 November 2012. 
29 ibid. 
30 Based on RPKs for 2011, see Airline Business (September 2012), 28. 
31 Delta/Air France/Alitalia/Czech Airlines (Docket OST-2001-10429), Order 2007-5-16; 
Delta/Korean Air Lines/Air France/Alitalia/Czech Airlines (Docket OST-2002-11842), Order 
2002-6-18; Delta/Northwest/Air France/KLM/Alitalia/Czech Airlines (Docket OST-2004-
19214), Order 2006-2-1; Delta/Northwest/Air France/KLM/Alitalia/Czech Airlines (Docket 
OST-2007-28644), Order 2008-5-22; 
Air France/Alitalia (Case COMP/38.284/D2) Commission Decision 2004/841/EC [2004] OJ 
L362/17; Air France, Aeromexico, Czech Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Korean Air (SkyTeam) (Case 
COMP/37.984) closed on 23 January 2012; AF-KL/DL/AZ (case COMP/39.964) initiated on 23 
January 2012; see also press release IP/12/79 of 27/01/2012 Antitrust: Commission opens a 
probe into transatlantic joint venture between Air France-KLM, Alitalia and Delta and closes 
proceedings against eight members of SkyTeam airline alliance. 
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redeeming miles across the whole SkyTeam network; increasing the number of 
available airport lounges; offering a new and wider range of fare options; enhancing 
flight connections; and providing travel information from common ticket offices.  
2.4 Summary 
This chapter briefly described the three global airline alliances: Star Alliance, 
oneworld and SkyTeam. In numbers the three groupings are as follows: 
 
 Star Alliance oneworld SkyTeam 
Destinations/countries 
served 
1 329/194 810/149 1 000/187 
Fleet 4 570 2 381 4 137 
Annual passengers (m) 670.58 324.43 552 
Daily departures 21 900 8 627 15 465 
Employees 448 926 277 500 436 007 
Global RPK share (%) 24.8 15.1 19.6 
 
Table 2.1 Summary table of alliances 
 
Global airline alliances are generally based on a network of bilateral or multilateral 
agreements between the member airlines, covering most of their activities. This 
includes coordination of pricing, revenue management, seat inventory, network 
management and scheduling, marketing, sales and advertising, code-sharing, 
integration of FFPs, joint procurement, ground handling, airport facilities, ticketing, 
information technologies and distribution programs. All three global airline alliances 
created either revenue or profit-sharing metal-neutral joint ventures between core 
members concerning their transatlantic routes. The latter practice has, recently, also 
extended to transpacific markets,32 EU-Japan markets33 and the transborder US-
Canada markets.34 
                                                
32  See United/ANA and American/JAL cooperations. 
33  See British Airways’ planned cooperation with JAL. Press release of February 8, 2012 IAG 
01/2012, available at: 
 <http://www.iairgroup.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=240949&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1658196&highlight=> accessed 31 December 2012. 
34  See case CT-2011-004 United/Air Canada before the Canadian Competition Tribunal. 
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Alliances profess to facilitating numerous benefits, including: better flight 
connections, a greater possibility for earning and redeeming miles on all members 
FFPs, more destinations, more flights, new and innovative fare products enabling 
global travel, and better airport facilities. 
The abovementioned 3 global alliances provide the examples for the analysis of 
Article 101 TFEU. Understanding their history, background and development, which 
has been the purpose of this chapter, assists in substantiating the discussion which 
follows. 
3 Strategic alliances in general 
In Chapter 2, this thesis briefly described the history and development of the three 
global airline alliances, ie the most important strategic alliances in the airline 
industry. The full understanding of airline alliances first requires a general overview 
of strategic alliances. Consequently, the main purpose of this chapter is to familiarise 
the reader with the economic theory and the competition law aspects of strategic 
alliances. In the first part of the chapter, the concept of strategic alliances in 
economic literature, the motives and objectives behind them is discussed and a 
commonly accepted classification of what a strategic alliance entails is set out. The 
second part presents some of the basic issues raised under EU competition law. 
This thesis asks whether, in light of the more economic approach, airline alliances 
can be classified as object restrictions by interpreting this concept in a wider sense 
under Article 101(1) TFEU. By a detailed analysis of airline alliances, this thesis 
argues for the wider interpretation of restriction by object and do not identify any 
contradiction with the more economic approach of EU competition law. This chapter 
will present the economic and legal context of strategic alliances in general. This 
reveals the general purpose of alliance agreements and explains whether the 
economic environment really induces undertakings to cooperate with their 
competitors. The conclusions of this chapter are relevant both for the analysis under 
Article 101(1) TFEU and, more importantly, for the scrutiny of efficiency claims 
under Article 101(3) TFEU. The generally beneficial goals pursued by alliances, and 
the non-hostile, neutral legal approach of EU competition law explains why even an 
object classification should not prejudice the assessment of strategic alliances. These 
goals and approach also explain why arguments for efficiencies should be openly 
discussed under Article 101(3) TFEU. The chapter also explains why strategic 
alliances, as defined in this thesis, are primarily a concern for Article 101 TFEU 
rather than for the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR).1 
                                                
1  Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings [2004] OJ L24/1 (EUMR). 
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3.1 Strategic alliances: an economic perspective 
3.1.1. Concept of strategic alliances 
There is no uniform definition of a strategic alliance. Some people even say that 
strategic alliance is nothing more than a fashionable word invented by consulting 
companies.2 Strategic alliance is a specific kind of inter-firm relationship that can 
take a variety of forms, ranging from an arm’s length contract to a joint venture.3 
The concept of strategic alliances has gone through changes over the years. In the 
mid-1980s, researchers restricted the concept to joint ventures with legal entity and 
independence from the partner companies.4 Later, the concept was extended to 
encompass lasting partnerships between competitors, without any reference to the 
legal form chosen. In today’s widely accepted view, a strategic alliance is a lasting 
cooperation between competitors or undertakings operating on different markets, and 
based on mutual benefits.5 As has been proposed by various researchers,6 a strategic 
alliance can be said to have the following distinguishing characteristics: 
• Two or more entities unite and agree to pursue an important set of goals, 
while remaining independent subsequent to the formation of the alliance; 
• The partners share both the benefits of the alliance and control over the 
performance of assigned tasks during the lifetime of it; none of the partners 
have sole control over the other, although they do influence each other; 
• The partners contribute, on a continuing basis, towards key strategic areas; 
the relationship is not transactional and they each address the challenges of 
                                                
2  AR Fiebig, Strategische Allianzen und ihre Herausforderungen an das Wettbewerbsrecht der 
Europäischen Union (Dissertation) (Peter Lang Verlag 1996) 6. 
3  S Wahyuni, Strategic alliance development: a study on alliances between competing firms 
(Dissertation) (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 2003) (Wahyuni 2003) 2.  
4  E Tari, Stratégiai szövetségek az üzleti világban  (Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó 1998) (Tari 
1998) 19. 
5  ibid 19-20. 
6  Wahyuni 2003 (n 3) 19-20; and RJ Mockler, Multinational Strategic Alliances (John Wiley & 
Sons Ltd 1999) (Mockler 1999) 2; MY Yoshino and U Srinivasa Rangan, Strategic alliances: an 
entrepreneurial approach to globalization (Harvard Business School Press 1995) (Yoshino 
1995); M Darby, Alliance Brand: fulfilling the promise of partnering (John Wiley & Sons Ltd 
2006) 15-16; WW Suen, Non-cooperation: the dark side of strategic alliances (Palgrave 
McMillan 2005) 3. 
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incomplete contracts, ie agreements which cannot be written to specify all 
future scenarios. 
Based on the above, the following distinctive features to define a strategic alliance 
are adopted:7 
• A cooperation for mutual benefit, which 
• is intended to function for a longer period in the pursuance of strategic aims, 
and where 
• partner companies remain independent. 
• Through the contribution of assets or knowledge to the alliance, 
• some degree of activity integration is achieved. 
Using these characteristics, the interpretation of the concept of strategic alliances in 
this thesis excludes: (i) mergers, since they represent full control over the acquired 
company; and (ii) licensing, franchising agreements8 and traditional sales contracts, 
due to their ‘complete contract’ nature. 
3.1.2 Motives and objectives of strategic alliances 
To understand the popularity of strategic alliances, it is essential to speak about the 
economic environment and its changes over the last few decades. Markets have 
become larger and more open as a result of the globalisation. This proved to be both 
an opportunity and a threat to undertakings that had only previously operated at a 
national level. Competing in a global economy requires a larger scale and scope of 
operations. Decreasing communication and transport costs cause a convergence of 
consumer needs. Diseconomies of large firms drive companies to outsource 
businesses which are not related to the core business of the firm and specialise 
themselves in their core business. Competition is more dynamic owing to rapid 
technological development. Shorter product life cycles and increased R&D costs 
                                                
7  Tari 1998 (n 5). 
8  Except when there is continuing contribution and control among two or more independent firms. 
Mockler 1999 (n 6) 5. 
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force companies to engage in joint R&D and to share scarce resources.9 In parallel, 
the complexity of both R&D and production technologies increases, to the extent 
that companies are often unable to cope on their own. Finally, many of the (new) 
markets are characterised by network effects. In these markets, competition involves 
the attaining the critical mass before your rivals do the same. 
Companies need to react quickly in this unpredictable market environment. They can 
develop organically (internal growth), merge with another undertaking (external 
growth) or cooperate. The latter can take the form of a strategic alliance with the 
following motives and goals:10 
1. Technology, know-how: through a strategic alliance, undertakings can 
access technology, knowledge of production processes, knowledge of 
local culture and markets, and exchange complementary technologies. 
2. Financial asset: strategic alliances enable risk sharing, economies of 
scale, faster payback on investment, sharing R&D costs, minimising 
capital investment, as well as the availability of the partners’ financial 
resources. 
3. Competition: strategic alliances can help to compete against common 
competitors, reduce competition, influence structural evolution of the 
industry, and pre-empt competitors. 
4. Market access: they enables members to maintain market position, 
expand internationally, enter markets faster, gain presence in new 
markets, and overcome foreign government policy and trade barriers. 
5. Access to inputs, outputs and management experience: they provide 
access to materials, labour, licenses, distribution channels, brands, 
international experience and managerial expertise. 
6. Complementary partner resource contribution: strategic alliances can 
combine complementary resources, create product diversity, and integrate 
company operations. 
                                                
9  Wahyuni 2003 (n 3) 10. 
10  ibid 12. 
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There are several theories that provide useful insights into strategic alliance 
formation as a co-operative strategy. These are: the economics theory, game theory, 
strategic management theory and organization theory.11 
Economics theory provides four perspectives to the understanding of strategic 
alliances; these are: market power, transaction cost, agency, and increasing returns 
theory. 
Market power theory: strategic alliances can be used to gain market power, 
thereby maintaining or enhancing competitiveness and modifying market 
position.12 Literature makes a distinction between offensive and defensive 
coalitions according to the partner’s intention in forming an alliance.13 
Transaction cost theory: Transaction cost (search, information, negotiation, 
implementation and enforcement costs) can determine the choice between the 
market and the firm (or, in other words, hierarchy), ie whether an undertaking 
buys something or produces itself.14 However, between the extremes of market 
and firm there are ‘hybrid’ contracts or forms, which extend beyond traditional 
market contracts without reaching the other extreme, the hierarchy of firms.15 
Strategic alliances represent transitional cooperation forms, with specific 
characteristics, between the market and firm.16 Parties to the alliance agree to 
handle certain transactions between each other, thereby omitting the market. 
However, they abstain from integrating their whole activity into one 
centralised, hierarchical organisation.17 
Agency theory: this theory is concerned with the ability of principals to ensure 
                                                
11  ibid 17-38.  
12  Tari 1998 (n 5) 26; J Child and D Faulkner, Strategies of cooperation: managing alliances, 
networks, and joint ventures (OUP 1998) (Child and Faulkner 1998) 17. 
13  See SH Hymer, ‘The internationalization of capital’ (1972) 6 The Journal of Economic Issues 
91. 
14  RJ Van den Bergh and PD Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics (2nd edn 
Sweet & Maxwell 2006) (Van den Bergh and Camesasca 2006) 94. See in particular RH Coase, 
‘The nature of the firm’ (1937) 4 Economica 386. See also OE Williamson, Markets and 
hierarchies: analysis and antitrust implications (Free Press 1975). 
15  See OE Williamson, The economic institutions of capitalism: firms, markets, relational 
contracting (Free Press 1985). 
16  Tari 1998 (n 5) 30. 
17  ibid. 
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that their agents are fulfilling their objectives.18 The agency theory can be 
applied in the case of alliances to the possible self-seeking opportunistic 
behaviour of partners at the expense of the other. 
Increasing returns theory: increasing returns theory leads companies to 
develop dense technological networks and to form alliances to achieve critical 
mass, in order to become a major player in the market and to attain ‘first 
mover’ status.19 
Game theory can be concerned with the strategies adopted on the market by the 
market players (undertakings). It allows one to understand when a player shall 
choose to cooperate or defect (compete). Game theory can explain the reasons 
behind alliance formation and the conduct firms pursue in alliances as partners. 
Strategic management theory relates to the motives behind the formation of 
alliances, the selection of partners, and the need to achieve integration between 
partner cultures and systems.20 Cooperative arrangements can be motivated by risk 
reduction, economies of scale, technology exchanges, co-opting or blocking 
competition, government mandated trade or investment barriers, the need of 
international expansion, or vertical integration.21 The strategic management theory 
draws attention to the external and contextual factors which encourage a cooperative 
strategy.22  
Organisation theory’s most relevant perspective on the aspects of cooperative 
strategies is the resource dependence theory. According to this theory, strategic 
alliances reduce the uncertainty of obtaining the required resources, whereas joint 
ventures stabilise the flow of necessary resources, while providing access to the 
partner’s competences, knowledge and resources.23 When resources and 
competences are not readily nor sufficiently available to firms, they are induced to 
                                                
18  ibid 23. 
19  Wahyuni 2003 (n 3) 14. 
20  ibid 32. 
21  See FJ Contractor and P Lorange, ‘Why should firms cooperate? The strategy and economics 
basis for cooperative ventures’ in FJ Contractor and P Lorange (eds), Cooperative strategies in 
international business (Lexington Books 1988).  
22  Child and Faulkner 1998 (n 12) 33. 
23  Tari 1998 (n 5) 27. 
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seek cooperation with other firms.24 
3.1.3 Types of strategic alliances25 
Although, there are also other ways in which strategic alliances can be grouped, in 
the following, the classification of alliance between competitors and non-competitors 
is used.26 
 3.1.3.1 Alliances between non-competitors 
Among non-competitor alliances, the first to warrant mention is that of the vertical 
partnership of suppliers and customers. Strategic alliances in vertical relationships 
developed as a result of the transformation process of mass production to lean 
production. Traditional mass production means that the dominant producer has 
competence over the whole production process and subcontractors are trusted only 
with simple tasks on a strictly short-term contractual basis.27 
According to lean production, first applied by Japanese car manufacturers, the whole 
process of production has to be performed with significantly lower costs, tighter 
production deadlines and without stocks. The first phase in the development of lean 
production was the ‘just in time’ production cooperation.28 This already represents 
something beyond the traditional supplier-producer relationship. The next 
development phase was strategic partnership, based on joint goal setting, mutual risk 
and competence sharing and consensus.29 This partnership is intended for a longer 
period, where suppliers and producers are depending on each other. They share the 
duties and responsibilities and pursue a continuous exchange of information to 
achieve cooperation based on trust. 
The other area of strategic alliances between non-competitors is the cooperation 
                                                
24  Child and Faulkner 1998 (n 12) 34. 
25  See in particular B Garrette and P Dussauge, ‘Pattern of strategic alliances between rival firms’ 
(1995) 4 Group Decision and Negotiation 429 (Gartette and Dussage 1995); B Garrette and P 
Dussauge, ‘Anticipating the evolutions and outcomes of strategic alliances between rival firms’ 
(1995) 27 International Studies of Management & Organization 104; P Dussauge and B 
Garrette, Cooperative strategy: competing successfully through strategic alliances (John Wiley 
& Son Ltd 1999). 
26  See in more detail Tari 1998 (n 5) 44-45. 
27  ibid 82. 
28  ibid 83. 
29  ibid. 
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across different sectors. This could be explained by the connection or convergence of 
different technologies and markets.30 Another reason could be the companies’ effort 
for diversification or focusing on a particular sector. In the latter case, the creation of 
a strategic alliance can allow the firm can to ‘get rid of’ the branches which are not 
focused on.31 Finally, the establishment of a strategic alliance, by combining 
capabilities, can serve the creation of new activities and consumer needs.32 
3.1.3.2 Alliances between competitors 
The existence of an alliance between rival firms is paradoxical: competitors are 
expected to compete with one another instead of joining forces.33 This contradiction 
results in an inherent instability of competitor alliances, which could easily lead to 
their eventual dissolution. Nevertheless, instability largely depends on the starting 
point of the alliance and the background of the undertakings. It would, therefore, be 
a mistake to assert that alliances between competitors are always collusive or, on the 
contrary, that they would necessarily foster rivalry between the allies.34 Garrette and 
Dussauge35 have identified three types of alliance; their typology is as follows: 
 
Figure 3.1 Types of alliances 
                                                
30  ibid 87-89. 
31  ibid 91. 
32  ibid 91-92. 
33  Wahyuni 2003 (n 3) 25. 
34  Garrette and Dussage 1995 (n 25) 448-450. 
35  ibid 434. 
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3.1.3.2.1 Complementary alliances 
In complementary alliances, the parties contribute different assets or skills so as to 
take advantage of each of their separate resource pools. Generally they involve the 
marketing and distribution of an existing product, manufactured by one party that 
intends to penetrate a new market. Another party to the alliance provides its 
distribution network or market experience in an attempt to extend the product 
portfolio of the firm seeking assistance. Within complementary alliances, according 
to the division of particular tasks, we can distinguish, on the one hand, alliances that 
facilitate developing capabilities originally contributed by the other partner and, on 
the other hand, alliances that have no influence on the partners. In the case of the 
former, alliances often end with one partner taking over the joint business alone or 
creating its own capability. As a result of the enhanced learning process, the initial 
complementarity of the parties’ capabilities begins to disappear over time.36 
Undertakings party to complementary alliances are usually of different sizes, at least 
on the market where they cooperate. Complementary alliances generally increase 
competition; in the long run, the self-supporting entry on the partner’s market is 
possible. 
3.1.3.2.2 Shared-supply alliances 
Shared-supply alliances involve undertakings that choose to cooperate in order to 
achieve economies of scale on a particular component or at one stage of a production 
process.37 Shared-supply alliances usually include joint R&D but, also, joint 
purchase or production is possible. When manufacturing common components, it is 
important to note that the partners appear with different products on the final 
product’s market competing against one another. 
Shared-supply alliances are prematurely ended more often than any other type of 
alliance.38 Joint production of components or joint R&D can have negative effects on 
transaction costs, which sometimes outweighs any benefits realised through 
economies of scale. The automobile industry provides examples. For years, Peugeot, 
Renault and Volvo jointly designed and produced engines, which were used in cars 
                                                
36  Wahyuni 2003 (n 3) 30. 
37  ibid. 
38  ibid. 
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competing in different markets.39 Shared-supply alliances do not significantly affect 
the nature of competition on a given market. 
 3.1.3.2.3 Quasi-concentration alliances 
In quasi-concentration alliances, the partners appear with one common end product 
on the market, which is the result of joint R&D, production and marketing. They 
contribute similar assets and knowledge and practically eliminate competition 
between each other. The motives behind quasi-concentration alliances could be 
attributed to the need to generate a high amount of investment or to attain economies 
of scale. There is one important difference between quasi-concentration alliances 
justified by the size of the project and alliances seeking to create economies of scale. 
In the latter case, the partners in theory have all the capabilities to rely on their own 
resources and produce the product independently; while, in the other case, the risk of 
a project could hinder undertakings from realising it at all. The competitive effect of 
latter alliance is neutral. On the other hand, quasi-concentration alliances can have 
anticompetitive effects when the partners have the capability to produce the product 
independently. 
Quasi-concentration alliances are inherently more stable than the other types of 
alliance. They are rarely finished before the end of the project.40 The serious 
commitment on part of the participants, and their unwillingness to go their separate 
ways, acts to stabilise these alliances. 
 3.2 Strategic alliances: a competition law perspective 
Competition authorities around the world are increasingly faced with the problem of 
how to define and deal with strategic alliances, regardless whether they mention it 
expressly in annual reports, decisions or define the concept of a strategic alliance. As 
early as 1992, the Bundeskartellamt chose the topic ‘Strategic alliances – A new 
challenge for competition policy’ for the sixth International Cartel Conference.41 The 
Canadian Bureau of Competition Policy issued a policy statement in 1995 to give 
                                                
39  Tari 1998 (n 5) 61. 
40  Wahyuni 2003 (n 3) 32. 
41  See Dr. K Hansen (ed), Strategische Allianzen – Eine neue Herausforderung für die 
Wettbewerbspolitik, Dokumentation der Internationalen Kartellkonferenz Berlin 1992 
(Bundeskartellamt 1993) (Hansen 1993). 
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general guidance and clarify its enforcement approach to strategic alliances under the 
Competition Act.42 William J. Kolasky Jr.43 - in a testimony before the Federal Trade 
Commission44 - urged for the introduction of antitrust guidelines covering strategic 
alliances and joint ventures. 
In 1994, the EU Commission noted in its XXIVth Report on Competition Policy that 
‘[t]he application of the basic competition rules to strategic alliances has become one 
of the major challenges for EU competition policy in recent years’.45 In its 2001 
guidelines on horizontal cooperation agreements,46 under paragraph 12 dealing with 
the scope of that document, it states: 
‘More complex arrangements such as strategic alliances that combine a 
number of different areas and instruments of cooperation in varying ways are 
not covered by the guidelines. The assessment of each individual area of 
cooperation within an alliance may be carried out with the help of the 
corresponding chapter in the guidelines.’  
In paragraph 3 of the same document, the Commission suggests that: 
‘Companies need to respond to increasing competitive pressure and a 
changing market place driven by globalisation, the speed of technological 
progress and the generally more dynamic nature of markets. Cooperation can 
be a means to share risk, save costs, pool know-how and launch innovation 
faster.’ 
In the latest version of the horizontal guidelines, the Commission reiterates:47 
                                                
42  Strategic alliances under the ‘Competition Act’ – Director of Investigation and Research, 
November 1995, available at:  
 <www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/01671.html> accessed 31 December 
2012. 
43  Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, United States Depratment of Justice, Antitrust 
Division. 
44  WJ Kolasky, ‘Antitrust enforcement guidelines for strategic alliances’ in Corporate Law and 
Practice Course Handbook Series (1998) July-August, Structuring, Negotiating & Implementing 
Strategic Alliances 499 (Kolasky 1998). 
45  XXIVth Report on Competition Policy (1994) (European Commision 1995) 55. 
46  Commission notice, guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal 
cooperation agreements [2001] OJ C3/2.  
47  Communication from the Commission, guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] 
OJ C11/1 (horizontal guidelines), para 2. 
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‘Horizontal co-operation can be a means to share risk, save costs, increase 
investment, pool know-how, enhance product quality and variety, and launch 
innovation faster.’ 
These are the precise reasons for alliance formation which were mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter. 
3.2.1 Competition law concept of strategic alliances 
The question left unanswered is whether competition authorities treat strategic 
alliances as a separate competition law concept or whether they just apply their 
existing framework. 
In his speech at the abovementioned cartel conference, Wolfgang Kartte, the former 
president of the Bundeskartellamt, said that the concept of strategic alliances is 
trendy and the relationships it describes differ greatly in nature.48 Nevertheless, he 
highlighted the following common features of strategic alliances: the partners remain 
legally independent, and the relationship between the partners is located between the 
market and hierarchy.49 What makes strategic alliances particularly noteworthy is the 
size of the firms and the international dimension. At the same conference, Leon 
Brittan, the Commissioner responsible for competition policy at that time, suggested 
strategic alliances were by no means a new concept in EU competition policy: 
‘We have been dealing with this phenomenon for quite a while, even if under 
different names.’50  
He stopped short of offering an exact definition of strategic alliances but stated that 
the problems involved in examining them are just the same as those involved in 
examining any agreement. Strategic alliances cover a wide range of situations. 
Others describe strategic alliances as various modes of cooperation between 
undertakings,51 or project-oriented cooperation with strategic objectives; generally 
between large undertakings, which retain their independence despite their close 
                                                
48  Hansen 1993 (n 41) 265. 
49  By using the terminology of the transaction cost theory. 
50  Hansen 1993 (n 41) 265. 
51  HH Hollmann, ‘Strategische Allianzen: Unternehmens- und wettbewerbspolitische Aspekte’ 
(1992) WuW 293. 
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cooperation.52 
The Canadian Bureau of Competition Policy stated that there are no specific 
provisions within the Canadian Competition Act dealing exclusively with strategic 
alliances, due to the myriad of corporate forms which these arrangements have taken 
and could take.53 The special characteristics of strategic alliances are: the parties’ 
maintained independence, partial integration with the joint pursuit of medium to long 
term goals, strategic but set time frame, and mutual contribution of assets, 
knowledge or information.54 The emphasis is not on the definition of strategic 
alliances but, rather, on their competitive effects.55 
Kolasky suggests that, in many respects, strategic alliances are ‘simply old wine in 
new bottles’.56 He refers to Robert Pitofsky,57 who defined joint ventures as any kind 
of collaborative agreement between actual or potential competitors that lies between 
a cartel and a merger. In this regard, the terms joint venture and strategic alliance are 
interchangeable synonyms that can be analysed using the same framework.58 
To summarise, from a competition law enforcement point of view, strategic alliances 
are not defined separately due to the wide range of forms they can take. That said, 
enforcers and competition law experts are aware of the problem that strategic 
alliances raise. Nevertheless, competition authorities apply their traditional 
assessment frameworks, even if this task proves particularly complicated on certain 
occasions. 
3.2.2 The general approach of the EU Commission 
In the early-1990s, the EU internal market programme was close to completion, 
while liberalisation was also on the global agenda, which inevitably forced 
undertakings to deal with the situation of more intense competition and a rapidly 
changing economic environment. In newly liberalised industries, strategic alliances 
                                                
52  J Basedow and C Jung, Strategische Allianzen: die Vernetzung der Weltwirtschaft durch 
projektbezogene Kooperationen in deutschen und europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht (Verlag C. H. 
Beck 1993) 18. 
53  Strategic alliances under the ‘Competition Act’ (n 42), Director’s preface. 
54  ibid part 2: Inter-firm cooperative arrangements. 
55  ibid. 
56  Kolasky 1998 (n 44) 505. 
57  Former Chairman of Federal Trade Commission. 
58  ibid 506. 
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appeared to be a clever solution to these challenges. The Commission adopted a 
favourable approach to all forms of cooperation that strengthened the efficiency and, 
thus, the competitiveness of the parties.59 In the BT/MCI case,60 the Commission 
concluded that the relevant market was opening up to world competition because of 
liberalisation and technological advances. It was, therefore, necessary for firms to 
adjust to the new environment. The Commission took into consideration the 
convergence of telecommunication and information technologies, the introduction of 
new services and products, the rapid globalisation of markets relating to new value-
added services and the significant growth in demand. 
The general approach to strategic alliances is best described by the Commission in 
its aforementioned 1994 Annual Report, where it says:61 
‘It is not only the individual elements of such cooperation, but also their 
combined effect on competition which need to be assessed in a dynamic way 
taking into account both the advantages of strategic alliances and their negative 
effects on competition between the parties, including the potential spill over 
from areas of cooperation to other areas of the parties’ activities. A strategic 
alliance may have the impact that the parties no longer want to compete but 
rather cooperate in general.’ 
The Commission intends to safeguard the achievements of liberalisation and prevent 
all agreements which have the same foreclosure effect as the statutory protection that 
existed prior to liberalisation. Strategic alliances are, therefore, only compatible with 
competition provisions if they do not shut off their traditional (national) markets.62 
In the 1995 Annual Report, it is expressly stated that:63 
[…] ‘newly emerging markets is not a password for approval. While alliances 
should be allowed, or even encouraged when pro-competitive, they cannot be 
accepted where they thwart or threaten the demonopolization process. Where 
big players join forces, the Commission should aim to prevent market 
                                                
59  XXIVth Report on Competition Policy (1994) (European Commision 1995) para 17. 
60  BT/MCI (Case IV/34.857) Commission Decision 94/579/EC [1994] OJ L223/36. 
61  Para 156. 
62  XXVth Report on Competition Policy (1995) (European Commission 1996) Introduction by 
Karel van Miert. 
63  ibid para 8; See also XXVIth Report on Competition Policy (1996) (European Commission 
1997) para 66. 
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foreclosure.’ 
Enhanced global competitiveness is not an excuse for the elimination of competition 
at a national level.64 These examples show that the Commission applies its existing 
assessment methods and it is concerned with the same problem as in any other case, 
namely market power. 
3.2.3 Forms of strategic alliances and their treatment 
Strategic alliances can take a large variety of forms; however, from an EU 
competition law perspective they can either qualify as a restrictive agreement under 
Article 101 TFEU or as a concentration under the EUMR. For the purposes of this 
thesis, the definition of strategic alliances is taken to include the competition law 
concept of joint ventures and to exclude ‘real’ mergers. A joint venture is an 
arrangement by which two or more undertakings integrate part of their operations 
and put them under joint control, in order to achieve a particular commercial goal.65 
It requires the creation of either a separate legal entity or, at the very least, a 
recognisable joint committee or informal organisation clearly identifiable as separate 
from its parents. In addition, both parents contribute assets, knowledge and 
personnel to enable the joint venture to carry out its allotted tasks. 
3.2.3.1 Strategic alliances, which are concentrations 
Given the fact that the merger of previously independent undertakings66 or the 
acquisition of sole control over one company by the other67 are not regarded as 
strategic alliances, the only relevant provision of the EUMR is Article 3(4): 
‘The creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions 
of an autonomous economic entity shall constitute a concentration within the 
meaning of paragraph 1(b).’ 
                                                
64  See Atlas (Case IV/35.337) Commission Decision 96/546/EC [1996] OJ L239/23; Phoenix 
(Case IV/35.617) Commission Decision 96/547/EC [1996] OJ L239/57; XXVIIth Report on 
Competition Policy (1997) (European Commission 1998) para 71; XXVIIIth Report on 
Competition Policy (1998) (European Commission 1999) Foreword by Karel van Miert; 
65  A Jones and B Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (4th edn OUP 2010) 985. 
66  EUMR Article 3(1)(a). 
67  EUMR Article 3(1)(b). 
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The Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/8968 notes that, 
although the Commission is conscious of the possible ‘structural’ impact of strategic 
alliances on the markets involved, the difficulty in sufficiently defining them for the 
purposes of mandatory ex ante notification hinders their involvement within the 
scope of the EUMR.69 Based on the Commission’s experience, strategic alliances are 
not usually designed to bring about the structural change envisaged under Article 
3(1) of the EUMR and may not necessarily result in the creation of a full function 
joint venture.70 The Green Paper also highlights that the only strategic alliance 
assessed under the EUMR was the KLM/Alitalia airline alliance (1999), which 
suggests that Article 101 TFEU still appears to be the most appropriate legal 
instrument for assessing such transactions.71 
Accordingly, the EUMR has limited relevance for the assessment of strategic 
alliances and applies only where the alliance qualifies as a full-function joint 
venture.72 A joint venture must perform, on a lasting basis, all the functions of an 
autonomous economic entity in an operational respect. The joint venture has to carry 
out the same functions as any other normal firm operating on the market. It must 
have a management dedicated to its day-to-day operations and access to sufficient 
resources including finance, staff and assets in order to conduct, on a lasting basis, 
its business activities. Joint ventures taking over only partial functions, like R&D, 
production or distribution are not treated as full-function. Using the typology of 
strategic alliances, it can be concluded that most of these co-operations do not fulfil 
the conditions of full-functionality. 
3.2.3.2 Strategic alliances as restrictive agreements 
If full-functionality is missing from a joint venture, or the transaction does not have 
Union dimension, then Article 101 TFEU may still have a role in their assessment. 
In the case of strategic alliances, the existence of an agreement between parties can 
always be presumed since they are established on a contractual basis. International 
strategic alliances will also usually satisfy the requirement of having an effect on 
                                                
68  COM (2001) 745 final, Brussels, 11/12/2001. 
69  ibid para 101. 
70  ibid para 113. 
71  KLM/Alitalia (Case COMP/JV.19) [2000] OJ C96/5. 
72  See Commission consolidated jurisdictional notice under Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 on 
the control of concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C95/1, paras 91-109.  
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trade between Member States. Consequently, the most important issue would be 
whether the agreement has as its object or effect the restriction of competition. 
Should a strategic alliance restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) 
TFEU, the opportunity would remain to argue that it creates efficiencies within the 
meaning of Article 101(3) TFEU, which would outweigh the restrictive effects.73 
In the following, only a few general thoughts on strategic alliances and EU 
competition law are emphasised. The horizontal guidelines state that horizontal co-
operation agreements can limit competition in several ways.74 The agreement may be 
exclusive and limit the potential for the partners to compete against each other, or for 
third parties to do the same. It can also reduce the independence of decision-making, 
through the contribution of assets or through the affection of financial interests. A 
horizontal agreement may also increase the likelihood of coordination.75 
Complementary alliances bear similarities to commercialisation agreements and it is 
very possible that they can escape the application of Article 101 TFEU. Since the 
parties contribute different assets or skills to take advantage of the each other’s 
capabilities, the main question from a competition law point of view is whether the 
strategic alliance is objectively necessary to allow one party to enter the market in 
question.76 When alliance formation is led by the desire to access otherwise 
impenetrable markets, the competitive effect is positive. On the other hand, the 
assessment shall be negative when the strategic alliance serves as nothing more than 
a disguise for a collusive practice.77 
Shared-supply alliances could be classified, for example, as R&D agreements and in 
most of the cases they do not fall within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU.78 They 
do not influence the parameters of competition since they are ‘distant’ from the final 
product market. They involve only one stage of the production process and the 
partners usually appear on the market with separate products. On the other hand, 
Article 101(1) TFEU can apply if the cooperation results in significant cost 
                                                
73  See, in particular, Communication from the Commission, notice, guidelines on the application of 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ C101/08 (Article 101(3) guidelines). 
74  See horizontal guidelines (n 47) para 33. 
75  ibid para 34. 
76  ibid para 237. 
77  ibid paras 242-245. 
78  ibid paras 129-132. 
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commonalities where R&D represents a considerable part of the undertakings’ costs. 
A strategic alliance in the R&D field can restrict competition by slowing down 
innovation and may also reduce competition between the parties outside the scope of 
the agreement or lead to coordination.79 Still, in the absence of market power, 
negative effects are rarely anticipated.80 A shared-supply alliance can also take the 
form of a joint purchasing agreement or a joint production agreement concerning a 
particular component. Again, in these cases, the potential negative effects on 
competition can be limited if the co-operation exists only at this level of the 
production chain without creating significant cost commonalities,81 or where there is 
an absence of market power82 and other jointly performed functions like 
commercialisation. 
Quasi-concentration alliances can appear in two extremes. Firstly, Article 101(1) 
TFEU is not applicable if: (i) the alliance is motivated by the huge investment and 
risk associated with a project, and (ii) none of the participants would be able to 
undertake the project independently. In the second scenario, it is probable that a 
strategic alliance restricts competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU 
where the parties co-operate in every production phase to produce a common 
product, although they would have been able to appear independently too. In these 
joint productions, the partners inevitably cooperate on output and prices and, 
therefore, Article 101(1) TFEU is applicable.83 
However, the assessment under Article 101(1) TFEU is only one element of a 
strategic alliance’s analysis. The other side, which is reflected in Article 101(3) 
TFEU, is the assessment of the positive economic effect of restrictive agreements.84 
Under the first condition of Article 101(3) TFEU, the agreement should create 
efficiencies. These benefits have to be objective; efficiencies should not be assessed 
from the subjective point of view of the parties. The claimed efficiencies should be 
transaction-specific, verifiable and benefit - in part - consumers. Efficiencies can 
include cost efficiencies arising from technological leaps, synergies, economies of 
                                                
79  ibid para 127. 
80  ibid para 133. 
81  ibid paras 175-180 and 201. 
82  ibid paras 165-168 and 202-204. 
83  ibid paras 157-161. 
84  Article 101(3) guidelines (n 73) para 32. 
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scale and scope, learning economies, better planning of production, or better 
capacity utilisation.85 There are also efficiencies which are qualitative in nature, ie 
when the quality of the product is enhanced, a new feature is added or where a 
completely new product/service is created.86  
Strategic alliances can create substantial efficiencies and, as has been shown, they 
are partly motivated by the partners’ own goal to achieve efficiency, thereby 
improving their own competitiveness. Strategic alliances can achieve economies of 
scale relating to indivisibilities, increased dimension, specialisation, massed 
reserves, and superior organisation or learning effect.87 Concerning economies of 
scope, we have seen that strategic alliances are established with the intention of 
lowering transaction costs, internalising externalities or to ensure important inputs. 
Economies of R&D include: spreading cost and risk, combining complementary 
assets, eliminating redundant R&D effort, technology transfer and rent dissipation,88 
which are also mentioned and regarded as motives and goals of alliance formation. 
Under the second condition of Article 101(3) TFEU, consumers must at least be 
compensated for the actual or likely negative impact caused by the restriction of 
competition and, as such, the net effect should be neutral.89 It is not required that 
consumers receive a fair share of every efficiency and compensation can take the 
form of increased quality in exchange for higher prices. The Commission prefers a 
cost reduction in variable and marginal costs as opposed to lowering fixed costs. In 
any case, the incentive to raise prices arising out of an increase in market power 
must be balanced against the incentive to reduce prices arising from enhancements in 
efficiency.90 
Complementary alliances facilitate entry into new markets and, therefore, the pass-
on of benefits is rather obvious. Shared-supply alliances very rarely affect the 
competitive situation on the market of final products; alliance members compete 
against each other and, therefore, they have an incentive to increase output and lower 
prices as a result of the efficiency created by the alliance. In the case of quasi-
                                                
85  ibid paras 64-68. 
86  ibid paras 69-72. 
87  Van den Bergh and Camesasca 2006 (n 14) 169-170. 
88  ibid 188-190. 
89  Article 101(3) guidelines (n 73) para 85. 
90  ibid para 101. 
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concentration alliances, residual competition and elasticity of demand play a decisive 
role.  
Finally, the condition of indispensability and the requirement not to eliminate 
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question depend on the 
market circumstances of each strategic alliance; no specificities can be identified 
according to the type of alliance.  
3.3 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the general economic and competition law perspectives of 
strategic alliances. In the economic section, it first dealt with the concept of strategic 
alliances by identifying the main characteristics as follows: a cooperation for mutual 
benefit, which is intended for a longer period, pursuing strategic aims whilst the 
partner companies remain independent. A degree of activity integration is achieved 
via the contribution of assets or knowledge to the alliance. The chapter then 
examined the motives and objectives of strategic alliance formation, including some 
theoretical explanations. As for the types of strategic alliances, it used the 
classification of alliances between competitors and non-competitors. Within the 
group of competitors’ strategic alliances there are three types. 
Firstly, complementary alliances bring together undertakings with different assets 
and skills, allowing each partner to take advantage the complementary skills 
possessed by the other. Secondly, shared supply alliances entail the co-operation of 
undertakings with similar assets at one stage of the production process who seek to 
achieve economies of scale on a particular input. Finally, quasi-concentration 
alliances are created by undertakings with similar assets who proceed to develop, 
manufacture and market a common product. 
In the competition law section, it was concluded that there is no special definition of 
strategic alliances in competition law. However, competition authorities are aware of 
the problem these agreements represent and they try to assess them with traditional 
competition law concepts. Under EU competition law, strategic alliances rarely 
qualify as a concentration under the EUMR. In most cases, strategic alliances are 
examined as restrictive agreements under Article 101 TFEU. 
4 Legal and economic background of air transport  
This chapter explores the legal and economic background of the industry that serves 
as a stage for the strategic alliances discussed in this thesis. It assists with the 
understanding of the topic since the industry characteristics and its historical settings 
largely influence airline alliances. This chapter first discusses the international law 
background of air transport, followed by a description of the market opening, the 
present legal regulatory environment and the external aviation policy of the EU. The 
chapter concludes by highlighting some of the relevant economic insights of airline 
operations.  
In this thesis, the question is asked whether the more economic approach allows for 
the wider application of restriction by object and thereby the classification of airline 
alliances as object restrictions. This thesis concludes that the characteristics of airline 
alliances support this idea without conflicting with the more economic approach of 
EU competition law. A detailed discussion of the legal background to air transport is  
essential for answering the thesis question since the applicable legal regime played a 
significant role in the transformation of the aviation industry and triggered the course 
of events leading to alliance formation.  
Partial liberalisation and dismantling of legal barriers enabled the emergence of 
business forms that induced the creation of alliances. The same partial liberalisation 
and legal restrictions on foreign ownership continue to hinder airlines in merging 
according to the business rationale that applies in other globalised industries. These 
restrictions serve as one, but not necessarily the only, reason for the popularity of 
alliances as a business form.  
In this environment, airlines often use alliances to mimic the effects of legally 
impermissible mergers. Within these revenue-sharing alliances, partners eliminate 
competition between each other with regard to the all important competition 
parameters of air transport markets. This is the very feature which requires the 
restriction by object classification of these agreements. Describing the liberalisation 
process explains the genesis of true airline competition, while the current regulatory 
framework assists in understanding the nature of competition allowed between 
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airlines. The analysis of external EU aviation policy reveals that, despite the 
considerable progress made in aviation liberalisation, strategic alliances are here to 
stay for at least in the short and  medium term. 
The section on the economics underpinning the aviation industry explains the 
economic rationale of airline cooperation and alliance formation. It presents those 
economic principles that must be respected by all airlines provided they intend to 
remain on the market on a long-term basis. The economic characteristics of air 
transport markets also explain route-specific competition and the nature of 
competition between airlines. Understanding these relationships is indispensable for 
any analysis under Article 101 TFEU. Since it is argued that the wider interpretation 
of object restrictions has to be complemented by a realistic application of Article 
101(3) TFEU, the economic insights of aviation are also crucial for the proper 
analysis of efficiencies. These insights facilitate understanding critics of the 
Commission’s approach to out-of-market efficiencies discussed later (section 
6.2.7.1).  
Accordingly, the following discussion of the legal and economic background will 
put into context the issue of strategic alliances which is essential for a robust analysis 
of the area. 
4.1 International law on air transport 
4.1.1 The Chicago System 
Notwithstanding the military and commercial importance associated with air 
transport almost from the beginning, the first attempts to create a comprehensive 
multilateral regime within the industry failed.1 An incomplete pattern of bilateral 
agreements evolved between the countries that had airlines and the countries to and 
from which those airlines wished to fly.2 The right of innocent passage was 
acknowledged but landing for commercial purposes was not allowed and depended 
on the individual authorisation of states. 
                                                
1  See Conference Internationale de la Navigation Aerienne, Paris 8 May-28 June 1910. 
More details in M Milde, ‘International Air Law and ICAO’ in M Benkő (ed), Essential Air and 
Space Law (Eleven International Publishing 2008) 5-12. 
2  R Doganis, Flying off course, airline economics and marketing (4th edn Routledge 2010) 
(Doganis 2010) 28. 
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In 1944, delegates from 52 countries gathered in Chicago to discuss the possibility of 
a multilateral agreement on air transport. The economic background of the US and 
the UK largely explains the outcome of the Chicago conference. The US had the 
equipment and ambition of creating a global air transport network but, nevertheless, 
lacked their own airfields around the world.3 The UK, on the other hand, had airports 
in each of the colonies but lacked a network to connect their empire, alongside a 
shortage of suitable aircraft. Under these circumstances, the US called for a 
multilateral open skies agreement, namely without limitation on market parameters 
such as tariffs, capacity or routing.4 The UK stressed that the proposed system 
should serve the needs of the travelling public and provide parties with a ‘fair share’ 
of traffic.5 The two conflicting approaches resulted in the failure of an extensive 
multilateral agreement for commercial activities to emerge, which has – to this day – 
determined the shape of international aviation. 
Despite this, the following agreements were reached. The Convention on 
International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention)6 deals with every aspect of 
commercial aviation, operation of aircraft and air services, both in the air and on the 
ground. The Convention reaffirms the states’ complete and exclusive sovereignty 
over their airspace and declares an equal right for all signatories to participate in 
international air transport.7 The Chicago Convention also set up the International 
Civil Aviation Organisation, a United Nations specialised agency. Article 6 of the 
Chicago Convention serves as a basis to the bilateral system, as it prohibits services 
over or into the territory of a contracting state without the authorisation of that state.8 
                                                
3  ibid 29. 
4  ibid. 
5  A Cheng-Jui Lu, International airline alliances: EC competition law, US antitrust law and 
international air transport (Proefschrift) (Universiteit Leiden 2002) (Cheng-Jui Lu 2002) 11.  
6  Available at <www.mcgill.ca/iasl/sites/mcgill.ca.iasl/files/chicago1944a.pdf> accessed 31 
December 2012. 
7  Chicago Convention Article 1. 
8  There are nine freedoms of air (traffic rights): 
The first two traffic rights are the so-called ‘transit rights’, which do not provide any commercial 
opportunities. 
  - First freedom: the right to fly over another country without landing. 
  - Second freedom: the right to land for technical reasons (eg refuelling). 
The remaining six traffic rights serve as the basis of commercial air traffic; therefore, they are 
labelled ‘commercial rights’: 
 - Third freedom: the right to carry revenue traffic from the home country to the authorising 
country. 
 - Fourth freedom: the right to carry revenue traffic from the authorising country to the 
home country. 
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Article 7 established a general prohibition on cabotage. 
Although the maximum exchange of traffic rights failed, an agreement on the two 
transit rights was reached.9 This agreement facilitates air services, as the home 
country of an airline does not need to have bilateral air service agreements with 
every country among the route flown, just with the country of destination. 
Consequently, it has only practical importance and, as such, no real commercial 
relevance. 
4.1.2 System of bilateral air service agreements 
Based on Article 6 of the Chicago Convention, all commercial aviation activity is 
dependant on bilateral air service agreements (ASA). These agreements deal with 
market access, flight frequency, capacity, applicable fares and tariffs. ASAs can be 
divided in to three major parts.10 The first part is the bilateral agreement itself. Aside 
from the administrative provisions, contracting parties use the agreement to 
determine the method of airline designation (ie which airlines are allowed to fly), the 
regulation on capacity and the issues concerning tariffs and their approval. 
Designation used to be single, allowing only one airline from each contracting 
country to establish air services. An important rule concerning designation, and 
which still largely determines and distorts the industry structure, is the ‘substantial 
ownership and effective control’ requirement. The designated airline should be 
substantially owned and effectively controlled by nationals of the designating 
country. As the whole system was governed by the desire for equal rights for all 
signatories to participate in international air transport, fares and capacity were 
                                                                                                                                     
 - Fifth freedom: the right to carry revenue traffic between the authorising country and third 
countries when the service starts or ends in the home country. 
 - Sixth freedom: the right to carry revenue traffic with connecting third and fourth freedom 
services through the home country. 
 - Seventh freedom: the right to carry revenue traffic between two other authorising 
countries without any connection to the home country. 
 - Eighth freedom: cabotage right, the right to carry revenue traffic on domestic routes in the 
authorising country as an extension of, or first leg of, a third or fourth freedom service. 
 - Ninth freedom: cabotage right, the right to carry revenue traffic on domestic routes on a 
standalone basis.  
For further details, see ICAO Manual on the Regulation of International Air Transport (2nd edn 
ICAO 2004) Chapter 4.1 Basic Market Access. 
9  International Air Services Transit Agreement (Transit Agreement), available at: 
 <www.mcgill.ca/iasl/sites/mcgill.ca.iasl/files/chicago1944b.pdf> accessed 31 December 2012. 
10  Doganis 2010 (n 2) 30-31.  
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strictly controlled. In terms of fares, parties referred to and applied the IATA11 tariff 
fixing mechanisms. 
The second part - annexes - specifies the routes to be operated within by the 
designated airlines of each state. Thirdly, every ASA may consist of a 
‘Memorandum of Understandings’ or an ‘Exchange of Notes’ which allow for the 
creation of confidential clauses or modifications to the originally adopted document. 
Early bilateral ASAs were extremely protectionist (the ‘predetermination type’) and 
regulated all aspects of air services in a very strict, anticompetitive manner. Only a 
specified number of routes were to be operated within, fifth freedom services12 were 
rarely permitted, each party could designate only one airline, the substantial 
ownership and effective control rule applied, and capacity was split 50/50 between 
the operating airlines.13 
On 11 February 1946, the US and the UK signed an air service agreement at the 
Bermuda Islands, which has since become known as Bermuda I.14 Although this 
agreement still constituted a traditional ASA, it was somewhat more liberal than the 
predetermination type. It permitted fifth freedom services15 and imposed no 
restriction on capacity and frequency. The IATA price fixing system was indicated 
as a favourable method for determining prices.16 For many years, this agreement 
served as a template in civil aviation. A network of approximately 3 500 - 4 000 
bilateral ASAs became the legal basis of international commercial aviation.17 
Remarkably, some 30 years after Bermuda I, the US and UK entered into a new and 
much more restrictive ASA that regulated air transport services between them until 
2008.18  
                                                
11  International Air Transport Association. 
12  See n 8. 
13 R Doganis, The airline business in the twenty first century (2nd edn Routledge 2006) (Doganis 
2006) 29. 
14  ibid 14. See also <en.wikisource.org/wiki/Bermuda_Agreement> accessed 31 December 2012. 
15  Annex III of the Bermuda Agreement. 
16  ibid Annex II. 
17  According to IATA, some 3 500 - 4 000 bilateral are in force around the world (2012 figure). 
See Agenda for Freedom initiated by IATA, <www.agenda-for-freedom.aero/Pages/faq.aspx> 
accessed 31 December 2012.  
18  Available at: <airlineinfo.com/treaties/unitedkingdom7.pdf> accessed 31 December 2012. 
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 4.1.3 Multilateralism in international air transport 
Although bilateral ASAs dominate the landscape of international air transport in the 
Chicago system, the seeds of multilateralism already appeared at the time of the 
Chicago conference. Besides the earlier mentioned Transit Agreement, the 
International Air Transport Agreement (‘Five freedoms’ Agreement) has also been 
adopted and it granted the first five freedoms on a multilateral basis.19 Read together, 
these two agreements could have been the basis of a multilateral regime. However, 
given that only 12 countries signed the ‘Five freedoms’ Agreement in over 50 
years,20 only the Transit agreement attained the required number of signatories to 
enter into force, thus obliging states to separately negotiate agreements to gain 
additional traffic rights.21 
Over the past few decades, multilateral agreements have been considered marginal in 
their importance. In recent years, however, the possibility increased for the net 
consisting of 3500-4000 bilateral ASAs to be transformed, over time, into a few 
separate multilateral agreements. Perhaps the most important initiative outside the 
EU has been the Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of International Air 
Transportation (MALIAT).22 Besides, there are other regional liberalisation 
processes in Asia,23 the Pacific24 and South America.25  
4.2 Deregulation in the US 
During the first part of the 20th century, the US Congress enacted a number of 
                                                
19  International Air Transport Agreement, available at: 
 <www.mcgill.ca/iasl/sites/mcgill.ca.iasl/files/chicago1944c.pdf> accessed 31 December 2012. 
20  Cheng-Jui Lu 2002 (n 5) 13. 
21  SD Rynerson, ‘Everybody wants to go to heaven, but nobody wants to die: the story of the 
transatlantic common aviation area’ (2002) Summer/Fall Denver Journal of International Law 
and Policy 424. 
22  Current members are Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore and the USA. See 
<www.maliat.govt.nz> accessed 31 December 2012. 
23  For further details, see P Forsyth, J King and CL Rodolfo, ‘Open Skies in ASEAN’ (2006) 12 
Journal of Air Transport Management 143. See also the Agreement among Director General of 
Civil Aviation of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam on the Establishment of Sub-regional 
Air Transport Cooperation, overview summary available at: 
  <http://legacy.icao.int/icao/en/atb/ecp/CaseStudies/CLMV_Cooperation_En.pdf> accessed 31 
December 2012. 
24  See the Pacific Islands Air Services Agreement available at: 
 <http://www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/PIASA%20text%2010%2
0signatures.pdf> accessed 31 December 2012. 
25  Andean Open Skies Pact, available at: 
 <http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/normativa/d297e.htm> accessed 31 December 2012. 
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statutes that subjected major industries to substantial governmental regulation.26 
Economic regulation was first established in the railroad industry before extending to 
motor carriers, airlines, telephony, banking and electricity between 1880-1930,27 
building largely upon the statutory regime first enacted in 1887.28 
4.2.1 The years of regulation 
In 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Act29 was adopted which established the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB), the main regulatory agency from 1938-1978 in this field. 
The Act afforded the CAB the authority to control mergers, agreements, entry and 
exit, to regulate fares, to award direct subsidies, to give antitrust immunity and to 
investigate unfair trade practices.30 The aim of this regulation was to promote 
adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable rates.31 
During the early years of regulation, CAB classified airlines as trunk, local, 
commuter, supplemental and intrastate airlines. The distinction among these airlines 
was the following:32 Trunk airlines were allowed to develop national networks and 
they had no restrictions as regards to the markets or the size of their aircraft. Local 
carriers had restrictions imposed on the markets they could serve, while commuter 
airlines had limitations placed on the aircraft they could use. Supplemental airlines 
had no right to operate scheduled services. Finally, intrastate airlines were free to 
operate within their home state.33 In this environment, airlines competed on capacity 
and frequency and, although this probably increased welfare, it was more than offset 
by the negative impacts of higher prices.34 Market entry was restricted and between 
                                                
26 Statement of JI Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division before the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate concerning antitrust issues in the airline 
industry (July 27, 2000). See for example Merchant Marine Act of 1916 39 Stat. 728, 46; Motor 
Carrier Act of 1935, P.L. 74-255, 49 Stat. 543; Communications Act of 1934, P.L. 416, 48 Stat. 
1064; Natural Gas Act of 1938, P.L. 75-688, 52 Stat. 821; Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, P.L. 
706, 52 Stat. 973. 
27  AR Goetz, ‘Deregulation, competition, and antitrust implications in the US airline industry’ 
(2002) 10 Journal of Transport Geography 1 (Goetz 2002) 2. 
28  See Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 379 enacted February 4, 1887. 
29  P.L. 706, 52 Stat. 973. 
30  EE Bailey, DR Graham and DP Kaplan, Deregulating the airlines (MIT Press 1985) (Bailey 
1985) 11. 
31  ibid. 
32  Based on Bailey 1985 (n 30) 15. 
33  The most developed intrastate markets were that of California and Texas due to their size. 
34  R Fischer, Time sensitivity of passengers and market structure in the airline industry, a model of 
international air transport (Dissertation zur Erlangung der Würde eines Doktors der 
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften) (Peter Lang Verlag 1997) (Fischer 1997) 39. 
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1938 and 1977 the CAB did not permit any entry into city pair markets that already 
had two or more carriers.35 Even expansion of incumbent airlines was strictly 
regulated. Airlines wishing to expand were required to show that their expansion 
would not harm the other airline on the route.36 Air fares were also controlled and 
the fare structure was rigid, imposing uniform rates and refusing permission to make 
individual price increases or deductions.37 The fare structure became increasingly 
distorted in its relationship to cost structures; fares were substantially above efficient 
levels.38  
4.2.2 Deregulation and its effects on the industry 
Over the years, regulation, both in general39 and in relation to air transport, has 
garnered much criticism among academics.40 Advocates of deregulation have tended 
to base their arguments on three key theoretical pillars: in the airline industry (i) 
economies of scale are non-existent, (ii) barriers to entry are low, and (iii) the 
markets are contestable.41 Barriers to entry, exit and market contestability are closely 
related. It was argued that, in transport markets, barriers to entry and exit are non-
existent or, they are extremely low due to the absence of large sunk costs. An 
undertaking can simply lease an aircraft and fly it wherever it wants without any 
difficulties. As aircrafts have developed a second hand market, exit would also be 
unproblematic. It was argued that this enables hit and run competition, which leads 
us on to contestable markets theory. Despite having only been fully developed in the 
                                                
35  P Hanlon, Global airlines, competition in a transnational industry (3rd edn Butterworth 
Heinemann 2007) (Hanlon 2007) 71. 
36  S Borenstein and NL Rose, ‘How airline markets work...or do they? Regulatory reform in the 
airline industry’ in NL Rose (ed), Economic regulation and its reform: what we have learned 
(forthcoming from University of Chicago Press) (Borenstein and Rose 2008) 6, available at: 
<www.nber.org/chapters/c12570.pdf> accessed 31 December 2012. 
37  Cheng-Jui Lu 2002 (n 5) 23. 
38  Borenstein and Rose 2008 (n 36) 7. 
39  See eg WJ Baumol and AK Klevorick, ‘Input Choices and Rate-of-Return Regulation: An 
Overview of the Discussion’ (1970) 1 The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 
162; GJ Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2 The Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management Science 3; RA Posner, ‘Theories of Economic Regulation’ (1974) 5 The Bell 
Journal of Economics and Management Science 335. 
40  See eg RE Caves, Air transport and its regulators: an industry study (Harvard University Press 
1962); GW Douglas and JC Miller III, Economic regulation of domestic air transport; theory 
and policy (Brooking Institution 1974); WA Jordan, Airline regulation in America; effects and 
imperfections (Johns Hopkins Press 1970). 
41  Goetz 2002 (n 27) 3; For a good overview see also ME Levine, ‘Airline competition in 
deregulated markets: theory, firm strategy and public policy’ (1987) 4 Yale Journal on 
Regulation 393. 
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early 1980s,42 Alfred Kahn - the chairman of CAB and the ‘father of airline 
deregulation’ - referred to it at the times of deregulation. He suggested that ‘the 
realistic threat of entry by new and existing carriers on the initiation of management 
alone is the essential element of competition’.43  
In other words, even the threat of entry and potential competition can compel market 
participants to charge competitive prices and to produce the equivalent of perfect 
competition output. Under these circumstances, market structure loses its relevance 
and, as such, even a monopoly would be unproblematic. Preconditions for 
contestability are:44 completely free entry and no exit costs; the entrant has no cost 
disadvantage compared to the incumbent; no sunk costs; and the entrants can hit the 
market with lower prices before the incumbent can respond with any price 
adjustment. Besides the theoretic approach, the Californian and Texan market 
provided empirical evidence.45 Intrastate carriers offered lower prices and still 
incurred higher profits.46  
On 24 October 1978, the Airline Deregulation Act47 (ADA) was adopted, the 
regulatory powers of the CAB have been gradually relaxed and, as of 1 January 
1983, all its authority concerning domestic fares expired. From 1 January 1985, CAB 
ceased to exist and, with the Sunset Act,48 its remaining powers were transferred to 
the Department of Transportation. With the ADA, entry and exit on the domestic 
market became free and carriers gained full control over prices. 
It is difficult to evaluate the precise effects of deregulation. The US economy was in 
serious recession following the years of the ADA; there was a substantial rise in fuel 
prices and further advances in aircraft technology in the 1970s reduced operating 
costs. As a consequence of the deregulation, 270 million more passengers enplane 
every year and 350 billion more revenue passenger miles (RPMs) are generated per 
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annum, while US communities have over three million more departures every year.49 
Morrison and Winston50 estimated the welfare gains of deregulation at at least a 
USD six billion annual improvement for travellers, and a USD 2.5 billion annual 
increase in industry profits.  
It was only after 1981 that new entry became large scale and, by September 1983, 22 
new interstate carriers emerged. They offered lower fares, albeit to varying 
degrees.51 In real terms, tariffs fell while the use and variety of discount fares rose 
significantly.52 Studies have shown that prices fell by 30%, even if the continuation 
of improved regulation is taken into account.53 Industry concentration and costs fell, 
while profits rose. Airlines began to rapidly restructure their route networks. They 
placed emphasis on connecting services using a particular airport (the hub) as a 
transfer point.  
The earlier mentioned theoretic foundations of deregulation proved to be invalid and 
inapplicable to air transport.54 It became evident that airlines operating hub-and-
spoke networks realise significant economies of scope and traffic density, which 
were reinforced by computerised reservation systems (CRS), frequent flyer 
programmes (FFP) and other loyalty schemes. In addition, despite earlier thoughts to 
the contrary, economies of scale also concern advertising and marketing 
expenditures that play an important role in the deregulated market. Advertising costs 
are sunk costs; they cannot be recouped when exiting the market. Airport congestion, 
FFPs and the capital intensiveness of CRSs manifested themselves as entry barriers. 
Finally, incumbent operators are capable of reacting instantly to the actions of new 
entrants by using sophisticated revenue management systems.  
All in all, in the midst of the straightjacket of regulation, deregulation facilitated a 
dynamic marketplace where consumers gained enormously from lower fares.55 For 
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airlines, deregulation has been a costly experience; although, a few have prospered 
in the new environment.56 Moreover no new equilibrium has yet been found, many 
innovative and new solutions have appeared. 
4.2.3 More liberal bilaterals as an effect of deregulation  
In 1978, the US turned its attention to renegotiating ASAs; partly as a result and a 
logical extension of deregulation, and partly as an element of the same initiative of 
which deregulation formed part. Following the 1978 statement on ‘International Air 
Transport Negotiations’57 and the 1979 International Air Transportation Competition 
Act,58 a significant liberalisation of existing ASAs entailed. Of course, these 
international changes were well within the interest of US carriers. A logical 
extension of internal network development was for the carriers to draw international 
traffic to their respective hubs.59 
It was the like-minded Netherlands, in 1978, who signed the first modified ‘open 
market’ ASA with the US.60 The agreement contained multiple designation, 
extensive fifth freedom rights, more extensive market access, free capacity and 
frequency determination even on sixth freedom services, double disapproval and 
country of origin rules on price control.61 By the early 1990s, a further phase of 
liberalisation began with the conclusion of the ‘open skies’ agreements. In 1992, the 
first open skies agreement was concluded between the US and again the Netherlands. 
An open skies agreement contains no limitations on route access, pricing or other 
market parameters but, nevertheless, they still prohibit cabotage and apply the 
substantial ownership and effective control rules, thereby limiting opportunities to 
the contracting countries’ carriers. 
4.3 Liberalisation in the EU 
US deregulation served as a direct impetus for liberalisation in the EU. There were, 
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however, some important differences between the two regions. The European market 
is composed of Member States with different languages, cultures and economies. At 
the time of liberalisation, each Member State had its own flag carrier with their 
vested interests, and these were mainly in state ownership. Most flights are 
international with very high cost levels.62 In geographic terms, the European market 
is smaller and the population density is much higher. In addition to this, the US 
population and business centres are spread much more widely and, therefore, 
average journey length is significantly longer than in Europe (1 200km compared 
with 900km).63 In Europe, all the travel generating centres are in fairly close distance 
among the ‘hot banana’, reaching from southeast England to northern Italy.64 
Moreover, given the strong and ever-developing road and railroad infrastructure, 
alternative travel modes often constitute close substitutes to air transport on shorter 
distances. The hub-and-spoke system on intra-European level has less potential 
because direct flights are favoured. 
4.3.1 Road to liberalisation in Europe 
Facilitating liberalisation within the EU was by no means an easy task, especially 
given the final decision lay in the hands of Member States in the Council. They were 
reluctant to change the traditional bilateral system for decades. Liberalisation in the 
EU was driven by two parallel initiatives of the Commission, which mutually 
reinforced one another. The Directorate General for Transport had made several 
attempts to push through liberalisation measures in the Council since the mid-1970s, 
while the Competition Directorate forced the application of competition rules in the 
air transport sector. 
The original framework of air transport in Europe was based on bilateral ASAs of 
the Chicago system. This situation and the special strategic, economic and national 
interests connected with aviation resulted in the ambiguous, not too far reaching 
provisions in the EC Treaty. In contrast to all other sectors, there was no basis for a 
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common transport policy.65 Article 80(2) of the EC Treaty established that ‘the 
Council may, acting by a qualified majority, decide whether, to what extent and by 
what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down, for sea and air transport’.66 
Member States tried to interpret this obscure drafting as excluding air transport from 
the ambit of the entire Treaty (minimalist approach).67 On the other hand, the 
Commission argued that the general provisions - including those on competition - 
apply (maximalist approach).68 The final word was given by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (Court of Justice) in several judgments over the course of a 
number of years, which approved the Commission’s approach.69 
Since 1979, the Commission has put forward several documents and legislative 
proposals in support of air transport liberalisation and the application of competition 
rules to the sector.70 The first partial success of this took the form of the 
experimental directive of the Council on regional air services;71 although, its 
significance was certainly limited.72 The Commission’s position was further 
strengthened in 1985 when the Court of Justice found that the Council was in breach 
of its obligations when it failed to establish a common transport policy.73 In 1985, a 
precise timetable was set up for the completion of the internal market, including air 
transport with a deadline of 1992, while the Single European Act represented a 
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political commitment to this deadline.74  
In 1986, the Commission sent letters to ten Member States’ airlines alleging that 
they were in breach of the competition rules.75 In this regard, it used the competition 
rules to achieve results on the regulatory side.76 Member States were finally 
convinced and compelled to act in the Council and on 17 December 1987 the ‘first 
package’ of liberalising and implementing measures was adopted. It comprised the 
implementing regulation for air transport,77 an authorising regulation enabling the 
Commission to adopt block exemptions;78 a directive on fares;79 and a decision on 
capacity and route access.80 The following year, the Commission adopted three block 
exemptions.81 The first package enabled the application of competition rules on 
intra-EU routes in the same way as in other industries.82 It also standardised and 
relaxed different fare-determining and fare-approval systems and, furthermore, eased 
restrictions, introduced more flexibility and strengthened convergence among the 
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ASAs of Member States with other Member States. Consequently, this reform built 
on the existing Chicago system. More liberal ASAs were allowed to remain in force 
or to conclude. 
In 1990, following the review of the first package, the Council adopted the ‘second 
package’. This included new regulations on fares,83 on route access and capacity,84 
while a modification85 allowed the adoption of new block exemptions.86 In 1991, a 
new regulation for cargo services87 was adopted and the Commission attained the 
authority to adopt interim measures in its proceedings.88 The new legislation further 
relaxed the rules and increased flexibility. 
4.3.2 The third package and the present regulatory system of the EU  
Compared to the first two packages, the third package was truly revolutionary. The 
first and second packages built on the traditional bilateral system and tried to relax 
ASAs between Member States in a harmonised way, in an attempt to facilitate 
something between the ‘open market’ and ‘open skies’ agreements. Upon 
introduction of the third package, Member States switched from a system of liberal 
bilateral ASAs to an almost entirely open multilateral system. The aim was to keep 
state intervention to a minimum and to provide airlines with the freedom to decide 
independently on key parameters of competition. This framework rested on three 
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pillars: Regulation 2407/92 on licensing,89 Regulation 2408/92 on market access,90 
and Regulation 2409/92 on fares91 which created a system of common licensing 
rules requiring substantial ownership and effective control of EU nationals; as well 
as providing a full exchange of traffic rights and practically free pricing.  
In 2008, the Parliament and the Council adopted the new regulatory framework of 
air transport, consolidating the three regulations of the third package into one. 
Regulation 1008/2008 simplified and updated the text to regulate the licensing of EU 
air carriers, the right of EU air carriers to operate intra-EU air services and the 
pricing of intra-EU air services.92 
4.3.2.1 Licensing  
An undertaking established within the EU can only carry air passengers, mail or 
cargo if it has been granted an appropriate operating licence.93 The regulation sets 
uniform conditions for the granting of operating licences in the EU by any of the 
competent authorities within a Member States.94 Undertakings must in particular 
hold an Air Operator Certificate (AOC), comply with insurance and ownership 
requirements and provide financial guarantees. In addition, management will be 
requested to provide proof that the undertaking is of good reputation.95 An operating 
licence shall be valid as long as the air carrier complies with the requirements 
defined by the Regulation.96 The new licensing rules still apply traditional ownership 
rules,97 ie the requirement to maintain the substantial ownership and effective control 
of EU nationals.98  
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4.3.2.2 Market access  
EU air carriers are authorised to operate freely between any airport pair within the 
EU based on their individual business decisions and, furthermore, Member States 
cannot subject their operation to any permit or authorisation.99 The European market 
operates as an open aviation area with a single set of rules for EU airlines. As with 
the earlier regulations on market access, Regulation 1008/2008 also provides the 
potential for public service obligations between an airport and a peripheral or 
development region in the EU or on a thin route to an airport in its territory.100 The 
grant of traffic rights is automatic, except in cases specified by the Regulation 
itself.101 The Commission has clarified, in its Viva Air decision, that the right to 
exercise traffic rights does not extend to slot allocation.102 The availability of slots 
may not be criteria for the granting or refusal of authorisation.103  
4.3.2.3 Fares  
EU air carriers and, on the basis of reciprocity, air carriers of third countries shall 
freely set fares for passengers and cargo for intra-EU air services, except in the case 
of a public service obligation.104 Member State authorities have no opportunity to 
intervene in airline pricing, including the earlier restrictions on pricing with respect 
to third country routes arising from bilateral agreements between Member States (eg 
sixth freedom price leadership).105 
4.3.2.4 Slot allocation  
A scarcity of slots constitutes one of the most significant barriers to entry in air 
transport markets. Capacity building or even the expansion of airports is a lengthy 
process, complicated by environmental issues. Furthermore, with the adoption of a 
hub-and-spoke route system, traffic is concentrated within particular airports. 
Naturally, new entrants have initially sought to enter dense routes, while incumbents 
have also increased frequency on those. All this has increased congestion at key 
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European airports. Slot allocation at EU airports was organised according to the 
IATA rules, which are based on the principle of ‘grandfathering’.106 In essence, it 
means that an airline, which operates a particular slot in one season, acquires the 
right to operate it in the following season.107 In practice, airlines behave as the owner 
of a slot. Realising that the benefits of liberalisation could unevenly spread, and that 
competition was becoming distorted due to the lack of available slots, the Council 
adopted in 1993 a regulation on the EU rules of slot allocation.108 
According to the recitals of the Regulation, slot allocation should be based on 
neutral, transparent and non-discriminatory rules. The Regulation applies to EU 
airports109 and establishes provisions for coordinated and fully coordinated airports. 
Article 8 essentially confirms the principle of grandfathering. Newly created, unused 
slots110 and vacated slots are to be placed in a slot pool. 50% of the slots in the pool 
shall be distributed to the applicant carriers and the other 50% to new entrants. The 
Regulation applies to both EU and third country carriers but, in the case of the latter, 
the application of the Regulation can be suspended based on reciprocity. 
In light of the increasingly problematic state of airport congestion in Europe, the 
Commission responded in 2011 by submitting a proposal for the review of the slot 
Regulation.111 The new Regulation would expressly allow slot transactions and 
improve the efficiency of new entrant rules. Its purpose would be to improve the use 
of airport capacity and improve the allocation process, thereby supporting market 
entry.  
4.3.2.5 Computerised reservation systems 
CRSs were first developed in the 1960s and 1970s and served simply as a device for 
saving time and labour while handling a large and growing amount of flight 
reservation data.112 CRSs can pose several problems for airline competition. Most 
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importantly, although the spread of internet sales in air transport is increasing, a 
significant number of bookings are still made through CRS at travel agents.113 As 
flights tend to be booked from the first screen page of a CRSs’ visual display unit, 
owner airlines can easily manipulate what is displayed on these screens in order to 
bias the thought processes of customers in favour of their own services, rendering 
market entry more difficult. In recent years, however, most airlines have disposed of 
their shareholdings in CRS.114  
CRS operation is characterised by large economies of scale. Average cost is 
continuously falling as the creation of the system requires large fixed costs while the 
marginal cost of handling additional bookings and flights is close to zero.115 These 
circumstances presented good reasons for some kind of general regulatory measure 
regardless any potential case-by-case application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The 
Council chose to establish a code of conduct in the form of a Regulation.116 As a 
result of this, CRSs should be used in a non-discriminatory and transparent way,117 
subject to certain safeguards118 thereby protecting the interest of consumers. 
4.3.2.6 Ground handling  
Another important area for the success of air transport liberalisation is the ground 
handling market. These are essential for the optimal functioning of air transport; 
opening up these markets should help to reduce the operating costs of airlines.119 
Ground handling agreements were subject to block exemptions in the first two 
packages but this proved to be an inefficient treatment of the problem and, therefore, 
the Council adopted a Directive in 1996.120 The Directive aims to ensure that at least 
one, from the airport’s dominant air carrier and from the managing authority 
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independent ground handling operator, can enter the market and that self-handling is 
made possible for all airlines. 
4.3.2.7 Airport charges 
Also, as a part of the initiative concerning airports, the European Parliament and the 
Council adopted a Directive on airport charges.121 The Directive sets out common 
principles for levying airport charges at EU airports with more than 5 million 
passengers annually. Total transparency, airport user-consultation and non-
discrimination are the main elements of calculating charges.122  
4.3.3 External aviation policy of the EU 
From an early stage, it became apparent that a multilateral liberalisation initiative, 
like the one adopted in the EU, could not realise all of its potential benefits unless 
also complemented by a common policy towards third countries. In this respect, we 
can identify another significant difference in comparison to the US. Airlines of the 
US were able to take advantage of their new liberalised home market when they 
expanded their network internationally. All market participants were treated as US 
airlines satisfying the substantial ownership and effective control requirement. When 
it came to consolidation, they were able to take control of competitors’ networks and 
hubs. 
In contrast, although EU airlines enjoyed the benefits of the internal market, in the 
absence of a common external aviation policy with respect to third countries they 
remained restricted to eg French, or UK airlines. As a consequence, European 
airlines were not able to fly third country destinations from airports outside their 
respective home countries, unless this was permitted by the bilateral ASAs of all the 
countries involved.123 A merger between national airlines would risk the loss of the 
whole traffic right portfolio of the acquired airline. From outside the EU, the 
European market still appeared very much fragmented among its national borders. A 
common external aviation policy would clearly be of interest to the EU since, when 
                                                
121  Parliament and Council Directive 2009/12/EC of 11 March 2009 on airport charges [2009] OJ 
L70/11. 
122  ibid Articles 3, 6 and 7. 
123  eg in 1991, the UK secured seventh freedom rights for its airlines to fly directly from Belgium, 
Germany or the Netherlands to the US. 
 67 
it comes to negotiations, the EU can offer a market of 27 Member States, a 
population of ca. 500 million and numerous commercially attractive destinations.  
Still there are good reasons for the failure to create one. Member States appeared 
reluctant to transfer negotiation rights, because they felt as though the Commission 
was understaffed and inexperienced in bilateral aviation matters.124 Another reason 
for the resistance could be protectionism and defence of the own national airline’s 
interests. The fact that, at an EU level, Member States can achieve more with 
partners jointly does not mean that they cannot achieve more individually than other 
Member States. They are in direct competition with each other in their struggle to 
create better access to markets for their airlines.125 Member States were induced to 
deal individually. The aviation relationships with the US provided the clearest 
example of this. 
The US realised this opportunity and applied the ‘divide et impera’ tactics in its 
dealings with Member States. They could easily lure particular Member States to 
open up their markets individually. Moreover, as a consequence, neighbouring 
Member States also had the extra incentive to avoid traffic diversion and, therefore, 
followed suit.126 As a result, European airlines could only fly from their respective 
home countries, without any cabotage rights within the deregulated US market. On 
the other hand, US airlines had open skies access from any point in the US to many 
European destinations and, through fifth freedom rights, they had an almost 
unlimited possibility to fly within the liberalised European market (‘quasi 
cabotage’).127 In order to remedy this situation, the Commission long sought the 
power to negotiate with third countries. 
4.3.3.1 The road leading to the Open Skies judgments 
From a very early stage, relationships with third countries have proved a 
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troublesome issue for the Commission.128 The Commission’s initial proposal129 for 
an exclusive competence was met with strong opposition from Member States. It had 
insisted on exclusive competence for concluding bilateral ASAs,130 maintaining that 
some Member States infringed this competence.131 The Council blocked these 
initiatives and rejected the Commission’s argumentation, maintaining that Member 
States have full control over international aviation negotiations, with the exception 
of joint dealing which the Commission was granted a mandate on.132  
Once again, the Commission pursued a strategy resembling the one used for internal 
liberalisation. On the one hand, the Commission made repeated proposals to the 
Council concerning external negotiations. On the other hand, it tried to use various 
Treaty provisions to substantiate its competence in these matters and ‘threatened’ 
Member States with infringement procedures. Since its threats proved ineffective,133 
the Commission sent letters of formal notice informing the Member States concerned 
that their open skies agreements with the US constituted an infringement of EU law. 
On 17 June 1996, the Council decided to grant authorisation for the Commission to 
open negotiations with the US in the field of air transport. The purpose of these 
negotiations was to establish a Common Aviation Area with the US but, 
nevertheless, the Commission had a limited mandate.134 Since Member States 
continued to negotiate ASAs with the US, the Commission decided to re-open the 
infringement procedures and, in November 1998, the Commission referred eight 
Member States to the Court of Justice within the ambit of an Article 258 TFEU 
procedure.135 The Commission did, however, achieve some success as regards 
certain neighbouring countries.136  
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4.3.3.2 The Open Skies judgments 
On 5 November 2002, the Court of Justice made its judgments in the Open Skies 
cases.137 The Commission claimed that the seven Member States that entered into 
open skies agreements were in breach of the principles governing the division of 
external competences between the EU and the Member States. In alternative they 
infringed either [Article 351(2) TFEU] or [Article 4(3) TEU] with their failure to do 
everything possible to render these agreements fully compliant with EU law. 
Furthermore, the Commission accused all eight Member States of infringing [Article 
49 TFEU] because substantial ownership and effective control clauses discriminated 
according to nationality concerning the establishment of airlines. 
Concerning external EU competence in aviation matters, the Court of Justice 
established that the Member States had infringed the EU’s exclusive competence in a 
limited and rather insignificant area.138 Any agreement negotiated in this area on a 
national level is contrary to EU law. 
Concerning the right of establishment, the Court of Justice provided that Member 
States who are party to an agreement with a third country should grant, to the 
permanent establishments of companies resident in another Member State, the 
advantages provided for by that agreement on the same conditions as those which 
apply to companies resident in the Member State concerned.139 Substantial 
ownership and effective control clauses within ASAs are an obvious case for 
discrimination without any justification. Such discrimination deprives EU airlines 
from benefiting from the right of establishment and taking advantage of the ASA 
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concluded by a Member State other than their home country,140 as well as limiting 
the total available advantages of the internal market. Consequently, the Member 
States failed to fulfil their obligation under the Treaty. 
Concerning the ownership and control clauses, the Commission gained a clear 
victory. In relation to external competence, the Commission achieved only a 
marginal victory and only ‘secured’ exclusive external competence in relation to 
fares and CRSs. Member States still retain the competence to negotiate agreements 
on essential parts of ASAs, the so-called ‘hard rights’. 
4.3.3.3 Aftermath of the Open Skies judgments, external 
aviation relations at present  
The Commission tried to seize the opportunity and make the most of the Open Skies 
judgments, therefore adopting a rather hard-line position as to the interpretation and 
consequences of the Court of Justice ruling.141 The Commission held that the 
illegality problem of ASAs entailed a comprehensive international aviation policy 
which has to be elaborated upon in order to address the problem.142 This is necessary 
due to the value added when compared with the effort of individual Member States. 
In the Commission’s opinion, ‘the only way to proceed is in a coordinated manner, 
using the Community institutions’.143 The Commission thought that bringing ASAs 
in line with EU law would be achieved by negotiating new EU level agreements. 
Member States disagreed and insisted upon their involvement in future negotiations. 
In February 2003, the Commission had already formulated a proposal which sought 
to achieve a compromise.144 It stressed that, in the case of limited traffic rights, 
capacity or frequency, distribution and allocation should be non-discriminatory and 
made between airlines having equal rights, irrespective of their nationality. 
Concerning the role of EU institutions and Member States in international relations, 
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it is established that joint action by both parties is required.145 
The Commission therefore proposed a package of measures containing a full 
mandate from the Council to negotiate an open aviation area agreement with the US, 
a general mandate to negotiate aviation issues of exclusive EU competence, and a 
draft regulation providing a coordination and information exchange mechanism 
between the Commission and the Member States to ensure coherent outcomes from 
the bilateral discussions which Member States and the Commission have with 
different partners. On 5 June 2003,146 the Council authorised the Commission to 
negotiate an EU level ASA with the US,147 a comprehensive, liberal air service 
agreement that would establish an open aviation area between the EU and the US. 
The Council also endorsed the mandate necessary for the correction of Member 
States’ ASAs in light of the Open Skies judgments  (horizontal mandate).148 Finally, 
the Council also decided upon a general approach on the draft Regulation on the 
negotiation and implementation of air service agreements between Member States 
and third countries. 
Accordingly, external aviation negotiations can be pursued in the following ways: 
Concerning certain key partners, the Commission received, and requires in the 
future, an individual mandate ensuring exclusive competence on all aspects of 
aviation.149 With the horizontal mandate, the Commission can pursue negotiations 
with any third country in relation to ownership clauses or fares.150 On the other hand, 
Member States also retain their right to negotiate with third countries.151 
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4.3.3.3.1 The ECAA and other neighbouring countries 
The European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) agreement152 is based on the mutual 
market access to the air transport markets of the contracting parties and the freedom 
of establishment, with equal conditions of competition and respect for similar rules, 
including in the areas of: safety, security, air traffic management, social 
harmonisation and the environment.153 It enables the extension of the internal 
aviation market to countries in South East Europe. The agreement prohibits 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality and secures the right of 
establishment.154 Competition rules are included in Annex III of the agreement and 
cover restrictive agreements, abuses of a dominant position and state aid. In practice, 
the ECAA agreement will see all Balkan countries adopt and apply a competition 
regime wholly compatible with EU law. 
The EU has also opened and/or concluded negotiations with other important 
neighbouring countries.155 The Ukraine is treated as a priority country with the aim 
of integrating the Ukraine within the European aviation area.156 In the Mediterranean 
region, Morocco is the primary partner for the EU and the first country to finalise a 
new type of aviation agreement with it, called the Euro-Mediterranean Aviation 
Agreement.157 In 2010, Jordan signed a similar agreement.158 In 2012, the EU and 
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Israel signed an agreement creating an open aviation area between Israel and the EU, 
based on common rules.159 In September 2012, the Commission proposed further 
steps in the EU’s external aviation policy. It set the target of completing aviation 
agreements with neighbouring countries such as Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Tunisia, 
Turkey and Egypt by 2015 and asked for this purpose for a general negotiating 
mandate for these countries.160 
4.3.3.3.2 Open aviation area with the US 
For the EU, by far the most important of all third country partners is the US. 
According to an economic report prepared in January 2007, an EU-US agreement 
would generate 26 million additional passengers over 5 years.161 It would produce 
economic benefits worth EUR 6.4-12 billion in the form of consumer surplus, and 
would also create 72 000 new jobs in the new EU-US market. An EU-US open 
aviation area would amalgamate the world’s two largest and most developed aviation 
markets with annual passenger numbers of 712 and 650 million respectively,162 
which would probably serve to trigger a complete transformation of the global 
industry.163 
The Commission’s negotiating mandate explicitly recognised the possibility of 
creating the open aviation area in several steps, taking into account the US’ 
opposition to certain issues like cabotage in the US or foreign ownership in US 
airlines. Negotiations began in October 2003 and a breakthrough was achieved in 
March 2007. After additional rounds of negotiations, the parties gave their support to 
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an improved text, which the Council approved unanimously. The text contained 
safeguard measures which, it was intended, would ensure that the second stage 
agreement - which involves realising the open aviation area - would be concluded 
within a reasonable time.164 The first stage agreement was signed at the EU-US 
Summit on 30 April 2007 in Washington165 and entered into force on 30 March 
2008.166 
The first stage agreement, an open skies deal, is a milestone in the international 
aviation relationships of the EU, which replaced existing bilateral ASAs or, in the 
case of six Member States, even created a relationship with the US. The aims of the 
agreement include: establishing an aviation system based on competition among 
airlines with minimum government interference open access to markets. Airlines of 
both parties are granted unlimited third, fourth and fifth freedom rights.167 This 
means that any EU airline can fly from any European point to any US destination or 
beyond/behind and vice versa.168 In addition, EU airlines are allowed to fly certain 
seventh freedom routes as well.169 There are no limitations whatsoever concerning 
routing, frequency, capacity170 or pricing.171  
With regard to the crucial ownership and control issues, Annex IV of the EU-US 
Agreement provides some respite. The investment of EU investors in US airlines 
will be considered in a more benign manner.172 Moreover, EU airlines can acquire 
control over ECAA, EEA and certain African airlines173 without fear of losing their 
traffic rights due to objection from the US. The agreement deals comprehensively 
with several areas of aviation.174 Article 20 declares that the parties will vigorously 
apply their competition rules respectively and seek to minimise potential differences 
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that can arise. Annex II of the agreement provides detailed rules of cooperation 
including scope, area and methods. 
On 25 March 2010, a stage two agreement was reached between the EU and the 
US.175 In comparison to the first stage agreement, the parties made progress with 
regards to environmental, security, and labour issues. Despite progress being 
achieved, ownership and control rules, as well as 7th freedom traffic rights, will only 
enter into effect at a later stage subject to legislative changes at both sides. 
4.3.3.3.3 Targeted negotiations with other third countries 
Besides its agreement with the US, the EU also managed to negotiate a similarly 
ground-breaking agreement with Canada,176 which was endorsed by the Council on 
30 March 2009. The EU and Brazil also initialled a comprehensive agreement on air 
transport services in March 2011.177 The Commission asked expressly for a 
negotiating mandate in the case of Russia,178 China,179 Chile,180 and India.181 In 
2008, the Council authorised the Commission to open negotiations with Australia 
and New Zealand on comprehensive air transport agreements.182 The Commission 
confirmed again the importance of comprehensive aviation agreements with key 
partners in 2012.183 
4.4 Basic airline economics 
Button and Stough provide a useful summary of the peculiarities of air transport.184 
‘Airline operations have a number of peculiar economic features that need to be 
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viewed as an entity. They provide network services that are non-durable (in the sense 
that once a flight leaves, it has been “consumed”). For any flight there is a finite 
capacity involving the carriage of a variety of different clients, not only passengers 
and freight but also various classes of passengers. These different classes extend 
beyond explicit divisions into such categories as “business class” and “coach” and 
embody differences in time preferences, fares, and ticket flexibility that characterise 
the vast diversity of users of air transportation. Airlines provide an intermediate 
product (few people travel for the pure pleasure of it, but rather because of what they 
will find at the destination) and air transportation imposes externalities on third 
parties (such as environmental effects). There are also various forms of economy 
associated with scale of the services provided, the length of time an operator has 
served a market and the structure of the network adopted.’ 
While none of these features are unique in themselves, their combination does pose 
specific problems when trying to understand the economics of the industry.185 
4.4.1 Drivers and characteristics of air transport demand 
Doganis identifies two groups of factors that affect demand for air travel.186 The first 
group affects all markets, these are: incomes; supply conditions (fare and quality); 
the level of economic activity; population size and growth rate; and the social 
environment (length of holidays, attitude to travel). The other group of factors affect 
demand in a particular market, on a given route. This includes: the level of tourist 
attractions; exchange rate fluctuations, historical and cultural links; earlier 
population movements; labour flows; and the nature of economic activities. 
The most important factors from the first group, otherwise known as macro-level 
drivers, are income levels which are closely related to economic growth and 
declining real prices. Analysts believe that for increases in demand for air transport 
GDP growth can be used as a good proxy.187 Demand for air transport grows at a 
multiple of GDP growth.188 Since the demand for air transport is derived demand, 
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connected in part to the general economic climate, the level of economic activities 
has a strong and direct influence on business travel and, indirectly, on leisure travel. 
Increased economic activity generates employment and, thus, an increase in business 
travel.189 On the other hand, economic prosperity increases household income, which 
also leads to an indirect increase in leisure travel.190 A small population base can 
limit demand for air travel, even in the presence of large incomes. The dynamic 
population growth of India and China, on the other hand, clearly explains the rapid 
development of their air transport industries. Attitudes towards travel can be best 
illustrated by comparing traffic developments between Poland/UK-Ireland and 
Hungary/UK-Ireland. After EU accession, many Polish workers travelled to the UK 
and Ireland to take advantage of the open employment market, while Hungarians 
seemed to be reluctant to do so. As a consequence, Wizzair flies on 21 routes from 
Poland compared with two routes from Hungary.191 
On the route level, the level of tourist attractions can influence demand. 
Development of a particular region as a tourist destination, the level of services, 
infrastructure, and the climatic conditions can each serve as an explanation for 
increases in demand. Historical and cultural links could be between countries and 
their earlier colonies. Large population movements, like the one between France and 
North Africa, can validate demand for air transport. There are unpredictable random 
factors like the 2003 SARS epidemic or the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as well as war or 
natural disasters that can also determine demand. In 2011, Air France/KLM was 
largely hit by the events of the ‘Arab Spring’ and the tsunami in Japan, since it had 
particularly strong positions on routes to these regions.  
Demand for air transport has several important characteristics: it can be strongly 
influenced by the supply of output, fluctuation, and sometimes directionality.192 With 
the help of price discrimination, revenue management, and loyalty programs – such 
as FFPs and travel agency commission overrides (TACOs) – airlines are themselves 
able to influence demand. With the aid of FFPs, they can change price elasticities. 
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By manipulating supply, carriers can enhance demand. The ‘quality’ attributes of an 
air service – including: frequency, departure and arrival times, and available capacity 
– have a demand-increasing effect, especially among business travellers.193 The 
increase in demand is the result of the ‘S-curve’ effect.194 When a carrier dominates 
output, it will get a disproportionately large market share.195 The phenomenon of 
when a larger network increases demand is often referred to as revenue economies of 
scale/scope or demand-side economies of scope. 
Air transport is characterised by fluctuation, which can be cyclical, periodic or 
irregular. Cyclical fluctuations follow economic cycles with larger amplitude. 
Periodic fluctuation can be further divided into seasonal, weekly and daily peakings. 
Seasonal peakings refer to demand peaks within the year, for example, due to 
climatic reasons (eg summer). Weekly peakings concern the travel patterns of 
businessmen in the weekdays and leisure travellers in the weekends.196 Daily 
peakings are in the morning and the evening. Finally, there are irregular peakings, ie 
in the case of sporting events like football tournaments, which generate large traffic 
in particular periods.197 ‘Directionality’ means that there is a difference in demand 
for the outbound or inbound flight on a certain route. For example, on Friday 
evening there is huge demand for air travel to Las Vegas, while on Sunday evening 
there is high demand out of Las Vegas.198 However, in the opposite direction at the 
same time demand is virtually non-existent.  
To understand markets, its segmentation could be useful. Segmentation is based on 
the assumption that customers are different and that they react in different ways by 
representing different demands and, according to these variations, they can be 
                                                
193  ibid 50. 
194  See W Wei and M Hansen, ‘Impact of aircraft size and seat availability on airlines’ demand and 
market share in duopoly markets’ (2005) 41 Transportation Research Part E 315; M Tretheway 
and T Oum, Airline Economics-Foundations for Strategy and Policy (Centre for Transportation 
Studies, University of British Columbia 1992) (Tretheway and Oum) 27-28; U Binggeli and L 
Pompeo, ‘Analyst viewpoint, does the S-curve still exist?’ (2006) IATA Economics, available 
at: <http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/McKinsey_SCurve.pdf> accessed 31 
December 2012; WE Fruhan Jr, The fight for competitive advantage: a study of the United States 
domestic trunk carriers (Harvard Business School 1972); G Eads, ‘Competition in the domestic 
trunk airline industry: too much or too little?’ in A Phillips (ed), Promoting competition in 
regulated markets (The Brookings Institution 1975). 
195  Holloway 2008 (n 187) 99. 
196  ibid 54. 
197  Vasigh 2008 (n 189) 60. 
198  ibid. 
 79 
grouped together.199 The most common segmentation is business and leisure 
travellers, and sometimes the category ‘visiting friends and relatives’ (VFR) is 
added. These groups can have different demand and different quality needs. Business 
travellers are less concerned about prices, tend to book only a few days before 
departure and value good quality in the form of convenient schedules, ticket 
flexibility, on board services or non/stop services. Leisure travellers are generally 
more price sensitive, tend to book well in advance of their flight and are prepared to 
travel on connecting flights.  
4.4.2 Supply-side characteristics of air transport 
The supply or output of a passenger airline is measured in available seat-miles or 
available seat-kilometres which means that the output unit is one seat carried on one 
mile or kilometre. According to Holloway,200 supply in the air transport sector has 
the following distinctive characteristics. Firstly, adding output improves the quality 
of the product in customers’ eyes. The first option is adding output with frequency 
unchanged, eg larger aircraft, which means more empty seats. Business travellers 
value this increased seat availability. As these passengers contribute a 
disproportionately larger amount to the total revenue of a flight than low fare 
passengers, the loss from empty seats could be more than compensated. Increasing 
output in the form of more flights improves the choice of departure time, which is an 
important aspect of product quality and, again, is valuable for business passengers. 
An explanation can be given with the introduction of time cost, or the opportunity 
cost of not travelling at the preferred time. Whenever a passenger cannot travel at the 
preferred time because of a full booking or the small number of frequencies, he/she 
is making a trade-off between the actual and preferred departure/arrival time. The 
level of opportunity cost per time unit can be referred to as the time sensitivity of 
passengers.201 Douglas and Miller investigated the phenomenon and introduced the 
concepts of frequency and stochastic delay.202 Frequency delay means the time cost 
arising from the number of flights, while stochastic delay refers to time cost caused 
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by the non-availability of empty seats. The increase of frequency decreases 
frequency delay, and the increase of empty seats reduces stochastic delay.  
According to the next feature, airline seats are perishable products. Consumers need 
to be physically present to receive the product; unsold output is lost as soon as the 
aircraft takes off, as storage is not possible. Production and consumption takes place 
at the same time, pressuring producers to take whatever price they can get for the 
product. Even a relatively low price contributes towards the high fixed cost of a 
flight. The small group of business travellers is extremely important for airlines as 
they contribute disproportionately towards total revenue. Output customisation is 
limited. Supply in the short run exhibits significant rigidity. Fixed costs are high.  
4.4.3 Drivers and characteristics of airline costs 
The characteristics of fixed, variable and marginal cost in the air transport market are 
as follows: Supply is provided by expensive indivisibilities (aircraft), which rarely 
ever meet the exact level of demand. Although aircraft are produced in different 
sizes, capacity is necessarily limited and after full booking, capacity cannot be 
increased just by seats as measurement of unit. If extra capacity is needed, a larger 
aircraft or new frequency has to be added. Therefore, fixed costs form a significant 
part of the total cost. The aircraft, in itself, represents a considerable expense, no 
matter how many passengers are on board. It needs the same two pilots, the 
minimum number of cabin crew, the same maintenance and ground handling and, 
furthermore, the same airport charges have to be paid. It is true that fuel 
consumption, the cost of meals for passengers, travel agency commissions and 
passenger handling charges may be lower but these expenses appear relatively small 
in relation to fixed costs. Under these conditions, marginal cost and variable cost can 
be treated as equivalents. On the other hand, marginal cost can represent the entire 
cost of adding a new aircraft when extra capacity is needed. 
Doganis classified the following elements as the most important cost 
determinants:203 externally determined cost drivers; labour; aircraft type; route 
network; airline marketing and product policy; financial policies; corporate strategy 
and quality of management.  
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Cost of labour accounts for a significant part of total airline costs. As an aircraft is a 
sophisticated, hi-tech piece of equipment, it is understandable that the crew operating 
or repairing it has to be paid and trained well which costs money. The next cost item 
is fuel, which now represents at least 30%,204 having previously accounted for 12-
15%,205 of airline expenses; owing to the price of jet fuel having more than doubled 
since 2008.206 Airlines have to pay en-route charges for air traffic control, airport 
charges for landing at and using airports, and ground handling fees for ground 
services. Long-haul operators have lower airport costs due to fewer landings. Short-
haul airlines with large frequency can spend significant amounts on landing fees. 
Distribution costs depend on the method in which airlines choose to sell their tickets. 
Most airlines pay a commission to travel agents, however, as part of the recent trend 
of continuous cost cutting, airlines rely more and more on direct sales through their 
own websites.   
Fleet composition significantly affects an airline’s costs. It is widely accepted that 
larger aircraft have lower operating cost per unit of output.207 This means that an 
aircraft of double size shall not result in double the operating costs. It will be lower 
per seat kilometre. Of course, in absolute terms the operating cost of a wide-body 
aircraft is much higher but it has a greater capacity as well, so these costs will 
disperse to more seats. Larger aircrafts have a proportionately lower drag and higher 
payload per unit of weight. Furthermore, their maintenance costs are also 
proportionately lower.208 Some call this effect ‘aircraft economies of scale’. Fleet 
commonality drives cost down. Crew training, maintenance and ground handling can 
be cheaper when one or only a few types - or at least a large amount of the same type 
- are introduced. This is the reason why low-cost airlines choose a single type for 
their operations. 
High aircraft speeds lower unit cost, as a faster aircraft produces more output in the 
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same period, which allows costs to be spread more widely.209 Every aircraft has a 
maximum range with a maximum payload. After reaching the maximum range, it 
has to decrease payload to fly further, which means lower output and, therefore, 
rising unit costs. An airline can operate an aircraft at its cheapest if it flies with 
maximum payload on routes, which corresponds precisely to the maximum range it 
is capable of. On longer routes, the aircraft spends more time in the air and flies with 
higher average speeds. 
Block time is the period from ‘engines on’ to ‘engines off’.210 Block speed indicates 
the average speed, while block fuel denotes the average fuel consumption in the 
same period. An aircraft is much more efficient in the air than on the ground. 
Unnecessary waiting at the airport, climbing out of the airport and the descent phase 
of the flight reduces block speed and increases block fuel. During a longer stage, the 
inefficient phases represent a much smaller proportion of the block time and, as 
such, these effects are compensated with higher speed and lower fuel consumption. 
This improves unit cost. On short-haul services, however, it is not possible to spread 
the cost of the ‘expensive’ parts; therefore, unit costs can be noticeably higher. Stage 
length has the same effect: with a longer stage, output is higher and consequently the 
same expenditure is lower on a per unit basis. 
Following deregulation, in seeking to take advantage of free entry to markets, 
airlines dramatically restructured their networks by concentrating in space and time 
traffic to particular airports, the so-called hubs.211 With the help of hubs, airlines 
gather and distribute traffic from multiple origins to multiple destinations using the 
airport as a transfer point. This network structure can provide various cost 
advantages.212 
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The first advantage is economies of density. Economies of density arise when unit 
cost declines as the volume of traffic carried within an unchanged network 
increases.213 The primary source of economies of density is the aforementioned 
advantage derived from aircraft size and improved utilisation. Density can increase 
due to natural growth over time, based on low prices or most importantly due to the 
network design of the airline.214 In the hub-and-spoke system, by combining the 
passengers’ itineraries, airlines manage to increase traffic density. In a point-to-point 
network, these passengers would have used separate and, most probably, smaller 
aircrafts. 
Based on the extent of density increase, the effect could be that of a higher load 
factor, an increase of capacity within the same aircraft (more seats), an increase of 
capacity leaving frequency unchanged (larger aircraft) and, finally, increased 
frequency.215 A larger aircraft with the same load factor means proportionately the 
same percentage of empty seats but - in real numbers - more empty seats, which 
could increase the service quality in the eyes of business travellers. More frequency 
also has a demand enhancing effect. Increased demand can, in turn, result in higher 
density and we see a self-reinforcing process. This is the Mohring effect.216 
Empirical studies confirm that economies of traffic density can be significant.217 A 
1% increase in output only results in a 0.8% increase in costs. However, once the 
minimum efficient traffic density level is reached, there are no more gains associated 
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with greater density.218 
Economies of scope arise when it is cheaper to produce two or more products 
together for a single undertaking, than to produce each product by separate 
undertakings. Economies of scope are present when two airline products share 
production costs (joint carriage of two passenger classes or passengers and cargo on 
the same aircraft), or marketing costs (the general advertising affects several 
markets).219 In a hub-and-spoke system, an airline can use various facilities 
associated with a particular flight leg in the production of other products. 
Holloway divided competitive scope into two elements: geographic scope and 
product scope.220 For example, the addition of a new spoke to a hub means that the 
costs of a hub will be spread over multiple routes. In other words, the cost of an 
additional route is more than compensated by the increased traffic, which lowers 
cost. Product scope concerns the joint production of products of different quality 
such as first, business and economy class. Here, the costs will be dispersed among 
the different cabin classes. Economies of scale imply that unit cost falls as the 
aggregate output increases. Certain activities within airline operations show 
noticeable economies of scale. This is the case with fleet commonality, maintenance, 
external purchases, ground handling and marketing activities. There is a debate as to 
whether the economies in advertising are scale or scope economies. Some 
researchers refer to these phenomena collectively as ‘economies of size’.221  
Finally, Button and Stough argue that there could be economies of experience that 
favour incumbent airlines against new entrants.222 For example, the goodwill of the 
incumbent, its better market knowledge and organisation provide advantages and at 
the same time higher cost for the entrant. Learning, as a cost decreasing factor, can 
have similar origins.  
4.4.4 Characteristics of pricing 
Pricing is a fundamental element of airline operations as its aim is to maximise 
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revenue from price inelastic demand and to stimulate demand from the elastic part in 
order to fill otherwise empty seats.223 Profit maximisation and profitability should be 
secured. Pricing is supplemented with revenue management.224 Pricing creates a fare 
structure with the connected conditions, while revenue management allocates seats 
to these fare categories. 
Airline operations have large fixed costs and low variable costs. Airline products are 
perishable and the market is composed of different consumer groups with different 
demand characteristics. Therefore, applying uniform prices is not always feasible. 
With a uniform price, certain price sensitive passengers will not travel and their seats 
will be empty. On the other hand, low prices that enable everybody to travel are not 
appropriate to cover the associated costs of the flight. Therefore, airlines try to price 
discriminate among passengers by earning on price inelastic passengers and filling 
up the remaining empty seats with price sensitive passengers, while preventing 
revenue dilution.  
From an airline point of view, every passenger should ideally pay according to 
his/her willingness to pay. The preconditions of effective price discrimination are: 
the existence of a downward sloping demand curve; sufficiently identifiable, large 
and distinct passenger groups; the ability to control diversion from high-yield to low-
yield fares; and assurance that the incremental cost of administering the fare 
structure shall not exceed the incremental revenue it generates.225 Different 
passenger groups pay different prices.  
In practice, airlines use ‘fences’ to avoid revenue dilution. These fences are the 
various conditions attached to fare classes like duration limits on stay, ticket 
refundability, change fees, purchase time restrictions or the requirement that the 
name of the passenger should be on the ticket.226 
In the airline industry, price discrimination helps to extend the market, increase 
demand and output, and cover high fixed costs. This creates economies of traffic 
density, which lowers unit cost and, most probably, prices as well. The low price 
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passengers can increase density to the extent that additional frequencies can be 
introduced on a route which, in turn, can enhance demand from high-yield business 
travellers who value high frequency.  
After a tariff structure has been created which takes account of the abovementioned 
considerations, in the ambit of revenue management fare bases are assigned to fare 
classes and the seat inventory is allocated among these classes and managed until 
departure.227 According to Holloway, revenue management is the practice of 
controlling the availability of seats for sale at different fares and subject to different 
conditions, with a view to maximising revenue. Therefore, it plays a vital role in 
price discrimination and the successful operation of an airline.228 A revenue 
management system uses sophisticated software for these purposes. 
4.4.5 Airline networks, hub-and-spoke system 
Before deregulation, route licenses in the US were granted with little regard to 
economies of supply. As a result, connection with own flights or the flights of other 
airlines was not important. In the rest of the world, where air transport inevitably has 
an international character due to the smaller size of those countries, bilateral ASAs 
created a route structure that looked like a hub-and-spoke system. Following 
deregulation, airlines rapidly changed and redesigned their networks to exploit 
advantages of the economies described above.  
They created the hub-and-spoke system. The real novelty of this system was 
schedule coordination among the own flights. Inbound flights from various 
destinations are organised into banks or waves, ie incoming flights are concentrated 
in a short period of time. After transferring passengers to other flights, a similar 
number of outbound flights depart the airport en route to several different 
destinations. A window is the period between the arrival of the first inbound and the 
departure of the last outbound flight.229 A short window means good connection 
times and, therefore, increased quality for consumers, while a longer window would 
allow for more connections. The whole process of incoming banks, transfer and 
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outgoing banks is called a ‘complex’. Large airlines schedule several complexes at 
their hub airports during a day.  
The hub-and-spoke system multiplies the number of available destinations. More 
importantly, it can serve many more cities with greater efficiency. See the following 
table based on Hanlon 2008:230 




Number of local 
markets 
Maximum number 
of city pair markets 
n n(n-1)/2 n n(n+1)/2 
5 10 5 15 
50 1225 50 1275 
 
Table 4.1 Hub-and-spoke systems 
This vast number of possible markets allows carriers to serve routes that would not 
even be economically viable in a point-to-point system. The combination of 
passengers’ itineraries increases traffic on each of the spokes and often only this 
additional traffic validates the connection or number of frequencies between certain 
cities. In fact, around half of air transport markets are too small to justify even one 
daily direct flight.231 Serving numerous destinations from a hub also results in more 
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efficient advertising since, from a general campaign, all products benefit, ie the cost 
of marketing is spread out to several city pairs. Hub-and-spoke networks can also 
have the advantage of deterring market entry to the benefit of airlines.232 
On the other hand, hub-and-spoke networks can have disadvantages. Transporting 
passengers in a hub-and-spoke network requires at least two flight legs at shorter 
stage lengths, which involves two take-offs and landings, groundhandling and 
maintenance checks. Shorter stage length entails higher unit costs. Airlines have to 
pay twice the airport charges and passenger fees, as well as needing to acquire 
maintenance services connected to the number of take-offs/landings. Establishing a 
hub is expensive. Hubs can increase congestion leading to a worsening of block 
speed and block fuel. Since passengers generally prefer direct connections, airlines 
have to provide a discount to compensate the traveller for lost time, thus resulting in 
lower yields.233 Therefore, the cost economies from hubbing would, ideally, more 
than compensate for any negative effects. This can depend on the proportion of local 
traffic travelling between the hub and particular spokes. Provided that a carrier 
dominates its own hub, it can charge an extra premium over local traffic, thereby 
offsetting low-yield connecting fares and avoiding over-dependence on low-yield 
transfer traffic exposed to inter-hub competition.234 A hub needs feeder traffic, as 
flow traffic is the essence of a hub-and-spoke network.  
Passengers may find that they have more destinations available, albeit most of them 
shall be through connecting and not direct flights. However, if only the hub-and-
spoke system generates enough traffic to operate flights on certain thin routes, then 
travellers in these cities have only advantages. In other cases, where a carrier 
previously operated a low frequency direct flight, the hub-and-spoke network 
enables higher frequency. Moreover, if the passenger lives in a spoke city connected 
to several hub-and-spoke networks, he can enjoy the benefits from inter-hub 
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competition.235 What might concern passengers is hub dominance. Nevertheless, 
increased prices are accompanied by wider choice and higher frequencies than it 
would be justified based on local demand alone. 
4.5 Summary 
In this Chapter 4, the legal and economic background of air transport has been 
reviewed. It has shown the international law aspects of air transport and the origins 
and reasons for the Chicago system, which builds on states’ complete and exclusive 
sovereignty over their airspace which, to this day, determines international air 
transport in most parts of the world. This principle serves as a basis for bilateral 
ASAs. The chapter also dealt with US deregulation, a domestic phenomenon that 
quickly produced spill over effects for the entire international air transport industry. 
Europe was among the first to follow the US example. However, the EU 
Commission had a much harder task to accomplish. It had to undertake its plans 
against the will of Member States, which opposed liberalisation for a number of 
years. The result is rather fascinating, taking into account the fact that a fully 
liberalised, integrated air transport market has been created between Member States. 
Over the last few years, the Commission has tried to extend these benefits to 
additional markets through a common external aviation policy.  
Finally, the chapter discussed the special characteristics of airline economics. The 
most important features are the cost economies arising, especially in hub-and-spoke 
systems. Economies of traffic density arise when unit cost declines as the traffic 
carried within an unchanged network rises. As the traffic volume increases, larger 
aircraft can be used with lower unit costs. Economies of scope arise when it is 
cheaper to produce two products together, rather than for each product to be 
produced by separate firms. In the hub-and-spoke system, traffic is channelled 
through one transfer point. On the outbound and inbound flights, passengers to and 
from different destinations use the same aircraft and several products are produced 
together with the effect of lowering costs.  
Given these legal and economic settings, the hub-and-spoke network structure 
currently serves as the standard for international long-haul air transport. The logic of 
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airline alliances should be understood against this background, which is not likely to 
undergo rapid change for at least the next decade. 
5 Strategic alliances in the airline industry 
This chapter sets out strategic alliances in the airline industry. It begins by 
examining the developments that led to the widespread use of alliances as a 
corporate strategy. It will identify the motives and objectives of strategic airline 
alliances. Alliances can take any form that constitutes something more than a normal 
contract but less than a full-scale merger. This statement also applies to airline 
alliances and, so, the chapter will also review the different forms that an alliance can 
take. Particularly consideration is afforded to revenue and profit-sharing joint 
ventures, which create the highest possible integration within an alliance and are the 
subject of on-going investigation within the EU. Finally, brief consideration is 
afforded to the issue of durability and success. The chapter will describe strategic 
alliances in detail and, in doing so, seeks to contribute towards clarifying the context 
of alliance agreements for competition law purposes. The chapter builds on the 
findings of the previous chapters.  
In this thesis, the question asked is whether, in the light of the more economic 
approach, airline alliances can be classified as object restrictions by interpreting this 
concept in a wider sense under Article 101(1) TFEU. By a detailed analysis of airline 
alliances, this thesis argues for the wider interpretation of restriction by object, and 
does not identify any contradiction with the more economic approach of EU 
competition law. The first section of Chapter 5 (section 5.1) describes the alliance 
phenomenon in the airline industry. It highlights the industry developments that 
contributed to the increasing importance of alliance strategy. Increased pressure on 
network airlines in domestic markets pushed them for more integrated alliances in 
the form of revenue-sharing alliances that eliminate all competition between partner 
airlines. This section also explains the background of alliance agreements and why 
they can be regarded as restriction by object despite their potential for creating 
efficiencies. 
Section 5.2 explains the airline specific motivations and ideas behind the creation of 
airline alliances. As with Chapter 3, this analysis reveals the purpose of alliance 
agreements, but here the focus is specifically on airlines. Therefore the conclusions 
of this chapter are relevant both for the analysis under Article 101(1) TFEU and 
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more importantly for the scrutiny of efficiency claims under Article 101(3) TFEU. 
The following section 5.3 examines in detail the form of cooperation within strategic 
alliances. It demonstrates the extent of cooperation and the level of integration, ie 
elimination of competition that is possible and usually undertaken within alliances. 
This type of analysis is crucial for the assessment under Article 101 TFEU since not 
all forms of strategic alliances would be considered as a restriction by object. Certain 
low-level cooperations within strategic alliances would be at most only restrictions 
by effect depending on the circumstances. 
Finally, section 5.4 considers the success and failure of airline alliances. These issues 
are highly relevant for the distinction between merger analysis and the approach of 
Article 101 TFEU. They support the view that strategic airline alliances cannot be 
equated with mergers. Therefore it is also legitimate to apply stricter rules in alliance 
assessments instead of pursuing a merger analysis within the ambit of Article 101 
TFEU.  
5.1 Background of alliance formation within the industry 
5.1.1 Business models in the liberalised markets 
Upon the emergence of US deregulation and EU liberalisation, as explored in 
Chapter 4, the domestic airline industries on both sides of the Atlantic began to 
approach ‘normality’. This means that markets now operate, in theory, without 
unnecessary government interventions according to normal market conditions. As a 
consequence, not everyone makes money. Undertakings that are well-managed shall 
make money in good years and, as such, are less affected by bad years. The worst-
managed firms, on the other hand, bear a high risk of outright failure.1 Airlines are 
now more so concerned with the economics of markets and devising strategies to 
create ‘factories that produce route density’.2 Their aim is to offer services at 
competitive costs while generating above cost revenues.  
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This can be achieved by either attracting high yield passengers with cost-intensive 
hub-and-spoke networks or by stimulating lower yield traffic and serving that traffic 
with a low-cost model. Incumbent airlines have now transformed into hub carriers in 
an attempt to maximise the cost efficiencies available to them. At the same time, 
low-cost airlines have emerged with the same goals as the incumbents albeit 
applying different methods in their efforts to achieve them. Kleymann and Seristö 
draw similar conclusions by identifying three generic airline strategies: growth, focus 
and low-cost.3 Growth can be facilitated through organic growth or through mergers 
and alliances. The focus strategy entails some form of niche strategy based on a 
certain geographic market or customer base; consider the example of Virgin Atlantic 
until recently.4 The low-cost strategy entails large volumes of customers being 
served at an extremely low-cost, thereby achieving a profit.  
Network airlines and low-cost airlines operate within the same economic reality. 
They intend to operate an aircraft size that allows competitive unit costs to be 
realised and, having established this, they then seek to find enough passengers who 
are willing to pay the fares in order to cover the total costs of running its flights.5 For 
the purpose of this thesis, the interaction between these two types of market player is 
most important, for it is this interaction which provides insights into the role of 
alliances. It is, therefore, the purpose of this section to provide an introduction to the 
differences and the interaction between these two business models. 
The significance of airline alliances as a form of business strategy has grown rapidly 
over the last two decades due to the increased domestic competition from low-cost 
airlines and, additionally, the overall trend of globalisation, which saw the legacy 
airlines shift their focus onto international markets or, in the case of European 
airlines, to long-haul international markets. At the same time, consumers began to 
expect a ‘from anywhere to everywhere’ service approach from their airlines.6 As 
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such, airlines were forced to cater for the needs of a global market.7  
In the 1990s, US airlines embarked upon an international expansion to increase the 
global reach of their domestic networks and to make use of the opportunities 
provided by the more liberal international regulatory systems. Alliances served as a 
facilitator of this process. European airlines that were prohibited from accessing the 
domestic US market also made use of alliances to develop their international 
networks. The early forms of airline alliance were loose cooperations in the form of 
marketing alliances that afforded more concentration to the revenue-side than to the 
cost-side of the operations. In the first period of post liberalised markets, traditional 
network airlines and low-cost airlines subsisted and developed in harmony with one 
another. This was the ‘golden 90s’ when global economic upturn boosted demand 
and business passengers were ready to pay high fares for flights.8 
5.1.2 Low-cost airlines 
However this period of mutually beneficial growth was brought to an end when low-
cost carriers achieved a critical size as a result of fundamental changes in the early 
2000s.9 Economic downturn, rising fuel prices and industry shocks – such as the 
9/11 terrorist attacks, the Iraq war or the SARS epidemic – hit network airlines 
especially hard and exposed their vulnerability in domestic operations as compared 
with low-cost airlines. As has been alluded to, only a fraction of city pairs can 
sustain direct flights on a daily basis. For example, in Europe approximately 75 000 
origin-destination markets exist but, nevertheless, only 3% of them have more than 
75 passengers per day.10 Low-cost airlines tackle the problem of route density in a 
different way. While network airlines aggregate passengers through their hubs, low-
cost airlines offer passengers attractively low prices to compensate them for the 
inconveniences they have to endure in terms of flight routes and journey time.11 In 
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this regard, they manage to enlarge the catchment area they serve,12 thus creating 
more opportunities to fill their aircraft while operating on a point-to-point basis. 
Low-cost airlines either fly via primary airports and stimulate extra traffic by setting 
prices that network airlines cannot match or, alternatively, they fly via small 
secondary airports at prices that passengers find attractive enough for the added 
trouble of getting there. 
Low-cost airlines have an inherent cost advantage in short-haul operations in 
comparison to network airlines due to the fundamental differences of their business 
models. This cost gap was initially as high as 45-62%.13 In fact, according to some 
commentators, more than 70% of continental traffic (US or European) could be 
served by low-cost airlines at a service quality level of 80% for less than 50% of the 
network airlines’ unit cost.14 
The cost advantage of low-cost airlines originates from a more streamlined business 
model: one that does not attempt to serve all potential passenger segments with a 
series of complex operations. Traditionally, and in the early years of liberalisation, 
network airlines targeted the custom of all passenger segments within their hub-and-
spoke network. These passenger segments included both high and low yield 
intercontinental/continental connecting/point-to-point traffic.15 The operation of 
complex hub-and-spoke systems came at a cost and this was initially financed by 
high yield business passengers. Indeed, network airlines were very much dependent 
on the volatile demand of high yield business passengers, which proved a significant 
weakness in turbulent economic times. This business model would remain 
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sustainable so long as no subgroup of passengers were able to deflect from the 
coalition of all passenger groups served by the airline.16 Low-cost airlines, on the 
other hand, concentrated exclusively on continental traffic on a point-to-point basis, 
thereby threatening the integrated production model of network airlines.17 Although 
there are many variants among low-cost airlines,18 they have in common certain 
operating characteristics, which create the abovementioned cost advantage.19 
Most importantly low-cost airlines operate a simple point-to-point network without 
incurring the additional cost of creating and operating a hub. In actuality, they 
expressly discourage connections between their own flights. They concentrate, 
instead, on a single class passenger service without cargo operations. They either 
charge extra for so-called ‘frill’ services like catering, lounges, frequent flyer 
programmes, seat allocation and extra comfort or, alternatively, they choose not to 
offer these services at all.  
Low-cost airlines mainly operate from secondary airports, meaning they can provide 
extremely quick turnaround times in order to minimise the non-efficient time spent 
on the ground. They operate fleets compiled of a single type of aircraft and employ 
only the minimum necessary cabin crew in an effort to reduce costs.  
Labour costs are also lower due to the employment of a generally non-unionised 
workforce with lower salaries. Employee productivity is significantly higher in these 
airlines in comparison to network airlines. Low-cost airlines achieve significantly 
higher aircraft utilisation rates as they actively seek to maximise the time spent in the 
air. These airlines fly with high density seating which has the effect of increasing 
output. On the ground, low-cost airlines generally outsource all non-core activities 
like ground handling or maintenance. With regard to distribution, they rely fully on 
direct internet sales through their own websites and usually refrain from using 
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CRSs/GDSs, travel agents or any other indirect sales channels. Finally, these airlines 
have increasingly generated revenue from ancillary services - like hotel bookings, 
car rentals, excess luggage charges, on-board sales and advertising - or from 
payments for ‘frill’ services. 
5.1.3 The response of network airlines 
Following the rapid and large-scale expansion of low-cost airlines in the early-
2000s, it became evident that - even without the external factors of 9/11, wars or 
economic crisis - the days of high fares were a thing of the past.20 In Europe, the 
market share of low-cost airlines increased from 4.9% in 2001 to 35.3% in 2010, 
while the respective figures for North America were 17.6% and 28.8%.21 Even more 
importantly, by the end of the decade the majority of network airlines’ domestic 
revenues came from markets with low-cost competitors.22 High fare demand in 
continental markets decreased significantly on a permanent basis.23 
Faced with the unavoidable competition from low-cost airlines in their short-haul 
markets, network airlines searched for an appropriate response.24 Initially, network 
airlines tried to copy their low-cost competitors by creating their own in-house low-
cost subsidiaries, but with little success. Another more general initiative from 
network airlines has been the numerous cost-cutting programmes implemented over 
the last decade. Network airlines tried to converge their business model towards low-
cost airlines by simplifying their products and pricing, reducing services levels 
where possible and by increasing productivity and aircraft utilisation.25 They sought 
to decrease their cost disadvantage by ‘de-peaking’ their hubs and by reducing or 
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abandoning secondary hubs.26 Network airlines put emphasis on increasing the 
proportion of direct channels in their ticket sales and substantially reducing travel 
agent commissions.27 
However, any restructuring of hub-and-spoke systems creates the challenge of how 
to avoid weakening the network’s competitive position relative to other networks.28 
The complex demand that network airlines tried to capture created complex 
networks with higher costs and, therefore, any change implemented as a response to 
low-cost airlines could destroy a network characteristics, which are valued so highly 
by other customer groups,29 or simply cause it to fail due to insufficient cost cuts.30 
In addition, all these changes have to be implemented in an environment of declining 
yields, with little chance that they would be able to capture the extra demand 
stimulated by low-cost airlines.31 Network airlines began to carry out extensive 
capacity cuts and outsourced some of their short-haul operations to lower cost 
regional airlines and subsidiaries.32 Both Air France and Lufthansa began substantive 
restructuring in 2012 in response to the increasing competitive pressure exerted on 
their short-haul routes.33 
In summary, network airlines are unable to compete profitably on short-haul markets 
due to the significant presence of low-cost competitors, the existing cost gap and the 
loss of high yield demand and, for the time being at least, there is nothing which 
suggests any change in that respect.34 In 2011, the largest low-cost airline in the 
world was Southwest Airlines with 135 million passengers, followed by Ryanair 
with 76 million.35 Low-cost airlines produce double-digit traffic increases and 
remain profitable, while their network airline rivals in the same markets tend to 
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downsize in an effort to minimise losses. 
5.1.4 Competition in long-haul markets 
However, the inherently more profitable operation of low-cost airlines in short-haul 
markets does not signal the endgame in the competition of these two business 
models of air transport. The point-to-point low-cost strategy, besides being 
inherently more profitable, is also inherently limited in its growth potential.36 Upon 
exceeding a certain size, there exists an extremely limited number of markets 
available for these airlines and the potential for low-cost operations or ancillary 
revenues have their limits too.37 In the pursuit of additional passengers and route 
density, low-cost airlines may wish to create ‘quasi-hubs’ where passengers self-
connect; however, this would raise their costs and lower their competitive advantage.  
Nevertheless, the ability of network airlines to combine passengers travelling on 
different city pairs provides them with an advantage in small markets or in medium 
and long-haul markets, where the intermediary stop at a hub is not seen as a decisive 
time/comfort penalty. These markets are not currently accessible to low-cost airlines, 
either because of the insufficient passenger numbers or due to the lack of suitable 
equipment for serving medium or long-haul markets on a point-to-point basis.  
These hub-and-spoke operations are most efficient at a sufficiently large scale, built 
around a hub airport with a relatively large and financially strong local passenger 
base. This can be explained by the economics of air transport, in particular 
economies of density, and by the fact that long-haul aircraft generally have a much 
higher capacity than short-haul equipment. Filling aircraft like the Airbus A380 
requires an extensive global network which has access to all important traffic 
generating areas. In Europe, for example, London, Paris and Frankfurt offer the base 
for such efficient networks which, in turn, also determines the number of mega-hub 
airlines that can survive, even with their short-haul networks being under fierce 
attack from low-cost airlines. Besides mega-hub airlines like British Airways/Iberia, 
Air France/KLM and the Lufthansa Group, only airlines with either a decisive cost 
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advantage or some niche role can survive independently in the long run.38  
The competitiveness and efficiency of network airlines in long-haul markets can be 
explained with the following factors. Long-haul operations are inherently more 
efficient than short-haul operations given the proportion of time in which the aircraft 
is in the air. Aircraft utilisation is also higher due to the long distances flown and, 
often, the pursuance of overnight operations,39 while the length of turnaround times 
does not cost that much time wise as in short-haul operations. Although the absolute 
costs of operating large capacity long-haul aircraft is more than in the case of single 
aisle aircraft, the unit cost is considerably lower. In short, long-haul aircraft are 
proportionally more efficient. In long-haul flights, passengers seem willing to pay 
for ‘frills’ and, even in weak economic periods, demand exists for high priced first 
and business class services. Long-haul services also have a much greater potential 
for complementary cargo operations that provide additional revenue streams to 
airlines.  
Exactly the same reasons can explain the difficulties of extending the low-cost 
model to long-haul operations.40 Most of the cost advantages of low-cost airlines 
seem to be difficult to transpose to long-haul operations in a way which provides the 
same amount of advantages. Furthermore, the limitations arising from the point-to-
point nature of low-cost airlines are even more striking in long-haul markets.  
The cost advantages derived from lower distribution costs are less relevant in long-
haul markets since passengers, and especially premium passengers in these markets, 
still tend to make their purchases through travel agents. Operating from secondary 
airports does not bring the same level of cost savings due to the longer stage length 
and the lower number of landings and take offs each day. Airport costs spread to a 
much higher volume of output and, therefore, are proportionately lower. Part of the 
traffic that low-cost airlines carry is traffic they have generated with low prices. This 
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phenomenon works in short-haul markets, albeit commentators consider it rather 
limited in the ‘seven days or more’ long-haul category.41 Finally, the long-haul 
aircraft technology that is currently available favours hub-and-spoke operations by 
reason of the aircraft’s capacity; not many markets can support point-to-point 
services of this scale.42 
Despite these difficulties, experiments of entering long-haul markets with low-cost 
services have been numerous in recent years.43 Nevertheless, as of today, none of 
these attempts has proved the sustainability of low-cost long-haul operations.44 The 
long-haul low-cost business model may become more credible with the arrival of the 
new lower capacity long-haul aircraft like Boeing’s B787 or, later, Airbus’ A350 
XWB. These aircraft promise to achieve significant cost improvements at lower 
capacity levels, thereby opening smaller routes for long-haul traffic.45 Although the 
appearance of low-cost long-haul carriers would place further pressure on network 
airlines, due to latters’ competitive networks, it is doubtful that they would cause 
difficulties similar to those seen in short-haul markets. 
5.1.5 Summary 
As has been shown above, network airlines have their advantage and strengths in 
long-haul global markets, which they are likely to maintain. Low-cost airlines, on the 
other hand, can successfully compete on short-haul markets with their point-to-point 
services, offering a viable alternative to hub-and-spoke networks. This is not likely 
to change or be reversed. Furthermore, this trend and the market circumstances that 
favour cost-efficient operations lead network airlines to focus on international 
operations, their own primary competitive advantage, and gain strength from their 
global networks.46 Alliance strategy appears to offer network airlines a way to 
address the challenges they face domestically, especially considering the restrictive 
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regulatory environment  that remains in international aviation.47 Currently the 
broadening and, in particular, the deepening of alliance relationships seems to be an 
essential part of network airlines’ strategy while, in the 1990s, entering into alliances 
seemed to provide little more than a good opportunity for additional revenue flow. 
This is the environment that has incentivised alliances, especially over the last 
decade. In the following section, the specific motives and objectives of alliance 
formation is explored. 
5.2 The motives and objectives of forming airline alliances 
Kleymann and Seristö mention three primary objectives in airline alliance 
agreements: defensive objectives, market offensive objectives and efficiency seeking 
objectives.48 Defensive objectives try to reduce environmental uncertainty and 
achieve a more stable operating environment through integration into an alliance. 
Offensive objectives include value enhancement, network enlargement and hub 
dominance.49 
What follows is a categorisation of the explanations found in the literature according 
to the aforementioned classification concerning the motives and objectives of 
alliance formation.50 The first category of motives and goals was ‘technology and 
know-how’. In the context of the airline industry, the first motive that warrants 
mention is aircraft maintenance.51 In the 1960s, airlines formed alliances to maintain 
their large wide-body aircraft at more economically viable terms. This category also 
includes access to knowledge of local markets or better management practices. 
Economies of experience refer to the added knowledge that an incumbent or local 
airline gained through its experience. An alliance can be motivated by this 
knowledge, since information can be exchanged between the alliance partners and 
the new partner does not need to acquire it on the market.52 Alliances can also help 
to share industry-specific practices through various working groups that operate 
within alliances.   
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The next category is ‘financial assets’ which includes: risk sharing, economies of 
scale, faster payback on investment, sharing of R&D costs, minimising capital 
investment, and availability of the partners’ financial resources. Economies of traffic 
density, scope and scale are among the most important factors to mention. Alliances, 
as a tool to extend networks, allow airlines to increase traffic density with passengers 
from an alliance partner. By connecting their networks, the carriers can generate 
extra traffic which, in turn, lowers unit cost.53 With the extension of their networks, 
airlines can increase the quality and quantity of connecting services, allowing for 
large economies of scope. Airlines can also achieve economies of scale in 
advertising with the help of joint alliance campaigns and the establishment of a joint 
brand image.  
Following deregulation in a more competitive, low yields environment, incumbents 
need to increase sales by adding flights, using larger aircraft or improving load 
factors to maintain revenue.54 Alliances can serve as an ideal tool for these purposes. 
Although the growth rates of the air transport industry have been above average, it 
continues to struggle with low profit margins.55 Alliances offer one potential means 
by which to increase profitability. Allying on the regional or international level with 
another airline, which has a lower cost base, can also result in lower costs. 
The next element within financial assets was risk sharing. Entering a new route can 
entail considerable financial risks, which could discourage an airline from pursuing 
it on a standalone basis. However, an alliance cooperation, where the partners have 
firmly entrenched marketing strength at either end of the route, can minimise risk 
and make the new service viable.56 None of the partners bears the full risk. In the 
globalising world economy, the airline industry is one of the most globalised, at least 
in terms of required services. A major market player has to be present in each of the 
main traffic generating geographic areas. The sheer scale of the financial resources 
needed for a standalone worldwide network makes the return on such an investment 
uncertain.57 An alliance can break-even on an investment of this kind a great deal 
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easier. Cooperation through alliances can deliver a worldwide network quickly, 
safely and at a lesser expense, offering both a seamless global service and the 
flexibility to adapt rapidly to any changes in the environment.58 
Under certain circumstances, joining an alliance can also be seen as a minimisation 
of capital investment. In this way, member airlines can utilise the joint brand, 
although alliance brands currently receive less recognition than the individual airline 
brands. Airlines with lesser-known individual brands can also familiarise passengers 
with the brand by associating it with the more established global alliance brand.59 
Code-sharing can bring the same benefits by way of wider brand recognition for the 
local partner.60  
The constant need for cost reductions can be satisfied with joint purchases in 
alliances. The potential for joint purchases were not realised for many years as, in 
the initial phase, alliances tended to concentrate on revenue generation and cost-
cutting only features on the agenda once there has been further deepening of the 
alliance members’ relationship. Aircraft purchases represent the most obvious 
example of joint purchases given that aircrafts constitute the most essential 
component in airline resources. There can, however, be cooperation in several other 
areas of procurement; such as in fuel, spare parts, catering or maintenance. 
Expensive long-term projects, like IT systems, can also be jointly financed by 
alliance partners.61 These advantages can also motivate alliance formation.  
The third category consists of ‘motives related to competition’. Refraining from 
joining an alliance can put an airline at a disadvantage.62 Indeed, the mere fact that a 
competitor has joined an alliance can motivate a carrier to enter one itself, especially 
if this is to avoid becoming isolated and potentially deprived of feeder traffic.63 The 
case of Virgin Atlantic is often cited as a good example of an airline that, at one 
point or another, will have to join an alliance if it wishes to survive in the alliance-
dominated transatlantic market. This point arrived in December 2012, when 
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SkyTeam member Delta announced that it forms a strategic alliance with Virgin 
Atlantic and buys Singapore Airlines’ share holding in Virgin.64 Another recurring 
topic is the potential entry of Gulf carriers into strategic alliances, which eventually 
started in 2012 with Qatar entering oneworld, Emirates joining forces with Qantas 
and Etihad closely cooperating with Air France/KLM. Industry professionals also 
often discuss the potential for loose alliances between low-cost airlines.65 In January 
2010, low-cost airlines Jetstar of Australia and AirAsia of Malaysia entered into an 
alliance agreement, which was the first agreement between two low-cost airlines.66 
In addition, Air Berlin - another low-cost airline - is already a full member of 
oneworld.  
Alliances can serve as an efficient defensive tactic against new rivals or those who 
have recently entered the market. Competing firms can easily be neutralised after 
inducting them into an alliance. In oligopolistic markets, such as general air 
transport, a strategic alliance could create the necessary conditions to mandate 
competitors to refrain from ruinous competition. The other possibility is to form an 
alliance against the new entrants. Tactical alliances can address a specific deficiency 
in the airlines’ network.67 As previously described in the section on industry 
background, the expansion of low-cost airlines largely contributed to the more 
widespread use of strategic alliances and, especially, to the deeper integration of 
these alliances.   
While rarely stated publicly as an objective, there can be little doubt that airline 
executives see alliances as a way of reducing or limiting competition.68 Dominating 
the own hub airport can provide substantial marketing benefits for the airlines. 
Offering a wide range of services at an airport can secure control over local frequent 
flyers, corporate deals and travel agent relationships. Youssef and Hansen identify 
market power as a possible means in which alliances are able to limit competition.69 
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67  Transatlantic airline alliance report (n 6) 4. 
68  Doganis 2006 (n 13) 95; Iatrou 2007 (n 7) 5. 
69  W Youssef and M Hansen, ‘Consequences of strategic alliances between international airlines: 
the case of Swissair and SAS’ (1994) 28 Transportation Research Part A 415, 416. 
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According to this theory, liberalisation threatens the economic rent established in the 
years of regulation that preceded it. Incumbent airlines therefore enter into alliance 
agreements with third country carriers. In doing so, these incumbents can hinder the 
expansion of domestic route networks for others. The improved connectivity which 
results from this, couples with the reduced threat of entry, encourages such alliances 
to come into existence. Goel also reaches the same explanation.70  
On the other hand, a strategic alliance can also be used in the opposite way. It can 
put pressure on the profit and market share of competitors. With the entry of KLM, 
Northwest and Continental to SkyTeam in 2004, the alliance gained critical mass and 
competitive strength in its rivalry with other global alliances. 
‘Market access’ is the fourth category among the motives and goals of strategic 
alliances. Cooperation provides an easy way to gain access to markets which were 
previously restricted and, as such, strategic alliances can quickly enlarge an airline’s 
network. Globalisation increases global competition and, in turn, it makes industries 
and markets vulnerable to changes in the economy and more dependent on foreign 
economies.71 A strategy that relies on the presence of airlines in several markets, 
lowers the dependency on one particular market. Strategic alliances facilitate this 
strategy when they enhance market access. In a survey conducted among US and 
European airlines, it was indicated that 67% of airlines recorded ‘global reach’ as the 
prime reason for forming alliances.72 Alliances offer a comfortable way to achieve 
this aim. The failed KLM/Alitalia alliance in 1999 provides another example. KLM 
was highly interested in the Milan area, part of the so-called ‘hot banana’, one of the 
best traffic-generating areas of Europe. Forging an alliance with Alitalia would have 
enabled KLM to tap into this lucrative market.  
The most important barrier to entry that still exists in international aviation is the 
substantial ownership and effective control condition, which is found in the majority 
of bilateral ASAs. These restrictions are a hindrance to foreign airlines, who are not 
able to take full advantage of market opportunities and, thus, forces them to rely on 
                                                
70  Abhishek Goel, ‘Strategic alliances in the global airline industry’ (2003) 11, available at: 
<http://www.iimahd.ernet.in/publications/data/2003-01-02AbhishekGoel.pdf> accessed 31 
December 2012. 
71 Agusdinata 2002 (n 57) 202. 
72  Iatrou 2007 (n 7) 3. 
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local partners. In other sectors of the economy, ie under normal market conditions, 
an undertaking interested in a particular market would simply buy a local 
undertaking or establish its own start-up. Either way, the undertaking would gain 
access to the local market.  
In air transport, however, the acquisition of a local undertaking by a foreign airline 
potentially equates to the loss of the acquired airline’s ‘nationality’ status; it is no 
longer in the substantial ownership or effective control of nationals from that 
country.73 As a consequence, the acquired undertaking may lose all of its traffic 
rights for domestic traffic and traffic to/from third countries. For example, if the 
struggling American Airlines were to be bought by its alliance partner British 
Airways/Iberia, it would lose its status as a US carrier. It would not be entitled to 
carry traffic on domestic US routes and, furthermore, third countries - which have 
bilateral ASAs with the US - could withdraw traffic rights from American Airlines to 
operate between the US and these third countries. Strategic alliances help to 
overcome these trade barriers as the members of an alliance, retain their 
independence, ie their nationality. This is one of the main reasons behind the clear 
prevalence of airline alliances over fully-fledged mergers. 
‘Access to inputs, output and management experience’ constitutes the fifth group of 
motives and goals. Access to valuable assets – which are not available internally – 
can justify a strategic alliance. At increasingly congested airports, scarce resources 
like slots or terminal facilities can inhibit access to markets. Within a strategic 
alliance, the coordination of activities between member airlines can enable the 
partner to offer such services. The pursuit of suitable slots at London Heathrow led 
to numerous examples in this regard. Due to extreme congestion at the airport, US 
airlines obtained many of their required slots from their European alliance partners.74  
In connecting markets, a vital input can be the traffic feed from alliance partners. 
Joining an alliance that has a wide and well-developed hub-and-spoke network may 
bring additional high-yield passengers for an airline. Premium passengers prefer to 
                                                
73  The loss of traffic rights is not an automatic process, since ASAs are more like 
intergovernmental trade agreements, where negotiating power can be decisive. For example see 
the case of Aerolinas Argentinas in Iatrou 2007 (n 7) 33.  
74  B Humphreys and P Morrell, ‘The potential impact of the EU/US Open Sky agreement: what 
will happen at Heathrow after spring 2008’ (2009) 15 Journal of Air Transport Management 72, 
77. 
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travel with short transfers and online connections. This is partly because of 
convenience75 and partly due to the wide market coverage, offering the possibility to 
collect and redeem frequent flyer programme (FFP) points throughout the network. 
An airline with a limited network and with non-coordinated connection possibilities 
will not appear as attractive, unless its service provides extra value for money. 
However, important high-yield premium passengers will probably increasingly 
favour the local alliance partner due to the abovementioned advantages. This 
increased traffic feed may ensure the viability or higher profitability of a flight 
through the economies associated with hub-and-spoke networks.  
Alliances between global airlines and locally specialised airlines can be motivated, 
on the latter’s part, by the need for international experience and management 
capabilities. Alliance membership may also provide invaluable access to the partner 
airline’s distribution channels or its highly valued corporate customers. Particularly 
in long-haul markets, the role of traditional sales channels like travel agents or 
airline offices still play an important role. Using the local sales channels of the 
alliance partner can be crucial for market success.  
‘Complementary resources’ represent the last group of motives and goals behind 
alliances. Although this category largely overlaps with those already mentioned, the 
following examples can be given. Alliances between airlines with complementary 
networks provide the best examples. By establishing alliances, parties combine their 
networks and expand the products offered. Under complementary networks, they 
create products of higher quality and they can increase the number of city-pairs 
offered, while enhancing the available connections and frequencies. Another 
objective in combining complementary resources is the coordination of fares and 
schedules for code-share services. The individual flight legs of a code share service 
are complementary inputs. Through the alliance, the parties can eliminate the 
problem of double marginalisation, internalise the effects of their pricing decisions 
and lower prices.  
In 2004, the combination of Air France and KLM brought together their 
complementary maintenance capabilities. Air France has specialised in the 
maintenance of Airbus aircraft while KLM did the same concerning Boeing 
                                                
75  One check in, shorter travel time, delayed flights will not be cancelled, etc. 
 109 
products. Given the fact that both airlines now operate a mixed fleet, these 
capabilities can help rationalise maintenance costs through the advantages of 
complementation. 
In the aforementioned, it has been said that one of the most important reasons for 
airline alliances is to overcome the ownership rules associated with merger control 
while, in sequence, seeking to imitate the effects of a merger. This might suggest that 
without the restrictive ownership rules all alliances would be transformed into 
mergers. However, strategic alliances can be motivated by transactional cost reasons, 
which can apply even in the absence of ownership rules. Globalisation makes the 
economy highly competitive and volatile. This is especially true for air transport, 
which shows clear signs of cyclicality and closely follows the trends of the world 
economy. Airlines try to adopt organisational forms, which are well-suited to cope 
with this kind of environment. The organisational form should, therefore, be flexible, 
have a rapid growth potential and provide a seamless global network.76 In certain 
cases, strategic alliances will be more appropriate than mergers for achieving this 
purpose.  
Another example of transaction cost considerations is the problematic issue of pilots’ 
and flight attendants’ trade unions. In a full-scale merger, the previously independent 
firms - with separate trade unions and separate collective agreements - have to be 
merged. The transaction cost implications of renegotiating these agreements can 
pose a severe hindrance, even to the merger itself. In a strategic alliance, however, 
the issue of trade unions is of less concern given that the two firms remain 
independent. Consequently, strategic alliances appear more suitable as a solution. 
5.3 Forms of cooperation in airline alliances 
In Chapter 3, a strategic alliance is identified as a cooperation for mutual benefit and 
one which is intended to operate over a longer period in the pursuance of strategic 
aims while the partner companies remain independent. Through the contribution of 
assets or knowledge to the alliance, some degree of activity integration is achieved. 
In the airline industry, airlines can cooperate with each other in all possible areas of 
their operations. Individually, these cooperations do not always fulfil the conditions 
                                                
76 Agusdinata 2002 (n 57) 204. 
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of a strategic alliance but, as a combination, they can qualify as one. A strategic 
alliance can comprise of numerous variations of these more limited cooperations. 
Accordingly, it is not possible to put forward an exact definition as to what 
constitutes a strategic alliance in commercial aviation. It is a question of integration 
level, and the existence of strategic aims which makes the difference between a 
commercial and a strategic alliance.77 The table below summarises some of the 
characteristics of the three existing global alliances: Star, oneworld and SkyTeam.78 
 
Figure 5.1 Cooperation level of alliances 
As shown above, even within the same alliance there are different levels of 
integration and not all members participate in every form of cooperation. This can 
depend on the role an airline plays in the alliance or the geographic region in which 
                                                
77 Doganis 2006 (n 13) 80. 
78  Source: Doganis 2006 (modified) 
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it operates. In the following, the individual areas of cooperation within strategic 
alliances are reviewed. 
The first group of cooperations can be best described by the term ‘network 
outsourcing’, which is where the airline extends its marketable network with the help 
of the partner through interlining, special prorate, blocked space, code-sharing or 
franchising agreements.79 
Interlining and prorate: interlining is rarely treated as part of a strategic alliance. It 
is rather an industry practice applied by the vast majority of network airlines. 
Interlining is an agreement between airlines, which enables a passenger to use a 
single ticket to travel on more than one airline. It covers both journeys where a 
passenger knows in advance that he will be carried by different airlines for different 
segments of his trip. Two airlines agree that they can issue tickets that include flight 
segments operated by the other airline. The operating airline charges the issuing 
airline for carrying an interline passenger according to the default IATA Multilateral 
Interlining Traffic Agreement (MITA or multilateral prorate agreement). Besides the 
MITA, the two airlines must also conclude a bilateral interlining agreement to enable 
the application of the IATA framework.80 Since airlines can refuse interlining with 
others, in certain cases interlining can be part of a cooperation. Proration, ie the 
division of revenue on the route between the two airlines is by default straight rate 
proration, which means that the revenue is split in proportion to the airlines’ share of 
the total mileage of the trip. Mileage is weighted to take into account the different 
unit costs of the airlines. 
Special prorate agreement: interlining agreements may be accompanied by special 
prorate agreements when airlines want to achieve tailor made, more advantageous 
conditions than the default, multilaterally determined straight rate proration methods. 
For example, an airline may specify a proviso for its own segment. This means that it 
will receive a fixed revenue whereas, under the straight rate rules, it would receive a 
                                                
79  S Holloway, Straight and level: practical airline economics (3rd edn Ashgate Publishing 2008) 
(Holloway 2008) 407. 
80  Competition impact of code-share agreements, final report (January 2007) prepared by Steer 
Davies Gleave (code-share study) 13 available at: 
 <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/transport/reports/airlinecodeshare.pdf> accessed 31 
December 2012. 
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smaller amount.81 Alliance partners often offer each other beneficial proration 
conditions that are not offered to non-aligned airlines. 
Code-share agreement: under a code-share agreement one party (the operating 
carrier) operates a particular service under its own or a combined designator code, 
while allowing the other party (the code-sharing/marketing carrier) to sell the same 
service to the general public under its own or the same designator code without, 
however, operating the service.82 Code-sharing involves the sharing of capacity, 
where one airline operates the flight and the other places its designator code on it. In 
principle this is an enhanced form of interlining where the airline which is not 
operating the flight can market the service as its own. Compared to an interlining 
flight, a code-share flight appears as an online, ie the airlines’ own flight, which has 
a high appeal to consumers. Even in the lowest form of alliances, code-share 
agreements are among the standard form of cooperations.83  
Code-share agreements can be classified in various ways. Based on the service 
which is code-shared, a distinction can be made between third, fourth, fifth and sixth 
freedom code-sharing.84 Another distinction is between ‘naked’ and ‘common 
product’ code-sharing. The first refers to a one-off route-specific agreement without 
any supplemental combination of resources and services. A ‘common product’ code-
share forms part of a wider agreement involving other aspects that improve the 
quality of the product, like FFP cooperation or lounge access agreements.  
A third classification distinguishes between franchised, connection and parallel 
code-share agreements.85 The franchisee airline operates the service under the 
franchisor’s brand identity and designator code, while not using its own code. The 
connection code-sharing parties operate on connecting services, eg a short-haul 
service to a hub and a transatlantic service from the hub. Within this category there 
are two further types: non-reciprocal/single-sector code-sharing and 
                                                
81  ibid 14. 
82  F Montag, ‘Legal questions arising from code-sharing’ (1995) European Air Law Association 
papers (Montag 2001) 101.  
83  The Joint application of American Airlines, British Airways, Finnair, Iberia, Royal Jordanian 
Airlines for approval of and antitrust immunity for alliance agreements (Docket OST-2008-
0252-0001) (oneworld application) says at 14 that each party will codeshare on the services 
operated by the other to the greatest extent possible. 
84  Montag 2001 (n 82) 102. 
85  Holloway 2008 (n 79) 408. 
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reciprocal/through code-sharing. In the case of the former, the short-haul leg of the 
flight carries both codes, while the long-haul leg carries only the operator’s code. 
Under reciprocal code-sharing, both codes are placed on both legs. The flight is 
provided by two airlines’ connecting services and they each place their code on the 
entire flight. Parallel code-share concerns earlier competitors. If they consolidate 
their services and only one remains active then it is a sole service. If they continue to 
operate and code-share each other’s flights, it is a dual service. There is always a 
prorate agreement complementing the code-share agreement as the carriers have to 
arrange the costs and revenues of each other’s passengers. The parties can also use 
straight rate proration, provisos or special terms as described above. 
Depending on the code-share agreement’s provisions on inventory control, code-
share agreements can be further categorised into ‘block space’ or ‘free flow/freesale’ 
agreements and, within block space agreements, sub-categorised into ‘hard block’ or 
‘soft block’ agreements. Block space agreements provide the non-
operating/marketing airline with a determined number of seats on a particular flight 
of the other airline. The commercial risk associated with selling these seats is on the 
marketing airline’s side. This means that, even if the seats remain empty those seats 
are deemed to have already been sold from the operating airline’s point of view and, 
as such, the operating airline has received revenue from their sale. This can be an 
absolute agreement with no possibility of change afterwards (hard block) or with the 
option of returning certain seats if not needed (soft block).86 The agreements might 
cover every available class on the flight to ensure the proper traffic mix.87 On the 
other hand, in freesale or free flow agreements, the marketing airline has free access 
to the seat inventory of the operating airline and, as such, the each of the two airlines 
book seats in the same inventory.88 
Ground handling agreements: many airlines provide ground handling services, 
especially at their home airports, and alliance partners can mutually provide each 
other with these services. Moreover, in third countries where none of the members is 
present, strategic alliances can jointly acquire these services, thereby lowering their 
operating costs. 
                                                
86  Code-share study (n 80) 11. 
87  Holloway 2008 (n 79) 415. 
88  Code-share study (n 80) 11. 
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Frequent flyer programmes: carriers can agree to coordinate their FFPs in respect 
of the reward structure and enable passengers to collect and redeem points in the 
programme of the partner airline ‘with the goal of creating a consistent customer 
experience’.89 A closer cooperation would be to merge the programmes. FFP 
cooperation is often connected to code-sharing agreements. 
Cargo agreements: the parties can agree to develop cargo products jointly, use  
cargo facilities and terminals jointly, and cooperate on ground handling with the aim 
of maximising the utilisation of their route network. 
Common sales and ticketing outlets: airlines can combine their sales offices all 
over the world, thereby avoiding duplication and increasing coverage by 
representing each other in certain geographic areas. The parties can consolidate 
administration and planning functions and can also set common sales goals. Alliance 
members can make joint offers for corporate customers, launch joint sales 
promotions and coordinate their sales activities.90 As the oneworld application 
phrases it, the parties ‘will jointly determine the most efficient strategies for selling 
alliance services, coordinating their sales forces, and allocating their sales 
resources’.91 
Route and schedule coordination: with coordination the parties try to maximise the 
number of travelling options of optimal quality (short transfer times), allocate and 
use fleet, slots and terminal facilities in the most efficient way (minimise costs, 
delays and aircraft dead time).92 Cooperation within an alliance may enable the 
members to spread their flights more evenly over the day on a particular route or to 
launch new services that they would not operate on a standalone basis. As the Star 
parties put it in their antitrust immunity application, they ‘will develop a joint traffic 
system based on coordinated route, capacity, and schedule planning of transatlantic 
                                                
89  Joint application to amend order 2007-2-16 to approve and confer antitrust immunity on certain 
alliance agreements (Docket OST-2008-0234-0001) (Star application) 18. 
90  eg ibid 42; Joint application of Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane SpA, Czech Airlines, Delta Air 
Lines, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Société Air France for approval of and 
antitrust immunity for alliance agreements (Docket OST-2007-28644-0001) (SkyTeam 
application) 31-32. 
91  oneworld application (n 83) 15. 
92  ibid 15. 
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routes’.93 
Joint engineering: the carriers provide each other with maintenance services where 
possible or acquire it together from third parties. 
Joint purchases: as previously mentioned, airlines increasingly turn to joint 
purchases to reduce costs. In the case of aircraft, this can result in significant 
savings. Normally airlines order aircraft with different cabin interiors, seating layout 
and flight kitchens in very small number. By engaging in joint purchases, airlines 
order with common configuration, which makes planes easier to build. A further 
advantage is that seasonal peaking and declines can be met with fewer problems 
because the transfer of airplanes between airlines causes no difficulties due to the 
common configuration.94 However, joint purchases are by no means limited to 
aircraft. In contrast to joint aircraft purchases, which remain a rarity, alliances pursue 
joint procurement in many other fields. Star alliance members, for example, buy 
common cockpit instruments and information management systems.95 
For example, in their alliance expansion agreement,96 United and Asiana indicate the 
following areas for joint procurement: ground handling, general goods and services, 
field and station supplies, catering, crew uniforms, information technology products 
and services, aircraft and equipment, fuel and maintenance. In their antitrust 
immunity application, the parties to oneworld mention the following as possible 
areas of joint purchases: fuel purchasing, aircraft acquisition, design and purchase of 
replacement parts.97 In the metal-neutral Star Alliance cooperation, the parties 
showed their intention to cooperate on volume/bulk purchasing agreements, joint 
negotiation with suppliers and establishing common specifications for the purchase 
of various goods and services.98 This concerns aircraft, fuel, ground handling and 
maintenance services, information technology and media/advertising.99 
IT systems: cooperation concerning IT systems includes coordination and 
                                                
93  Star application (n 89) 17. 
94  D Michaels and JL Lunsford, ‘Airlines Move Toward Buying Their Planes Jointly in Alliances’ 
Wall Street Journal (20 May 2003) A3. 
95  ibid 2. 
96  Joint Application of United Air Lines Inc and Asiana Airlines Inc for approval of and antitrust 
immunity for an Alliance Expansion Agreement (Docket OST-03-14202) Article 4.7. 
97  See oneworld application (n 83) 15. 
98  Star application (n 89) 46. 
99  See also SkyTeam application (n 90) 32. 
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harmonisation of information systems (inventory, yield management, reservations, 
ticketing, distribution, other operational systems), the joint development of new 
information technologies to facilitate ticketing (electronic ticketing, through check-
in, electronic check-in), distribution (online networks, internet bookings), 
coordination of capacity and flight planning. Star members cooperate to harmonise 
IT and accounting systems, and in their antitrust immunity application mention the 
example of the existing common baggage tracing system adopted between Lufthansa 
and United.100 IT cooperation can also include common information management to 
improve the communication between the different CRSs/GDSs that alliance partners 
use.101 In Star, there were eight different reservation platforms at the beginning of 
their partnership.102 
Airport facilities: the partner carriers share facilities and services at airports served 
by both parties. They operate joint lounges, check-in and customer service centres. 
These cooperations provide substantial benefits for the partners at airports, where 
airlines own terminals or have long-term lease contracts on it. Cooperation entitles 
eligible passengers of one airline to gain access to the lounge of the other airline, 
under the same conditions as though it were owned by their airline. Co-location of 
alliance partners can substantially improve connection times and comfort, providing 
passengers with a seamless connection experience.  
The members of oneworld have combined ticket offices, check-in facilities and/or 
lounges at some 50 airports worldwide. 103 Recently, oneworld airlines completed a 
joint project at Tokyo Narita, and they are also co-located at Tokyo Haneda.104 The 
biggest co-location project of the alliance so far has been the London Heathrow 
Terminal 5 move. Star Alliance airlines already operate under one roof at Bangkok, 
Beijing, Miami, Tokyo Narita, Seoul and Singapore airports.105 SkyTeam airlines 
share a single location in Terminal 4 at Heathrow as well as combined airport 
services, including check-in desks, self-service kiosks and baggage drop-off 
                                                
100  Star application (n 89) 46; see also SkyTeam application (n 90) 33. 
101  Iatrou 2007 (n 7) 80-81. 
102  ibid. 
103  An introduction to oneworld: The alliance that revolves around you (oneworld media 
information) 5, available at: 
<http://www.oneworld.com/content/factsheet/2012-05-
01%20Introduction%20to%20oneworld.pdf> accessed 31 December 2012. 
104  ibid. 
105  <http://www.staralliance.com/en/benefits/connect-and-transfer/> accessed 31 December 2012. 
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locations.106 Terminal 4 holds SkyTeam’s first exclusive premium check-in area.107 
Harmonisation of standards: alliance members will often harmonise their 
respective product standards, service levels and in-flight amenities.108 They establish 
and implement certain minimum criteria. They share information, technology, plans 
and know-how concerning in-flight services. The entry process of new airlines can 
sometimes last for several years before the candidate can demonstrate it has 
implemented the required service level and standards. Recently, for example, Garuda 
Indonesia’s entry into SkyTeam has been delayed due to problems with its IT 
system.109 
Pricing, inventory and revenue management coordination: the parties develop, 
coordinate and offer fare products (corporate, net, retail sale promotional fares) 
jointly. They integrate their pricing functions to the fullest extent possible.110 They 
coordinate rebates, incentives, promotions, discounts offered to customers, the level 
of service fees, auxiliary services charges (excess baggage, pets) and air fares made 
available for holiday packages. They jointly develop and prepare bids for corporate 
and government accounts. Alliance members harmonise revenue management 
methods and procedures and jointly develop inventory management allocations. 
They provide each other access to their respective revenue management systems.111 
Code-sharing and joint services inevitably requires harmonisation of the individual 
airlines’ fare classes, fare structure and pricing policies. 
Joint marketing, branding, joint product development: airlines provide joint 
marketing by coordinating the level of commissions paid to travel agents, 
wholesalers, tour operators, consolidators, and by appointing common general sales 
agents. As aforementioned, they operate co-branded joint offices and co-locate 
certain facilities and staff. They pursue joint advertising for their products. Carriers 
can create joint logos and corporate markings as is the case with all three global 
                                                
106  <http://www.skyteam.com/en/Why-SkyTeam/Easy-Connections/> accessed 31 December 2012. 
107  ibid. 
108  oneworld application (n 83) 15. 
109  Garuda's entry into SkyTeam to be delayed until 1Q2013: CEO (CAPA Center for Aviation 15 
February 2012) available at: 
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alliances. They can adopt one global positioning strategy upon which a joint brand 
and product portfolio may be developed. This could include interior design, 
decoration, cabin layout, in-flight entertainment amenities and services. 
Metal-neutrality: engaging in this form of cooperation means that airlines that are 
party to the metal-neutral joint venture become indifferent as to which airline 
actually carries the customer. By sharing revenue on a metal-neutral basis, the 
cooperation removes each carrier’s incentive to act opportunistically in ways that 
inure to the short-term financial benefit of one carrier and, instead, ensures that each 
carrier acts to the benefit of – and is compensated for its contribution to - the alliance 
as a whole.112 
The US Department of Transportation defined metal-neutrality in the SkyTeam II and 
Star Alliance cases as follows:  
‘instead of competing among themselves for a greater share of revenue by trying to 
carry passengers on their own metal (aircraft), the participants agree to pool revenues 
and costs so that they become indifferent as to which carrier operates the service. 
Much like a single firm, the 4-way JV establishes a common bottom line where, [...] 
each participant shares the same incentive to maximize the profits of the venture.’113 
‘[...] a commercial environment in which joint venture partners share common 
economic incentives to promote the success of the alliance over their individual 
corporate interests. By pooling resources to improve the overall service offering, and 
by sharing gains and losses, the partners are able to harmonise the global network 
and become indifferent as to which of them collects the revenue and operates the 
aircraft on a given itinerary. They are then able to focus on gaining the customer’s 
business by providing the best available fare and routing between two cities.’114 
Metal-neutrality is the closest form of cooperation between airlines. It tries to imitate 
the effects of mergers. In the cases of Star Alliance and oneworld it involves 
revenue-sharing, while in the case of SkyTeam it is a profit-sharing cooperation. 
Metal-neutrality is supported by further cooperation in FFPs, revenue management 
                                                
112  ibid 11. 
113  Show Cause Order 2008-4-17 (Docket OST-2007-28644-0174) (SkyTeam II) 3. 
114  Show Cause Order 2009-4-5 (Docket OST-2008-0234-0193) (Star Alliance) 4. 
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and joint planning and sales. In essence, all cooperations within the alliance aim to 
achieve the complete alignment of incentives, ie the creation of metal-neutrality.115 
5.4 Success and failure of airline alliances, lasting/non-lasting 
alliances 
We have explored the motives, goals and possible forms of airline alliances. Before 
proceeding to examine the effects they produce, their potential outcome warrants 
some attention. In the following, an examination is conducted into whether there are 
any factors that influence the stability and long-lasting nature of an alliance. 
Understanding these factors is also essential for understanding strategic alliances for 
competition law purposes. 
There have been numerous failures of strategic airline alliances and break ups of 
alliance relations. Swissair-led Qualiflier stands out as the most prominent example 
but the failed marriage of KLM/Alitalia in the form of a joint venture in 1999 might 
also be mentioned. In addition, British Airways had a stake of 24.9% in USAir from 
1993 but later sold it to establish a relationship with American Airlines. Recently in 
2007, Aer Lingus which had been a oneworld member, left the alliance after revising 
its corporate strategy. In 2008, Continental left SkyTeam to join Star Alliance and 
later merged with United. Currently, both LAN and TAM are considering the option 
of leaving their respective alliances (oneworld and Star) following their merger, in 
order to choose only one alliance for the new merged entity. Therefore, the question 
arises as to what determines the outcome. 
Doganis identifies three phases of alliance building.116 In the first phase, the partner 
airlines are concerned only with additional revenue generation and they retain their 
independence and corporate identity. They apply simple code share agreements, joint 
FFPs and coordinate their schedules. Airlines can easily terminate such an agreement 
as they are only commercial in nature. In the second phase, the parties deepen their 
cooperation and add elements of cost reductions. Here, it is evident that the parties 
need more coordination and trust as they have to align many of their needs. For 
                                                
115  oneworld’s application refers to the following areas of cooperation: code-sharing, pricing, yield 
management, schedules, marketing and product offering, FFPs, sales, airports, cargo, cost 
reduction. See oneworld application (n 83) 14-15. 
116  Doganis 2006 (n 13) 101-103. 
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example, in the case of joint aircraft purchases this means that they have to agree on 
cabin layout, interior decoration or various pieces of in-flight equipment. The 
interdependence created in this way makes exit more costly and, thus, more difficult 
for an airline; but the higher gains from joining a new grouping can convince airlines 
to change. A good example is the case of Austrian Airlines which ended its long-
term relationship with Swissair in order to enter the Lufthansa-led Star Alliance. 
In the third phase, the parties move towards the complete integration of their 
operations by engaging in joint ventures, like those currently existing between the 
core members of all global alliances. This involves metal-neutral cooperation in all 
areas of operation. In essence, airlines attempt to mimic the effects of a merger. 
Under these conditions, separation seems to be less of a realistic option, even though 
it remains objectively apparent that two separate firms still exist. Perhaps the main 
instance where separation becomes foreseeable is where a joint venture member is 
bought by a non-member airline. A similar approach is presented graphically below 
but, in this example, the particular agreement types each form a separate level of 
integration and not just three phases.117 
 
Figure 5.2 Integration level of alliances 
                                                
117  Based on the presentation ‘Alliances & managing customer value’ of B Kreiken, SVP KLM 
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It seems that the phase of alliance integration can be important for the success and 
durability of the cooperation. If the partner airlines are, for whatever reason, stuck in 
the early phases of alliance development, their partnership is vulnerable. Delta, 
Swissair and Singapore Airlines were among the first to form an alliance at the end 
of the 1980s but still after ten years they had not progressed further than the simple 
cooperations associated with the first phase.118 When Lufthansa courted Singapore 
Airlines by promising something more, Singapore Airlines keenly sought to leave its 
partners at the time. Delta acted in the same way after an approach from Air France. 
In the more recent Continental switch from SkyTeam to Star Alliance, a decisive 
element was Continental’s dissatisfaction over its position in SkyTeam and its lack 
of involvement in the metal-neutral cooperation of SkyTeam. 
Partners should move along the integration process and carefully implement the 
particular phases. The example of KLM and Alitalia shows that bypassing the first 
two phases might result in undesirable effects.119 Success and durability needs the 
following conditions. Partners should have preferably some kind of symmetry 
concerning power and control over assets, size and received benefits.120 From the 
British Airways USAir alliance, British Airways derived much larger benefits, which 
created conflicts. The parties should have an agreed set of common objectives. 
Conflicting aims within an alliance is likely to diminish success. Airlines should pay 
attention to the background of their partners. Differing product and service 
standards, coupled with distinct cultural and management styles, may cause 
significant problems.  
The Boston Consulting Group identifies four reasons why airline alliances failed to 
further consolidate the industry.121 Asymmetric benefits, irreversible commitments, 
eroding option value and cumbersome decision-making might well be the reasons for 
the failure of alliances. In the alliances of big and small airlines with diverse 
backgrounds, nothing ensures that the benefits will be spread equally between the 
partners nor in proportion to the size of the investments and commitments made. The 
irreversible commitments necessary for the success of the alliance are regarded as 
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undermining one of the key principles of alliances, namely flexibility.122 Given the 
cooperative nature of alliances, decision-making is more difficult than in a 
hierarchical structure and partners often participate with their own interests in the 
decision. 
Iatrou identifies the following factors that influence the success of an alliance: 
business fit, development strategy, governance and organisation, cultural fit, trust 
and regulatory scenario relationships with unions.123 The most important aspect of 
business fit is the compatibility of the partners’ networks. Development strategy 
refers to a shared vision of a common future.124 When Aer Lingus decided to change 
its strategic positioning from a network airline to a point-to-point low-cost airline, it 
also meant that Aer Lingus lost its interest of being a oneworld member. 
Governance, cultural fit, trust and regulatory scenario do not require a detailed 
explanation. Relationships with trade unions are vital in the airline industry due to 
the power unions have over the operations of airlines.  
Bissessur and Alamdari divide the factors affecting an airline alliance’s success into 
three groups.125 The first is network related factors which includes effective network 
size, network complementary, partner hub separation and network integration. 
Service-related factors encompass fares, travel convenience and the degree of 
seamlessness. The third group concerns competition and includes interline 
agreements and competing alliances. 
According to Rhodes and Lush, the higher the commitment of resources, the greater 
the stability and duration of the alliance. Increased complexity on the other decreases 
stability. These two characteristics result in contradictory pressures on alliances.126 
Code-sharing will be the most stable alliance as both commitment and complexity is 
low under these conditions. The most durable alliance is characterised by a high 
level of commitment accompanied with minimal complexity. Alliances with low 
commitment and high complexity are the most likely to fail under this logic. 
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The question with regard to the durability of alliances inevitably raises the issue of 
whether they will be replaced by full-scale mergers in the absence of regulatory 
restrictions. Although it is often stated that this would certainly occur, research 
implies different results. Iatrou found that, although airlines agree that mergers will 
take place between airlines and consolidation is gaining momentum, the majority 
still view alliances as a phenomenon which is here to stay.127 It seems that alliances 
and mergers will co-exist and continue to form part of airline strategy into the future. 
According to Iatrou, 65% mention that mergers are a choice for airlines and not a 
necessity.128 In fact, only 6% thought that mergers were more important than 
alliances.129 Mergers are most likely to take place on a regional basis, as shown by 
the numerous takeovers of Lufthansa in Europe. However, due to reasons other than 
those relating merely to regulatory restrictions, alliances also remain an important 
tool in the strategy of airlines. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter has sought to present the industry-specific background of alliance 
formation and the airline-specific motives of entering strategic alliances. 
Competition on liberalised markets has the effect of constantly decreasing yields. 
With the widespread operations of low-cost airlines, the only way to sustain revenue 
is by extending international operations and improving load factors. The threat of 
low-cost traffic on short-haul markets has forced network airlines towards 
international cooperation. The most appropriate course of network extension is 
strategic alliance formation. The most important motives for the formation of an 
airline alliance are the need to overcome the ownership rules and the advantage of 
achieving economies of traffic density, scope and scale.  
Strategic airline alliances can take a number of forms but usually involve the 
combination of collaborations in certain areas. The primary element of every alliance 
is code-sharing and FFP agreements. Not every inter-airline cooperation reaches the 
level of a strategic alliance; a lot of them belong to the category of commercial 
alliances. The pursuit of strategic aims and the combination of assets for this purpose 
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makes all the difference. Cooperation within alliances can have varying intensity, 
starting from loose regional cooperation and the use of standard agreements to 
metal-neutral revenue or profit-sharing agreements. 
The final part of this chapter examined the stability and durability of airline 
alliances. The level of integration, commitment and complexity can be decisive in 
this regard. Simple commercial alliances can be vulnerable while an extensive 
cooperation covering all aspects of airline operations can cement the alliance. 
6 EU competition law analysis of airline alliances 
This chapter is dedicated to the analysis of airline alliance cases under EU 
competition law which constitutes the main part of the thesis and provides an answer 
to the thesis question by using the conclusions of the preceding chapters. In this 
thesis, the question asked is whether, in the light of the more economic approach, it 
is correct to classify airline alliances as restriction by object and interpret latter 
concept in a wider sense under Article 101(1) TFEU. By relying on the example and 
analysis of airline alliances and in particular metal-neutral alliances, the thesis argues 
that the wider interpretation of restriction of competition by object is correct and, as 
such, does not conflict with the more economic approach of EU competition law. 
However, the analysis of restriction by object must take into account the effects of 
Article 101 TFEU as a whole including Article 101(3) TFEU. Therefore this wider 
interpretation of object restrictions must be complemented by a realistic application 
of Article 101(3) TFEU, in order to achieve the desired outcome of an administrable 
and efficient enforcement regime that minimises error costs.  
Chapter 6 begins with the issues of market definition that establish the framework 
for assessing both competitive harm under Article 101(1) TFEU and potential 
efficiency benefits under Article 101(3) TFEU by defining the relevant competitive 
constraints (Section 6.1). The section also discusses the experience of both the 
antitrust and merger cases in the aviation industry.  
Section 6.2 explores the various aspects of Article 101 TFEU’s application to airline 
alliances. Section 6.2.3 on restriction of competition sets out the theoretical aspects 
in relation to restrictions by object under Article 101(1) TFEU, the more economic 
approach and the issue of administrability, as well as the relationship between these 
concepts. Although the arguments in this section do not focus on aviation, a full 
understanding of these issues is necessary to be able to answer the thesis question. 
This discussion starts by explaining the meaning and case law of restriction of 
competition followed by an overview of the relevant literature in particular on 
restriction by object. It explains the basics of restriction by object. Section 6.2.3.1 
defines the more economic approach and its effects on EU competition law. Section 
6.2.3.2 on administrability of efficient antitrust enforcement systems explains how 
the more economic approach claims to contribute to the overall efficiency of 
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competition law regimes and the goal of minimising error cost at affordable expense. 
It sets out the administrative errors that can arise from the inefficient design and 
application of competition rules, followed by a short overview of an ideal system. 
Section 6.2.3.2.1 presents the answers of US antitrust law for the challenge of 
minimising administrative errors by setting out the development of the per se versus 
rule of reason distinction. Although the US experience has limited direct relevance 
for the application of EU competition rules, it provides an excellent illustration of 
the most important factors and their interaction with regard to administrability.  
Section 6.2.3.2.2 on EU aspects analyses the structure and application of Article 101 
TFEU in light of the general ideas on administrability and the rich US experience. 
This helps to identify and emphasise the peculiarities of Article 101 TFEU. It is 
suggested that the bifurcated nature of Article 101 TFEU and the dichotomy of 
object and effect satisfies the needs of an efficient and sufficiently flexible system 
saving administrative resources if appropriate. It is argued that the categorisation as 
restriction by object only serves the purpose of shifting the burden of proof in certain 
cases but does not determine the outcome of the process. Therefore even the wider 
definition of restriction by object would be appropriate without negative 
repercussions on the efficiency of the enforcement system in the form of false 
positives. 
Sections 6.2.4 to 6.2.7 explain why the theoretical conclusions discussed above 
would be operable also in practice as demonstrated by the example of revenue-
sharing airline alliances. Section 6.2.4 uses the findings of Chapters 3 to 5 to set the 
framework for analysing airline alliances. It deals separately with the negative 
effects or possible theories of harm with regard to airline alliances and explains hub 
dominance and horizontal, vertical effects and multimarket contact issues. It also sets 
out the benefits of airline alliances, in particular the relevant supply-side and 
demand-side benefits. These sections demonstrate that revenue-sharing airline 
alliances may represent both a threat to competition and also a significant potential 
for efficiencies. The former legitimises the classification as restriction by object, 
while latter justifies the need to have a more realistic application of Article 101(3) 
TFEU. Section 6.2.5 explains why Article 101 TFEU is relevant for the assessment 
of airline alliances and why their examination should not take the form of a ‘quasi’ 
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merger analysis within the framework of Article 101 TFEU. Section 6.2.6 concludes 
the whole analysis of Article 101(1) TFEU by synthesising the conclusions of 
preceding parts of the thesis on why the concept of restriction by object seems 
appropriate for the case of revenue-sharing alliances. Section 6.2.7 of the thesis 
synthesises the conclusions relevant for the more realistic application of Article 
101(3) TFEU. 
As a result, this chapter answers the thesis question by providing that metal-neutral 
revenue-sharing airline alliances should be classified as object restrictions which 
serves the more economic approach and contributes to minimising error costs at 
reasonable expense. At the same time this analysis must be complemented by a 
realistic application of Article 101(3) TFEU, in order to achieve the desired outcome 
of an administrable and efficient enforcement regime that minimises error costs. 
6.1 Market definition in air transport cases 
In one of its early cases, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court of 
Justice) states that ‘the definition of the relevant market is of essential significance, 
for the possibilities of competition can only be judged in relation to those 
characteristics of the products in question by virtue of which those products are 
particularly apt to satisfy an inelastic need and are only to a limited extent 
interchangeable with other products’.1 For the purposes of EU competition law 
analysis, the EU Commission’s 1997 notice on the definition of relevant market is of 
particular importance.2 Market definition is a tool to identify and define the 
boundaries of competition between undertakings. This process identifies the 
competitive constraints that the undertakings concerned are faced with.3 The notice 
defines demand substitutability, supply substitutability and potential competition as 
the main sources of competitive constraints.4 The main disciplinary force, according 
to the Commission’s practice, is demand substitution, which exerts a more 
immediate and effective constraint on undertakings than the other sources of 
                                                
1  Case 6/72 Europemballage Corp and Continental Can Co Inc v Commission [1979] ECR 461 
para 32.  
2  Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of [EU] competition 
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competition.  
Defining the relevant market seeks to restrict attention only to those products and 
services which have a significant impact on competition.5 The relevant market is 
usually comprised of two dimensions, a product-specific and a geographic 
dimension. However, as an air transport service inherently involves a geographic 
dimension, it is less useful to draw a clear dividing line between the product and 
geographic dimensions of air transport.6 The definition of a relevant market forms an 
integral part of the competitive assessment of certain types of market behaviour. 
That said, the product and geographic markets merely represent separate dimensions 
to a single relevant market. Consequently, if these dimensions cannot be 
distinguished clearly, this does not necessarily mean the analysis is flawed.  
Passengers rarely fly for the pure pleasure of air transport; rather, they want to get 
from A to B. In other words, when passengers book flights to a desired destination, 
the flights themselves are an intermediate product. Under this interpretation, the 
product demanded could be defined as the transportation from A to B, rather than 
flying for the sake of flying. This product definition inevitably involves a geographic 
element and, consequently, determining a geographic market would seem to be 
somewhat superfluous. This approach is called the origin and destination, in short 
‘the O&D approach’. Demand substitution exists whenever an increase in the price 
of a product causes consumers to switch from the purchase of that product to an 
alternative (substitute) product. Supply-side substitution occurs when, in response to 
a price increase, other suppliers enter the market by switching their production to 
offering the product in question.  
In air transport, the issues of market definition can vary on a case-by-case basis. It 
has to be assessed whether city pairs (eg London-New York) or airport pairs (eg 
London Heathrow-New York JFK) should constitute the relevant market or, 
alternatively, whether undertakings compete on a wider market of several cities (eg 
Vienna/Bratislava-Manchester/Liverpool). The competitive constraints exerted by 
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other modes of transport can be decisive on short-haul routes where high-speed train 
connections exists. Certain cases raise the issue as to whether one-stop/connecting 
services compete with non-stop/direct services, or whether the market can be further 
divided according to different customer groups like time-sensitive/non-time sensitive 
(price sensitive) or premium/non-premium consumers. The answers always depend 
on the circumstances of a particular case.  
Nevertheless, the crucial question that always needs to be asked is the following: 
does the price increase of a transport service induce a sufficient number of buyers to 
switch to other services, so as to render the price increase unprofitable? In other 
words, can marginal consumers affect prices: are there enough consumers who, if 
they were switch to other services, could push pricing to competitive levels?7 If the 
answer is affirmative, then the service which the consumers switch to should also be 
included within the definition of the relevant market. It is important to note that in 
order to make a price increase unprofitable it is not necessary that all consumers 
switch. It might well be the case that a small decrease in output can offset higher 
prices. It might also be that services with different characteristics or prices are seen 
as substitutes in the eyes of consumers, while other similar services are not. What is 
decisive is how consumers actually react in the event of a price increase.8  
To sum up, this chapter will give some indications and examples from earlier cases 
to highlight the relevant factors to be considered when determining the relevant 
market in aviation cases. 
6.1.1 Origin & destination approach 
The Ahmed Saeed case was the first that dealt with market definition concerning 
scheduled air transport in EU competition law.9 Here, the Court of Justice adopted a 
test which sought to determine whether a scheduled flight on a particular route can 
be distinguished from alternatives, like charter flights, railways and road transport 
                                                
7  P Crocioni,‘Defining airline markets: a comparison of the U.S. and EU experience’ (2000) 45 
Antitrust Bulletin 1 (Crocioni 2000) 18. 
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‘by virtue of specific characteristics’.10 The Court of Justice states that the test can 
result in different outcomes depending on the case. The analysis may conclude that 
there exists an airline route where no effective competition is likely to arise but in 
principle, within the EU, air transport on O&D city pairs or several substitutable 
O&D pairs can be defined as the relevant market.11 This O&D or route-specific 
approach focuses on demand-side substitution, ie the consumers’ point of view. 
Somebody with the intention to travel from A to B, will not seriously consider flying 
from A to D as an alternative, since he needs to get from A to B. Each route 
constitutes a separate market. This approach, applied from the early years of the 
Commission’s practice, is not surprising. In the market definition notice, demand 
substitution is identified as the main source of competitive constraint, and the 
consumer’s viewpoint is deemed the most important.12 The O&D approach was 
confirmed in several subsequent court cases.13 
In Delta Air Lines/Pan Am, the Commission suggests that the market definition 
could amount to each route being treated as a distinct market.14 Depending on the 
demand-side substitutability of certain routes, a bundle of routes might collectively 
be defined as the relevant market. The Commission’s approach can be seen in more 
detail from the Air France/Sabena case.15 First it reinforces the premise that, in the 
air transport sector, the relevant market may be defined as the scheduled air transport 
of passengers on a particular route or bundle of routes connecting two geographical 
areas. The decision goes on to explain that substitution can be established based on 
the particular length of the routes, the distance between airports serving those routes, 
or the number of frequencies available on those routes. Subsequent cases apply this 
test.16 
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In KLM/Alitalia, the Commission rephrases its O&D approach.17 Although it takes 
notice of the developments on the supply side of the air transport market, the 
emphasis still remains on the demand-side perspective and the route-specific needs 
of the consumer. The relevant market, therefore, includes a route or a bundle of 
routes on the city pair comprising:18 
• ‘the direct flights between the two airports concerned; 
• the direct flights between airports whose respective catchment areas 
significantly overlap with the catchment area of the airports concerned at 
each end; 
• the indirect flights between the airports concerned to the extent that these 
indirect flights are substitutable to the direct flights. Substitutability of direct 
routes with indirect routes depends on a number of factors such as the flight 
time or the frequencies (and schedules) of the routes’. 
The latter definition in KLM/Alitalia set the new standard for subsequent cases.19 
The Commission has not departed from the O&D approach so far, although the 
parties in various cases have increasingly raised the issue of supply-side substitution 
and network competition.20 On the other hand, the supply-side aspects of air 
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transport and its network effects are taken into account, to a certain extent, when 
airport substitution or the substitutability of one-stop and non-stop services is 
examined. 
Other jurisdictions also routinely use the O&D approach. As the EU Member States 
explain in their report on airline alliances, the O&D approach is a suitable starting 
point for the competition analysis of air transport cases.21 In the 1999 OECD 
Roundtable on Airline Mergers and Alliances, the majority of contributing countries 
confirmed that they apply the O&D approach.22 The US Department of Justice 
(DOJ) also adopts O&D as its preferred approach. It considers the same demand-side 
aspects of air transport as the EU Commission.23 In the DOJ’s opinion, to 
Department of Transportation (DOT) in latter’s Star Alliance and oneworld 
investigations, the DOJ clearly argues for relevant markets no wider than city pairs.24  
6.1.1.1 Network market definition 
Network airlines operate hub-and-spoke networks or, if they do not have the 
sufficient size to do so, they form part of such networks within the scope of a 
strategic alliance. Strategic alliances play a prominent role in the creation of truly 
global networks. Currently, only three global airline alliances exist: Star Alliance, 
oneworld and SkyTeam. These alliances aim to create worldwide networks. Many 
argue that competition in the aviation industry should be understood and assessed as 
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competition between these global networks. Accordingly, competition analysis 
should also concentrate on the competitive effects of agreements or transactions on 
competition between these networks. Investigations limited to narrowly-defined 
routes or O&D city pairs cannot capture the true nature of this competition between 
networks, nor enable a proper assessment of the efficiencies to consumers brought 
about by these networks.25 The main concern of any investigation, therefore, should 
be network competition on a regional level or the effects on competitive conditions 
of air transport between regions or continents. 
However, according to the Commission, the demand for air transport services is 
always route-specific. If somebody is faced with monopoly prices on the route in 
which he/she flies, he/she may take little comfort from the fact that airline networks 
intensively compete on a European or worldwide basis. This is the demand-side 
approach, taking into account the customers’ requirements. A departure from the 
O&D approach would only be possible if airlines could enter a market quickly and 
without difficulty, should the airline on the route try to raise prices.26 The 
Commission has, on several occasions, assessed network competition issues. It 
acknowledges that network competition exists and increases with the rapid extension 
of alliance networks in a liberalised environment.27 Nonetheless, the Commission 
has so far concluded that it is unnecessary to change its well-established approach. 
The Commission denies the possibility of determining an overall national or 
European market in LH/SAS, referring to the O&D approach of the Union Courts.28 
In KLM/Alitalia, it also rejects the parties’ arguments which sought to justify a 
global air transport market where networks compete against each other.29 UA/US 
repeats the argument but gives a more detailed explanation for the limited supply-
side substitution.30 In the Commission’s opinion, airlines are not able to start 
services between all transatlantic city pairs and market them in the short term 
without incurring significant additional costs and risks. In 2012, more than 10 years 
after this decision, most of the regulatory barriers and economic considerations 
                                                
25  See eg UA/US (n 16) para 11; AF/KLM (n 19) para 10; LH/Swiss (n 20) para 13; LH/SN (n 20) 
para 13; LH/AuA (n 20) para 13; UA/CO (n 20) paras 10-11; IAG/bmi (n 20) para 33. 
26  See eg UA/US (n 16) para 12. 
27  LH/SAS (n 16) para 35. 
28  ibid para 34. 
29  KLM/Alitalia (n 17) para 22. 
30  UA/US (n 16) para 12. 
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arising from the hub-and-spoke systems still hinder rapid supply-side substitution on 
transatlantic markets. 
In AF/KLM, the Commission addresses the network competition issue in detail.31 
After repeating the importance of the demand-side approach, the Commission finds 
that the network approach would be relevant only for network carriers.32 Low-cost 
and regional airlines agree with the traditional O&D approach. Over the years, 
network competition was only raised as a serious possibility in relation to corporate 
contracts. As was evident in AF/KLM, the parties argued that corporate customers, 
like large multinational undertakings, increasingly considered contracting with 
airlines on the basis of the geographic coverage of their networks.33 An undertaking, 
like Shell for example, has travel needs all over the world. Therefore, when choosing 
a travel supplier, they decide based on what the network airlines and their respective 
alliances can offer. A larger network would be more likely to meet the demands of 
this type of customer. Consequently, corporate customers could base their decision 
on the competitive strength of a network and would not be concerned with individual 
routes.  
To date, the Commission has not, in any of its cases, identified a separate market for 
corporate customers, where demand would be network-specific and not route related. 
Experience tells us that, although corporate contracts cover multiple routes, certain 
important routes are treated separately. Discounts are also connected to the traffic on 
particular routes.  
The Ryanair/Aer Lingus case offered another opportunity to reconsider the 
traditional O&D approach of the Commission. The case concerned the merger of two 
airlines operating from the same Member State and mainly from the same airport in 
Dublin. The merging parties’ ease of entry into routes originating from Dublin raised 
the issue of supply-side substitutability between routes to/from Dublin.34 However, 
the Commission chose to apply the O&D approach, referring to the demand-side 
aspects and the competitors’ difficulties in switching between different markets. 
                                                
31  AF/KLM (n 19) paras 10-18. 
32  ibid para 11. 
33  AF/KLM (n 19) para 13. See also LH/SN (n 20) para 13; DL/NW (n 20) para 9; UA/CO (n 20) 
para 11; BA/AA/IB (n 20) para 18; IAG/bmi (n 20) para 31. 
34  Ryanair/Aer Lingus (n 20) para 59. 
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As a consequence, the traditional O&D approach serves as an appropriate basis for 
analysing air transport markets. Network effect and supply-side substitution can be 
captured partly with a route-specific analysis, while other aspects form part of the 
competitive assessment at a later stage.35 Network competition through one-stop 
services can appear as a competitive constraint, even if an O&D approach is applied. 
Similarly, competition by services to/from airports in the same catchment area can 
represent the network competition aspects. Those issues arising from network 
competition that cannot be dealt with within the framework of market definition will 
gain significance in the assessment of market power. Effects of frequent flyer 
programmes (FFP), corporate deals, market position at the hub city or traffic feed 
from the respective network may be considered as entry barriers. The Commission 
can also find anti-competitive effects that are not related to a particular route but, 
rather, the airlines’ network characteristics.  
In IAG/bmi, the Commission found that British Airways were able to engage in a 
foreclosure strategy consisting of restricting access to flights (or raising the costs of 
that access) for passengers connecting at Heathrow to services operated by other 
carriers in competition with British Airways on various long-haul routes.36 In the 
same case, the Commission investigated British Airways’ ability to dominate its 
London Heathrow hub in an anti-competitive manner.37 In LH/AuA, the analysis 
concerning the merged entity’s network strength in Central and Eastern Europe was 
also found not to be route-specific.38 Furthermore, supply-side considerations also 
play an important role in the analysis of potential competition. Only those airlines 
are considered as credible new entrants on a particular route which, for example, 
operate their own hub at one of the airports concerned by the route in issue. In this 
way, the competitive assessment takes into account the industry specificities of 
aviation. 
There is one notable exception to the generally applied O&D approach. Certain 
passengers, travelling for holiday purposes can be indifferent as to which destination 
they choose, provided it is warm and sunny. On these routes, a price increase can 
divert passengers from one destination to another equally sunny and warm 
                                                
35  AF/KLM (n 19) para 17. 
36  See eg IAG/bmi (n 20) paras 507-551.  
37  ibid paras 483-506. 
38  LH/AuA (n 20) paras 269-274. 
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destination. As a consequence, the two routes can be treated as substitutes.39 
The experience of other jurisdictions supports the above conclusions on network 
competition. The most valuable experience is that of the US. As discussed in the 
section on US deregulation, the theory of contestable markets served as the 
cornerstone of the market opening. This contestable market theory would mean a 
complete departure from the O&D approach. It is the case of perfect supply-side 
substitution. The theory, nevertheless, proved inaccurate, at least with regard to 
network airlines. As to low-cost airlines, it seems that brand image or having a base 
at a particular airport can still provide some advantages compared to new entrants.40 
Finally, the approach of the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) warrants particular mention. The ACCC usually applies a regional approach 
in international alliance cases, like international air passenger transport services 
between Australia and UK/Europe. It has done so because the distances involved in 
travelling from Australia make, at least for leisure passengers, alternative routings 
more viable. In such circumstances, and in most of the cases, it is considered 
inappropriate to define narrowly-defined markets on a city pair basis.41 However, in 
short-haul and domestic markets they would also apply the O&D city pair 
approach.42 
6.1.1.2 Airport substitution 
The issue of airport substitution can be used in two ways to modify the original 
O&D city pair approach. It can serve to narrow down the relevant market to only 
certain airport pairs (eg Heathrow-JFK) or, contrastingly, it can result in the 
inclusion of additional city pairs (eg Brussels-Manchester/Charleroi-Liverpool). The 
Commission regularly examines the substitutability of airports.43 Passengers 
                                                
39  KLM/Martinair (Case COMP/M.5141) [2009] OJ C51/4 paras 122-148. 
40  See among others these arguments in Ryanair/Aer Lingus (n 20) paras 545-784. 
41  See eg the Australian ACCC’s authorisation A91247&A91248 of 3 February 2011 on Virgin 
Blue Airlines’ and others’ application; ACCC authorisation A91265&A91266 of 29 September 
2011 on Qantas Airways’ and American Airlines’ application. 
42  OECD 1999 (n 22) 126. 
43  British Midland v Aer Lingus (Case IV/33.544) Commission Decision 92/213/EEC [1992] OJ 
L96/34 (British Midland) para 14; AF/Sabena (n 15) paras 34 and 39-42; BA/TAT (n 16) paras 
20-23; BA/Dan Air (n 16) para 10; Swissair/Sabena (n 16) paras 20-24; BA/Air Liberté (n 16) 
para 15; KLM/Air UK (n 16) paras 23-24; SAir/AOM (n 16) paras 15-17; AOM/AL/AL (n 16) 
para 15; UA/US (n 16) paras 22-34; KLM/Alitalia (n 17) paras 27-28, 31 and 34; AuA/LH (n 19) 
paras 54-56; BA/SN (n 19) paras 16-17; BA/IB/GB (n 19) paras 19-26; AF/KLM (n 19) paras 24-
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beginning or ending their journey in the catchment area of two or more airports can 
choose between those airports. Services from those airports can be substitutes from a 
demand point of view. The number of passengers in the overlapping catchment areas 
of airports should be sufficiently large to discipline the competitive behaviour of 
airlines operating at those airports. Depending on the circumstance, there can also be 
one-sided substitution between airports. In this case, passengers would switch from 
one airport to the other as a reaction to a price increase, but they would fail to do the 
same in the opposite direction. The assessment of airport substitution always 
requires a case-by-case assessment.  
Different passenger types behave differently according to their travel preferences. It 
is possible that the same two airports will be considered as substitutes for long-haul 
passengers and also belong to separate markets for travel within the EU. In UA/US, 
the parties argue for airport catchment areas of 250km in the case of international 
gateway airports like Frankfurt or Munich, and 100km for German regional 
airports.44 The Commission’s investigation did not confirm this definition. In another 
case, on the other hand, it acknowledges larger catchment areas for long-haul flights 
and smaller ones for intra-EU services.45 Business passengers travelling on the same 
city pair may not regard services between secondary airports as substitutes. Leisure 
passengers, on the other hand, may consider them on each occasion they fly.46 
The size or overlap of an airport’s catchment area largely depends on the overall 
travelling time of the journey the passenger intends to undertake and often on its 
purpose. Passengers take into account the convenience and cost of getting to an 
alternative airport.47 Good public transport connections at affordable prices may 
convince passengers to consider services to/from other airports as well. Passengers 
evaluate the services offered from an airport, ie the flight times, schedules and 
frequencies. Business passengers, for example, prefer high frequencies with flight 
                                                                                                                                     
34; AF/Alitalia (n 19) paras 47-53; LH/Swiss (n 20) paras 65-66, 77 and 100; LH/Eurowings (n 
20) paras 65, 82 and 96; Ryanair/Aer Lingus (n 20) paras 72-287; IB/Vueling (n 20) paras 52-63; 
LH/SN (n 20) paras 51-104, 116, 205-206 and 228; LH/bmi (n 20) 11-13 and 45-57; LH/AuA (n 
20) paras 15-17, 110, 124-126 and 155; IB/BA (n 20) paras 19-33; UA/CO (n 20) paras 13-14; 
BA/AA/IB (n 20) paras 26-30; IAG/bmi (n 20) paras 43-67. 
44  UA/US (n 16) paras 22-24. 
45  eg AF/KLM (n 19) para 25. 
46  For example, in the case of travel between Dublin and London, in British Midland (n 43) the 
Commission finds that Heathrow is the preferred airport (para 14), while in Ryanair/Aer Lingus 
(n 20) it involves all London area airports in the relevant market (paras 109-125). 
47  See the analysis of Ryanair/Aer Lingus (n 20) paras 73-76. 
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times enabling them to return on the same day. Secondary airports with 
predominantly low-cost traffic usually offer one daily or less frequent flights, at 
flight times not optimal for business passengers. Business passengers may choose a 
primary airport also due to the availability of extra services like lounges, which they 
are entitled to use by reason of their membership in FFPs.  
In Ryanair/Aer Lingus, the Commission, based on responses from airports, 
establishes a proxy of either a distance of at least 100 km or a driving time of at least 
1 hour as the typical minimum catchment area.48 However, this is only a first proxy 
and does not eliminate the need for a detailed case-by-case analysis concerning the 
individual airport pairs.49  
Airport substitution should also be examined from a supply-side or airline 
perspective. The relevant question concerns the ability of airlines to change airports 
and reschedule their services at the alternative site. Network airlines have limited 
possibilities to do so, since they operate hubs and need traffic feed. Therefore, 
network carriers need enhanced airport infrastructure with large capacity. Point-to-
point carriers, on the other hand, have lower expectations and increased mobility.50 
Airport substitutability for an airline depends on their passengers’ needs and the 
market segment they would like to serve.  
In AF/KLM, the Commission finds that Paris Charles de Gaulle and Paris Orly are 
substitutes for point-to-point airlines.51 They are both within comparable distance 
from the city and have comparable access facilities. Transfer traffic, in contrast, 
prefers Charles de Gaulle due to the larger offer of connecting flights. Airlines with 
long-haul connecting flights would have difficulties in changing between Charles de 
Gaulle and Orly. Thus, for them, substitutability is limited. 
As to the experience of other jurisdictions, airport substitution emerged as a crucial 
issue in the 1997 and 2001 AA/BA antitrust immunity cases of the DOT.52 The DOJ 
                                                
48  ibid paras 82-85. 
49  ibid para 83. See also IAG/bmi (n 20) para 49; LH/bmi (n 20) para 11; LH/AuA (n 20) para 15 or 
LH/SN (n 20) para 53. 
50  Ryanair is famous for significantly and instantly downgrading services at airports where they 
have commercial disputes. The 2011 example of Alicante or the 2012 case of Morocco are 
notable from recent years. 
51  AF/KLM (n 19) para 29. 
52  American/British Airways I (Docket OST-1997-2058), Order 99-7-22; American/British Airways 
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argued, in its opinions to DOT, that Heathrow and Gatwick were in separate markets 
for business passengers concerning UK-US routes.53 The DOJ explained the 
definition of separate markets with the following arguments.  
The entry to Heathrow was seriously limited by the restrictions that existed at that 
time due to the Bermuda II Agreement.54 Carriers consistently chose Heathrow as 
opposed to Gatwick if they had a choice to serve both airports. Heathrow has a much 
better location, closer to the London business district.55 The preference of business 
passengers for Heathrow produced significantly higher yields (ie profitability) for 
Heathrow services.56 The evidence also showed that most attempts to compete with 
the Heathrow service from Gatwick had been unsuccessful.57 Airlines providing 
parallel services from Heathrow and Gatwick to US destinations discontinued their 
services from Gatwick or faced serious difficulties due to the poor performances of 
these services. Passengers clearly favoured services at Heathrow. 
In BA/City Flyer, the UK Competition Commission conducts an extensive study of 
competition between Heathrow and Gatwick.58 The decisive factors are the price, 
type of journey, origin and destination of the traveller, type of passenger, type of 
flight and frequency.59 The Competition Commission finds that a sufficiently large 
proportion of passengers could be regarded as indifferent and, therefore, the airports 
form part of the same market.60 On the other hand, in the Air Canada/Canadian 
Airlines case, which concerns the Canada-London markets, the Competition 
Commission defines separate relevant markets for Heathrow-Canadian destinations 
with regard to time-sensitive passengers.61 A detailed and very interesting analysis 
                                                                                                                                     
II (Docket OST-2001-10387 and 11029), Order 2002-4-4. 
53  Comments of the Department of Justice (21 May 1998) (DOJ 1998) 13-14, available at: 
 <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/comments/1777.htm> accessed 31 December 2012. 
 Comments of the Department of Justice (17 December 2001) (DOJ 2001) 19-23, available at: 
 <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/comments/223248.htm> accessed 31 December 2012. 
54  DOJ 1998 (n 53) 13. 
55  ibid. 
56  ibid 14. 
57  DOJ 2001 (n 53) 20. 
58  CC, British Airways Plc and City Flyer Express Limited, Cm 4346 (20.07.1999), a report on the 
proposed merger, available at: 
<http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/1999/430ba.htm#full> accessed 
31 December 2012. 
59  ibid para 5.52. 
60  ibid paras 2.66, 2.84 and 5.52-5.62. 
61  CC, Air Canada/Canadian Airlines Corporation, Cm 4838 (02.08.2000), a report on the merger 
situations, para 2.31-2.34, available at: 
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can also be found on the substitutability between Milan airports in the 
Alitalia/Volare decision of the Italian competition authority, AGCM.62 
6.1.1.3 Non-stop and one-stop flights63 
The inclusion of network competition aspects in market definition can be achieved in 
various ways. One of the most obvious examples is to include one-stop or multi-stop 
flights within the relevant market. This acknowledges the fact that certain airlines 
can exert a competitive restraint on the non-stop services of competitors through a 
one-stop service via their own hub. The importance of one-stop services can differ 
from route-to-route depending on the distance of the flight, the geographic position 
of the hub or the time penalty that the extra stopover imposes. Business and leisure 
passengers may attribute different values to one-stop services since they have 
different preferences in terms of convenience, price or the total time of travel.  
Indirect flights are generally of lower quality in the eyes of consumers since they 
need to make a stopover. However on long-haul routes, such as the transatlantic 
routes, the extra time penalty of using an indirect flight has lower impact on total 
travel time. Besides travel time, there are also other decisive criteria. Convenience of 
departure and/or arrival time, frequency, FFP benefits, or level of service can also be 
of importance. A competitor, although operating a one-stop service, may provide 
more beneficial conditions concerning other criteria, which would induce the 
passenger to choose the one-stop service.  
On the other hand, as explained in previous chapters, airlines can increase 
frequencies with one-stop services via their hubs. The individual route segments of a 
one-stop service are not only dedicated to that particular O&D city pair but, also, to 
virtually all routes within the network. A one-stop service can be highly competitive 
if the hub-and-spoke network enables it to provide more frequent flights than would 
be economically justified when based solely on the local O&D demand. Given the 
                                                                                                                                     
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20111202195250/http://competition-
commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2000/443air.htm#full > accessed 31 December 2012. 
62  Provedimento n. 12185 Alitalia/Volare (10 July 2003). 
63  Throughout the thesis the non-stop/one-stop distinction is used. In several of the Commission’s 
decisions the terminology direct/indirect flights is used. The use of the word ‘non-stop’ flights is 
more precise because direct flights can include also flights that may entail a refueling stop 
and/or a disembarking/re-embarking stop, under certain conditions. See IB/BA (n 20) 4 footnote 
10. 
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limitations of air transport markets, it is often the case that only one-stop services 
can provide a daily connection on a city pair. Finally, one-stop services through the 
own hub can make it possible to enter certain markets which would not have a 
service at all. 
Substitutability from one-stop services was excluded in early Commission cases due 
to the short-haul operations of the airlines involved.64 In other earlier cases, the issue 
was only mentioned as a possibility in relation to long-haul routes.65 In 
KLM/Alitalia, the Commission considers one-stop flights within its assessment, to 
the extent that - based on flight time, frequency and schedule - they offer a viable 
alternative to the non-stop service on the route.66  
The issue of one-stop substitution clearly emerges as more significant in the 
assessment of transatlantic alliances or mergers with an effect on long-haul routes. 
The LH/UA/SAS67 and KLM/NW68 alliances and the UA/US merger all involved 
intensive market investigations on the issue. It was concluded that one-stop services 
constrain non-stop services on the transatlantic long-haul routes. One-stop services 
are viable alternatives depending on airline preference, price, schedule or the 
availability of direct flights.69  
In UA/US, the Commission offers guidance on the circumstances in which a one-stop 
service can be regarded as a substitute for non-stop flights.70 It has to be marketed as 
a connecting flight for that city pair in reservation systems. The extension of flight 
duration should be limited and the total travel time should still be comparable with 
the non-stop service.71 In UA/CO, the Commission modifies the test of UA/US.72 It 
                                                
64  BA/TAT (n 16) para 19; BA/Dan Air (n 16) para 10; Swissair/Sabena (n 16) para 26. 
65  SAir/AOM (n 16) para 18; SAir/SAA (n 16) para 12; SIA/Virgin (n 16) para 18. 
66  KLM/Alitalia (n 17) para 22. 
67  LH/SAS/UA (Cases COMP/D-2/36.201, 36.076, 36.078) Commission notice concerning the 
alliance between Lufthansa, SAS and United Airlines [2002] OJ C181/2 (LH/SAS/UA) see also 
OJ C264/3. 
68  KLM/NW (Case COMP/D-2/36.111) Commission notice concerning the Alliance between KLM 
Royal Dutch Airlines and Northwest Airlines, Inc [2002] OJ C181/6 (KLM/NW), see also OJ 
C264/5. 
69  M Gremminger, ‘The Commission’s approach towards global airline alliances — some evolving 
assessment principles’ (2003) 1 EC Competition Policy Newsletter 75 (Gremminger 2003); or 
IP/02/1569 (29/10/2002) Commission closes probe into KLM/NorthWest and Lufthansa/SAS/ 
United Airlines transatlantic air alliances. 
70  UA/US (n 16) para 17. 
71  150 minutes were suggested as the maximum connection time. The Commission used the same 
approach in subsequent cases. See AF/KLM (n 19) paras 21-23; LH/Swiss (n 20) para 17; 
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concludes that it is not important to apply a cut off at 120, 150 or 240 minutes 
(additional time) to determine which one-stop flights are included within the relevant 
market. All one-stop services can be taken into account in the assessment since their 
low competitive value will be reflected in any case in the small proportion of 
bookings they represent.  
The most important exception to the general inclusion of one-stop services on long-
haul markets comes from cases connected to London and the UK. The Commission 
in its first oneworld investigation excluded one-stop transatlantic London flights via 
other European hubs. The reason for doing so was backtracking, ie the need to travel 
eastwards before flying through the Atlantic westwards.73 This is a serious time 
penalty and, therefore, is not preferred by passengers. In the most recent oneworld 
investigation of the Commission, the issue of one-stop services was not necessary to 
decide.74 
With regard to medium-haul routes, the Commission considers one-stop flights as 
insufficient to provide competitive constraints on the non-stop operators. On the 
other hand, certain circumstances can justify a departure from this generally 
applicable conclusion. For example, on medium haul routes, such as Scandinavia-
Spain that were examined in SAS/Spanair, one-stop flights are at a lower 
disadvantage than on short-haul services.75 Depending on the route, the proportion of 
passengers travelling on one-stop flights was considerable in this case. The limited 
number of non-stop frequencies induced a large proportion of time-sensitive 
business passengers, but also leisure passengers, to choose one-stop services. 
Frequency delay offers an explanation here. The fact that the actual time of the 
normally preferred non-stop flight is so distant from the preferred travel time of 
business passengers increases the value of more frequent, albeit longer one-stop 
                                                                                                                                     
DL/NW (n 20) paras 16-18; LH/SN (n 20) paras 46-50; LH/bmi (n 20) paras 15-16; LH/AuA (n 
20) para 27; IB/BA (n 20) para 17; IAG/bmi (n 20) para 69. 
72  UA/CO (n 20) paras 19-25. 
73  C Tomboy, ‘The proposed British Airways-American Airlines alliance’ (2002) 2 EC 
Competition Policy Newsletter 38 (Tomboy 2002). In the UK, the OFT came to the same 
conclusion in its bmi/United investigation. See case CP/1535-01 Notice of consultation issued 
pursuant to Rule 8(1)(a) of Schedule 1 of the EC Competition Law (Articles 84 and 85) 
Enforcement Regulations 2001 – 9 August 2002, Notification by British Midland and United 
Airlines of their Alliance Expansion Agreement (bmi/United), para 65. 
74  BA/AA/IB (n 20) paras 23-25. 
75  SAS/Spanair (n 16) paras 13-18. 
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flights.76 
In AF/KLM, the Commission comes to the conclusion that on short-haul routes one-
stop flights provide a suitable alternative only under exceptional circumstances.77 
The issue requires a case-by-case assessment. The exceptional circumstance was the 
following. On the Amsterdam-Bordeaux and Amsterdam-Marseille routes, Air 
France with its 6 daily one-stop service had a significant market share (20-35%) 
since Basiqair offered only 1 daily flight. Notwithstanding the longer travel time, the 
one-stop service clearly enabled a one-day return trip.78 Latter possibility is 
particularly important for business passengers. Subsequent decisions applied the 
same principle.79 
The potential inclusion of both non-stop and one-stop services in the relevant market 
means that on the same flight there might be passengers who are counted for the 
O&D city pair A while the person next to him to O&D city pair B. Under these 
circumstances it can happen that market A is perfectly competitive, while B is a 
monopoly, and still the 2 passengers sit next to each other. They use the same 
aircraft and the number of passengers can have significant effects on the cost and the 
viability of both services. A higher number of connecting passengers can lower costs 
and increase capacity thereby affecting competition on the point-to-point market. 
The markets are interrelated. Therefore, the effect of connecting traffic should be 
taken into account at later stages, during the overall competition assessment of 
affected O&D routes.80 
6.1.1.4 Substitution with other modes of transport 
Given the geography of Europe, the location of the densely populated areas and the 
well-developed motorway/high-speed train networks, substitution from other 
                                                
76  See also LH/Swiss (n 20) para 17; LH/Eurowings (n 20) para 11; Ryanair/Aer Lingus (n 20) 
paras 288-289; LH/SN (n 20) paras 37 and 44; LH/AuA (n 20) para 26; IB/BA (n 20) para 17; 
IAG/bmi (n 20) para 69. 
77  AF/KLM (n 19) para 20. 
78  ibid para 80. 
79  AF/Alitalia (n 19) para 57; BA/IB/GB (n 19) para 19; BA/SN (n 19) para 15; LH/Swiss (n 20) 
para 17; LH/Eurowings (n 20) para 11; IB/Vueling (n 19) para 33; Ryanair/Aer Lingus (n 20) 
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one-stop flights as a real alternative. 
80  ECA 2004 (n 6) para 11. 
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transport modes often arises. As mentioned above, in Ahmed Saeed the Court of 
Justice chooses to include in the definition of the relevant market alternatives that 
cannot be distinguished by virtue of specific characteristics.81 On certain routes, 
therefore, substitution with railways and road transport may be examined as a 
competitive constraint.  
In the British Midland case, the Commission dealt with this issue in detail.82 The 
case concerned travel on the London-Dublin route. Based on the characteristics of 
surface transport (speed, convenience, several changes of transport means) the 
Commission excluded it as a substitute from a demand point of view for the great 
majority of the travellers. However, it acknowledges that some price sensitive 
travellers may consider surface transport and travel on the cheapest fare classes as 
substitutes.83 At the times when European high-speed train networks were still 
limited in size, several decisions followed the approach of British Midland and only 
found imperfect substitution from railways.84 
While in LH/SAS the Commission already acknowledged that theoretically high-
speed trains offer an alternative to air transport,85 in BA/TAT II it identifies Eurostar 
as a competitive constraint on air transport services between Paris and London.86 
When assessing the substitutability of railway services, the Commission takes into 
account the total travel time from city centre to city centre. Accordingly, in the case 
of flights, one has to add the time necessary for check-in and the total time to/from 
the airports at both ends of the route.87 According to the Commission, consumers 
decide based on total travel time rather than distance. Whenever total travel time is 
not significantly longer than the aggregate time of air transport, even time sensitive 
passengers will regard other transport modes as substitutes.88 Substitutability 
analysis also includes, as a second step, the comparison of prices for the different 
                                                
81  Ahmed Saeed (n 9) para 9.  
82  British Midland (n 43) para 14.  
83  ibid. 
84  AF/Sabena (n 15) paras 25 and 31; Swissair/Sabena (n 16) para 26; BA/Air Liberté (n 16) para 
15. 
85  LH/SAS (n 16) para 32. 
86  British Airways/TAT II (Case IV/M.806) [1996] OJ C316/11 para 20.  
87  ibid para 33. 
88  AuA/LH (n 19) para 58. When comparing total travel times, for air transport the Commission 
calculates with the actual travel time, servicing time (45 min) and the time needed to get at the 
airport from the city centre (one hour at each end of the route). The time added for the travel 
time varies according to the characteristics of the particular route. 
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transport modes.89  
The Eurostar services through the Channel Tunnel lend themselves as the most 
evident form of substitution from other transport modes. In fact, due to the 
competition from Eurostar, most of the network airlines drastically reduced their 
capacity on the Paris/Brussels-London routes. Current capacity serves only 
connecting flights for their long-haul flights. Market definition in cases relating to 
these routes evolved accordingly and now comprises both transport modes, where 
rail clearly dominates the sales.90  
It is unsurprising that railway transport is the most often discussed form of 
intermodal competition in EU cases.91 However, road transport was also examined 
several times and sometimes even found as a substitute for air transport among all 
types of passengers.92 Finally, substitutability from ferry services was also 
considered in some cases,93 most notably in Olympic/Aegean where the Commission 
extensively deals with evidence on substitutability between these two transport 
modes.94 
6.1.2 Differentiation according to different passengers groups 
In the forgoing section on air transport demand, it was briefly discussed that airline 
passengers can be grouped into distinct categories according to their different 
                                                
89  See AuA/LH (n 19) para 60; AF/KLM (n 19) para 72; AF/Alitalia (n 19) para 58; LH/Swiss (n 20) 
paras 59 and 64; LH/Eurowings (n 19) para 61; IB/Vueling (n 19) para 37; LH/AuA (n 20) para 
144; IAG/bmi (n 20) para 251. 
90  BA/SN (n 19) paras 18-21 and 23; See also C Tomboy, ‘Commission approves partnership 
between British Airways and SN Brussels Airlines’ (2003) 2 EC Competition Policy Newsletter 
64; joined cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94 European Night Services Ltd and 
others v Commission [1998] ECR II-3141 (ENS) para 90; Eurostar (Case IV/M.1305) [1999] OJ 
C256/3 (Eurostar) paras 8-27; SNCF/LCR/Eurostar (Case COMP/M.5655) [2010] OJ C272/2 
(Eurostar II) paras 21-30; LH/SN (n 20) paras 338-340; LH/bmi (n 20) para 63. 
91  In addition to the cases referred in the previous footnote, see in particular SAS/Maersk (n 12) 
paras 33, 39 and 44; AuA/LH (n 19) paras 57-61; AF/KLM (n 19) paras 69-72; AF/Alitalia (n 19) 
para 60; LH/Swiss (n 20) paras 55-59 and 63-64; LH/Eurowings (n 20) paras 51, 56-57, 60-61, 
70 and 72; Ryanair/Aer Lingus (n 20) para 294; LH/SN (n 20) paras 117-140; IB/Vueling (n 20) 
paras 36-40 and 244-245; LH/bmi (n 20) paras 63-64; LH/AuA (n 20) paras 141-144 and 189; 
Olympic/Aegean (n 20) paras 272-277 and 1362-1384; IAG/bmi (n 20) paras 75-77, 191, 213-
216, 249 and 251-253. 
92  AF/Alitalia (n 19) para 59. On the Milan-Nice route, the Commission found road transport as an 
alternative to direct flights for both time- and price-sensitive passengers. See also SAS/Maersk (n 
12) paras 33, 39 and 44; AuA/LH (n 19) paras 57-61; Ryanair/Aer Lingus (n 20) para 295.  
93  SAS/Maersk (n 12) para 45; Ryanair/Aer Lingus (n 20) para 295; IB/Vueling (n 20) paras 41-45. 
94  Olympic/Aegean (n 20) paras 94-271. Substitution from ferry services is also the second plea of 
the currently ongoing appeal case of the Olympic/Aegean merger, see case T-202/11 Aeroporia 
Aigaiou Aeroporiki and Marfin Investment Group Symmetochon v Commission. 
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characteristics.95 This market segmentation has important implications for an 
airline’s pricing policies96 and the way network airlines operate and organise their 
network structure.97 The question arises as to whether and how this market 
segmentation should be taken into account at the level of market definition. The 
question is all the more important, given that the aforementioned substitution from 
alternative airports, transport modes or one-stop flights may be decided differently 
depending on the composition of the relevant market.  
The market definition notice says98 that  
‘[…] the extent of the product market might be narrowed in the presence of 
distinct groups of customers. A distinct group of customers for the relevant 
product may constitute a narrower, distinct market when such a group could be 
subject to price discrimination. This will usually be the case when two 
conditions are met: (a) it is possible to identify clearly which group an 
individual customer belongs to at the moment of selling the relevant products 
to him, and (b) trade among customers or arbitrage by third parties should not 
be feasible’. 
Accordingly, the definition of separate relevant markets is justified for certain 
passenger groups whenever it holds that airlines can identify the passenger as 
belonging to one of the passenger segments and at the same time they can force the 
passenger to buy the product ‘designed’ for the passengers’ special willingness to 
pay. As shown in Chapter 4, a widely recognised distinction is the business/leisure 
traveller distinction among airline passengers. The case law does, however, use the 
terms ‘time-sensitive/non-time-sensitive’ or ‘time-sensitive/price-sensitive’ which 
offer a better characterisation of the two passenger groups.99  
Air travel can have many attributes that are perceived differently by the above 
passenger groups. Frequency, seat availability just before departure, flexibility in 
terms of reservation changes, short flight times (no stopovers or just a minimal 
                                                
95  Section 4.4.1 Drivers and characteristics of air transport demand. 
96  Section 4.4.4 Characteristics of pricing. 
97  Section 4.4.5 Airline networks, hub-and-spoke system. 
98  Market definition notice (n 2) para 43. 
99  Throughout this thesis the business/leisure and time sensitive/non-time sensitive distinctions are 
used more or less with the same meaning describing the two main passenger groups. 
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number of it), quality of in-flight services and prices are all important elements of air 
transport services. For passengers travelling mainly for business purposes, the time 
factor is most decisive. They prefer high frequencies to enable same day return, 
booking just before departure, flexibility to change the ticket according to their 
modified travel plans, and increased flight comfort (especially on long-haul routes). 
Prices play a less decisive role in their choice of product due to their higher 
willingness to pay for these extra services and the fact that, generally speaking, the 
employer pays for the ticket. These types of passengers are often referred as time-
sensitive passengers or business travellers. In the latest cases on alliances, the 
Commission uses the terms premium/non-premium passengers which denote 
passengers who buy first, business or premium economy class tickets who also value 
travel comfort and high service levels.100 
The consumers in the other group are price sensitive and travelling primarily for 
leisure purposes. Their main concern is the price of the airline tickets. For having 
lower prices they are prepared to accept restrictions on refund and other changes, 
they make their bookings well in advance and pay earlier. They do not require high 
frequencies since they do not plan to return on the same day and usually they are 
also indifferent concerning departure times. These passengers also consider and 
regularly use one-stop services by trading-off the increased travel time against the 
discounted prices.  
The existence of distinct passenger groups does not, however, automatically mean 
that airlines can easily identify them and successfully discriminate among these 
groups. Only in the latter case would it be justified to define separate relevant 
markets for time-sensitive and non-time sensitive passengers. Although airlines 
would face difficulties in finding out each passenger’s personal motivation for travel, 
they apply very sophisticated methods designed in such a way that passengers self-
select themselves and reveal their degree of price sensitivity. When purchasing their 
tickets, time-sensitive passengers present special needs, which reveal them as high-
yield travellers. Their inability to book well in advance, the times of day and week 
they travel, their need for flexibility and their relatively short business trips 
compared to holidays, all indicate their characteristics as a passenger.  
                                                
100  BA/AA/IB (n 20) para 21; UA/CO (n 20) paras 15-17; AC/CO/LH/UA (n 20) para 5. 
 148 
The so-called ‘fences’ around the different fare products such as duration and 
departure time limitations, purchase time restrictions, payment and refund conditions 
all serve the purpose of hindering arbitrage between the different consumer groups. 
The aim is to make all time-sensitive passengers buy airline tickets according to their 
willingness to pay. The remaining seats can be sold at discounted prices, although 
only to hinder flying them empty.  
Another effective tool supplementing price discrimination is revenue/inventory 
management used by almost all network airlines, as well as several low-cost airlines. 
Time-sensitive passengers are once again induced to purchase more expensive 
tickets by the airlines which close the availability of discounted fares close to the 
flight departure and only leave open more expensive fare categories. 
To conclude, the specificities of airline pricing and the existence of passenger groups 
with different demand characteristics, in most of the cases, warrant the definition of 
separate relevant markets for time-sensitive (premium) and non-time sensitive 
(price-sensitive, non-premium) passengers.101 
In the British Midland case, reference is made to different passenger groups. The 
Commission argues that some travellers, ‘in particular price conscious leisure 
travellers’, might consider other transport modes as interchangeable.102 Concerning 
the substitution between Heathrow and other London airports, the Commission refers 
to business travellers who would strictly prefer Heathrow and only a small group 
who would be prepared to use other airports as well. Similarly, in other early 
Commission decisions, the distinction between different passengers groups was 
connected to substitution issues.103 
In its judgment in the European Night Services case, the General Court recognises 
the distinction between time and price sensitive passengers concerning transport 
                                                
101  For a more detailed analysis on the justifications of defining separate markets for time sensitive 
and non-time sensitive passengers due to the airlines’ ability to price discriminate see LH/SN (n 
20) paras 15-35; Olympic/Aegean (n 20) paras 52-93. In previous cases the issue of price 
discrimination was rarely mentioned, in that regard see Eurostar (n 90) para 19; AF/Alitalia (n 
19) para 41; LH/Swiss (n 20) para 15; LH/Eurowings (n 20) para 12; IB/BA (n 20) para 14. 
102  British Midland (n 43) para 14. 
103  BA/TAT (n 16) para 21 (airport substitution); Swissair/Sabena (n 16) para 21 (substitution of 
charter operations); LH/SAS (n 16) para 31 (substitution of charter operations). 
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services across the Channel Tunnel.104 The Commission comes to the same 
conclusion in the Eurostar case.105 KLM/Alitalia provides the first occasion where 
the time-sensitive/non-time sensitive distinction is expressly mentioned separately in 
relation to air transport services.106 The various alliance investigations gave the first 
examples of defining separate markets for time-sensitive and non-time sensitive 
passengers in air transport cases.107  
In UA/US, the Commission forms the opinion that for transatlantic routes the line 
between time and price sensitive passengers becomes increasingly blurred.108 
According to the market investigation, the choice of business passengers is not 
necessarily based on travel times. However, this conclusion does not contradict the 
distinction between different passenger groups. By applying the premium/non 
premium passenger terms the distinction can still hold. Apart from the numerous 
cases establishing separate markets for time-sensitive/non-time sensitive 
passengers,109 there is only one case, Ryanair/Aer Lingus, which expressly departs 
from this established practice. The reasons are very case-specific. While the other 
cases all concern at least one network airline that routinely applied the 
aforementioned techniques for segmenting passengers, low-cost airlines do not 
entertain such systems. Both Ryanair and Aer Lingus applied one-way tickets that do 
not enable price discrimination.110 The Commission considers, therefore, that the 
time-sensitive/non-time sensitive distinction is not relevant in the case.111 In this 
case, the Commission also explores other possibilities but concludes that the relevant 
                                                
104  ENS (n 90) para 90.  
105  Eurostar (n 90) paras 14-21. See also Eurostar II (n 90) paras 17-19. 
106  KLM/Alitalia (n 17) para 21. 
107  Commission notice concerning the alliance between British Airways and American Airlines (OJ 
98/C 239/05) British Airways/American Airlines (Case IV/36.089); Tomboy 2002 (n 73) 38; 
LH/SAS/UA (n 67); T Soames and G Goeteyn, ‘Airline mergers and alliances: EU regulatory 
issues’ (2001) 16(1) Air and Space Lawyer 13; British Midland Ltd/Deutsche Lufthansa 
AG/Scandinavian Airlines System (Case COMP/38.712) [2001] OJ C83/6 (bmi/LH/SAS); O 
Stehmann ‘Commission approves British Midland International joining STAR alliance’ (2001) 3 
EC Competition Policy Newsletter 45 (Stehmann 2001). 
108  UA/US (n 16) para 18. 
109  AuA/LH (n 19) para 47; SAS/Maersk (n 19) paras 30-31; BA/SN (n 19) paras 10-11; BA/IB/GB (n 
19) paras 14-15; AF/KLM (n 19) para 19; AF/Alitalia (n 19) paras 44-46; LH/Swiss (n 20) para 
15; LH/Eurowings (n 20) para 12; DL/NW (n 20) para 14; IB/Vueling (n 20) paras 46-51; LH/SN 
(n 20) paras 15-35; LH/AuA (n 20) paras 18-22; IB/BA (n 20) paras 11-15; Olympic/Aegean (n 
20) paras 52-93; IAG/bmi (n 20) paras 36-42. 
110  Ryanair/Aer Lingus (n 20) paras 313 and 318. 
111  ibid 319. 
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market should be that of scheduled passenger air transport.112 
With regard to international examples, the experience of the US warrants further 
mention. In its comments on the second oneworld case before the DOT, the DOJ 
expresses high scepticism in relation to American Airlines’ and British Airways’ 
argument that they have no ability to use fare restrictions to price discriminate 
against time-sensitive passengers.113 According to the DOJ, this would imply that the 
complicated pricing structures and sophisticated yield management systems that 
carriers have constructed at great cost are ineffective and do not allow airlines to 
segment demand and discriminate between business and leisure passengers.114 The 
DOJ states that airlines have a substantial ability to price discriminate among 
passengers.115 In subsequent alliance cases the DOJ maintained this argument when 
it argued that one-stop services are not in the same market for a large group of 
passengers, ie time-sensitive passengers.116 Crocioni also finds that there is 
substantial evidence on the success of airlines in price discriminating between 
different customer groups.117 Nevertheless, he also argues that supply-side 
substitution can occur with no sunk costs, which would argue against distinct 
markets.118 
Supply-side substitution leads us to examples from Australia and New Zealand, as 
these aspects were not examined in either European nor US case law. In its 2003 
investigation of the Air New Zealand/Qantas alliance, the New Zealand Commerce 
Commission (NZCC) deals extensively with supply-side substitution between 
business and leisure markets.119 The NZCC accepts that an airline with satisfactory 
premium product can also relatively easily provide a satisfactory leisure product. 
Substitution in the other direction, is already more problematic.120 The NZCC finds 
                                                
112  Business/leisure passengers (paras 320-323); late booking customers (paras 324-327); price 
insensitive (‘low frills’) customers (paras 328-329); conclusion (para 332). 
113  DOJ 2001 (n 52) 17. 
114  ibid. 
115  ibid 18. 
116  DOJ Star (n 24) 21; DOJ oneworld (n 24) 9. 
117  Crocioni 2000 (n 7) 18.  
118  ibid 19. 
119  Commerce Commission Final Determination, Determinations pursuant to the Commerce Act 
1986 in the matter of an application for authorisation of a business acquisition and in the matter 
of an application for authorisation of certain restrictive business practices and involving: Air 
New Zealand and Qantas Airways Limited, 23 October 2003 (ANZ/Qantas 2003 CC) paras 227-
236. 
120  ibid para 231. 
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that many of the costs incurred by airlines are the same for business and leisure 
products121 and economies of scope can result lower unit costs. Serving a wider 
range of customers may help to smooth out seasonal fluctuations in demand.122 
Based on the above considerations, the NZCC’s final report concludes that business 
and leisure service products are only distinct segments of a differentiated product 
market, rather than separate markets.123 This approach is partly explained by the 
degree of supply-side substitution. 
The Australian ACCC also dealt with the issue of supply-side substitution. In its 
2005 revision of Qantas’ and British Airways’ alliance cooperation, the ACCC 
notes that a key input to the provision of airline passenger services is economy class 
seats.124 The same seat can be sold for fully flexible or deeply discounted fares 
depending on supply and demand. At the same time, it can be held back for late 
booking passengers. Nevertheless, this supply-side substitution is not sufficient 
enough to include both business and leisure products in the same market.125 On long-
haul flights such as Australia-Europe, the demand-side characteristics differ to such 
an extent that cabin reconfiguration would be substantial and costly. Furthermore 
this assessment is not just limited to seat configuration or fare structure but other 
expectations of business passengers. The ACCC, therefore, considers that separate 
product markets have to be defined.126 The same conclusion was reached after re-
examining the issue in the 2010 revision of the alliance cooperation.127  
The ACCC argues differently in its recent Virgin Blue/Air New Zealand case.128 
Compared to the previous cases of long-haul travel, in short-haul markets, 
substitution is no longer so costly and time-consuming.129 With their notified 
agreement, the parties propose to modify their service model ‘to enable them to meet 
the requirements of different passenger types through a combination of 
                                                
121  Airlines use the same pilot, aircraft, fuel, landing fee, crew, etc. for the ‘production’ of both 
business and leisure cabin products. Airlines generally also offer the two products together. 
122  ANZ/Qantas 2003 CC (n 119) para 232. 
123  ibid para 234. 
124  ACCC authorisation A30226 and A30227 of 8 February 2005 on Qantas Airways’ and British 
Airways’ application para 9.70.  
125  ibid para 9.71. 
126  ibid para 9.79. 
127  ACCC authorisation A91195 and A91196 of 31 March 2010 on Qantas Airways’ and British 
Airways’ application paras 4.22-4.28. 
128  ACCC authorization A91227 & A91228 of 16 December 2010 Virgin Blue’s and others’ 
application. 
129  ibid para 5.14. 
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product/service offerings rather than by offering distinct cabin types’.130 Virgin 
subsidiary, Pacific Blue, implemented network airline features on its services 
without reconfiguring seating and cabin arrangements. The ACCC finds this to 
constitute a lessening of limitation to supply-side substitution131 and concludes that 
business and leisure passengers form part of the same relevant market.132 
6.1.3 Charter operations and low-cost competition 
The last issue of substitutability concerns competition from charter airlines and low-
cost airlines. The issue on substitution also depends on whether the question was 
raised in the context of time-sensitive or non-time sensitive passenger markets. The 
usual features of charter operations or low-cost services largely differ from those 
required by time-sensitive passengers. On purely leisure destinations, on the other 
hand, charter airlines may provide significant competition. 
One of the main characteristics of charter services is the absence of a schedule, they 
are operated as and when demand requires. Tour operators are the prime customers 
of this service as they resell the seats as part of package holidays. The latter product 
is considered as a separate product from transport services since it also includes 
accommodation, airport transfer and other elements which holidaymakers usually 
demand. In recent years, however, charter airlines increasingly sell ‘seat only’ or 
‘dry seat’ tickets which individual passengers can buy through the websites of these 
airlines. Charter aircraft are flown on a seasonal basis with low weekly frequencies, 
in a high-density seating configuration without attention to peak periods. 
Before the explosion of low-cost traffic in Europe, low-cost services were more or 
less only treated as a substitute for non-time sensitive passengers. It was argued that 
the low frequency services to secondary airports without the additional service 
elements that time-sensitive passengers usually require have no appeal for these 
passengers. With around 40% market share in Europe, these assumptions can no 
longer be held as legitimate. Low-cost services are treated as part of the general 
market of passenger air transport and, depending on the circumstances, they provide 
different levels of competitive constraints on network airlines. 
                                                
130  ibid para 5.15. 
131  ibid para 5.16. 
132  ibid para 5.18. 
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The Commission mentions the possibility of competition from charter airlines only 
on a few occasions, and generally considers them to belong to separate product 
markets.133 In Ryanair/Aer Lingus, the Commission examines the substitutability of 
charter operations and especially ‘dry seat’ offers with the services of low-cost 
airlines but fails to identify any significant competitive constraint, even in these 
relationships.134 Interestingly, the experience of the Bundeskartellamt offers different 
conclusions on the substitutability of charter services and scheduled air transport. In 
a series of decisions, the Bundeskartellamt repeatedly defined a single market for 
charter, scheduled and low-cost airlines.135 
6.2 Article 101 TFEU and airline alliances 
Article 101(1) TFEU both sets out a general prohibition on agreements, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which restrict competition and 
provides a non-exhaustive list of prohibited practices:136 
‘The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which 
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the internal market, and in particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading 
conditions; 
                                                
133  The Commission considered charters as an alternative in Swissair/Sabena (n 16) para 21; and 
mentions this possibility for non-time sensitive passengers in BA/IB/GB (n 19) paras 29-32; The 
Commission established no substitution with charter operations in LH/SAS (n 16) para 31; 
SAir/LTU (n 16) paras 14-15; SAir/AOM (n 16) paras 11-12; KLM/Alitalia (n 17) para 52; 
SAS/Maresk (n 12) paras 35-36; AuA/LH (n 19) para 45; AF/KLM (n 19) para 93; AF/Alitalia (n 
19) para 56; KLM/Martinair (n 39) paras 111-121; Olympic/Aegean (n 20) paras 45-51. On 
substitution of scheduled flights to seat sales to tour operators (ie substitution in the other 
direction) see Airtours/First Choice (Case COMP/M.1524) [2000] OJ C93/1 paras 34-42; 
TUI/First Choice (Case COMP/M.4600) [2007] OJ C137/6 paras 52-57; KarstadtQuelle/My 
Travel (Case COMP/M.4601) [2007] OJ C113/1 paras 39-43. 
134  Ryanair/Aer Lingus paras 297-311.  
135  B 9 – 62100-U-147/00 Beschluss in dem Kartellverwaltungsverfahren Deutsche 
Lufthansa/Eurowings (19 September 2001) 14; B 9 – 67/07 Beschluss in dem 
verwaltungsverfahren Air Berlin/LTU (7 August 2007) 8; B 9 – 56/09 Beschluss in dem 
verwaltungsverfahren TUI/Air Berlin (4 September 2009) 15. 
136  Case C-209/07 Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd [2008] ECR I-
8637 (Beef Industry) para 23. 
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(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.’ 
Article 101(3) TFEU, on the other hand, establishes an exception provided four 
criteria are fulfilled: 
‘The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the 
case of: 
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, 
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, 
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair 
share of the resulting benefit, and which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in 
respect of a substantial part of the products in question.’ 
Agreements that cannot satisfy these conditions are automatically void under Article 
101(2) TFEU: 
‘Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be 
automatically void.’ 
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Based on the wording of Article 101(1) TFEU above, the following elements must 
be  established for the provision to apply: 
• That independent undertakings exist; 
• That there is an agreement or concerted practice between these undertakings 
(see section 6.2.1); 
• That the agreement or concerted practice has as its object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition (see section 6.2.3); 
• That the effect on competition is appreciable (see section 6.2.2); 
• That there is an appreciable effect on trade between Member States. 
In the assessment of airline alliances, the existence of undertakings is never in doubt. 
Airlines operate as commercial undertakings in the liberalised environment and are 
often publicly listed companies. Even in countries where the national flag carrier has 
not yet been privatised, it nevertheless operates as a commercialised entity, 
organisationally independent of ministries or other State bodies.  
The nature of airline alliances also means that the existence of an agreement is also 
evident in all cases, just like effect on trade between Member States.137 However, 
issues can arise as to how these agreements should be qualified: whether they should 
be examined under Article 101(1) TFEU or the EUMR.138 Finally, it is also useful to 
consider whether the restriction of competition is appreciable.  
6.2.1 Agreement between undertakings  
The existence of agreements between airlines as undertakings is never in doubt in the 
process of assessing airline alliances. The issue that sometimes requires clarification, 
on the other hand, is whether such agreements should be treated as cooperative joint 
ventures under Article 101 TFEU or rather as full function joint ventures under the 
                                                
137  Alliance agreements are by their nature capable of affecting trade between Member States due to 
the international cross-border aspects of air transport. Consequently they will always fall within 
the scope of EU competition law. See eg LH/SAS (n 16) para 63; AuA/LH (n 19) para 83; 
bmi/United (n 73) paras 73-76; BA/SN (n 19) para 53; BA/IB/GB (n 19) para 36; AF/Alitalia (n 
19) para 104; BA/AA/IB (n 20) para 31. 
138  Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings [2004] OJ L24/1 (EUMR). 
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EUMR.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, joint ventures must perform, on a lasting basis, all the 
functions of an autonomous economic entity from an operational point of view to 
come under the scope of the EUMR.139 The joint venture has to carry out the same 
functions as any other undertaking operating in the market. This means that it must 
have a management dedicated to its day-to-day operations and access to sufficient 
resources in order to conduct its business activities on a lasting basis.  
Airline alliances rarely involve cooperation of such intensity. For example in the 
case of Lufthansa and SAS, their agreement establishes a jointly and equally owned, 
jointly managed joint venture, which covers transport services between Scandinavia 
and Germany.140 The joint venture, nonetheless, is dependent upon its parent 
companies. Both Lufthansa and SAS maintain their commercial identity, provide 
transport services under their own brand name and neither provide the necessary 
resources to the joint venture for operations on a lasting basis.141 The joint venture 
therefore functions only as a ‘sales agency’ for the parties. It cannot be regarded as a 
new face on the market. Furthermore, the parent companies could enter the market of 
the joint venture, as they have not withdrawn permanently.142 Consequently, the 
cooperation does not satisfy the criteria of the EUMR.143  
The only exception to this general approach to alliance cooperation was the failed 
cooperation of KLM and Alitalia.144 The parties had planned to create two ventures, 
one for passenger transport and one for cargo.145 Due to the international regime 
governing air transport, the ventures would not have had separate legal personalities. 
The operations of the two parent undertakings, however, were intended to be jointly 
run and marketed through the venture. The parents would have made available all 
assets and capacity needed for day-to-day operations.146 This structure would have 
enabled the parties to share cost and revenue and to jointly maximise profits. The 
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decisions of the ventures would have been made by KLM and Alitalia, with strategic 
decisions being taken by the ventures and no scope for the parties to take decisions 
individually. The condition of joint control, therefore, was satisfied.147 The alliance 
qualified as a full-function joint venture assessed under the EUMR.  
6.2.2 Appreciable effect on competition 
The requirement of Article 101(1) TFEU, that competition should be restricted 
appreciably raises interesting issues in air transport cases. The appreciability 
requirement or de minimis doctrine aims to avoid insignificant restrictions being 
dealt with under EU competition law. The Court of Justice developed the doctrine of 
de minimis restrictions in its judgment of Völk.148 According to the Court of Justice, 
‘an agreement falls outside the prohibition of Article [101(1)] where it has only an 
insignificant effect on the market, taking into account the weak position which the 
persons concerned have on the market of the product in question’.149 The 
Commission’s de minimis notice150 provides further clarification regarding 
appreciability and identifies cases where the Commission will not initiate 
proceedings.151 Accordingly, no appreciable restriction can be established if the 
parties’ market share does not exceed 10%. The de minimis notice applies to all 
sectors including air transport. The Commission’s practice, however, appears to have 
elaborated a specialised de minimis rule for air transport, independent of the above 
general de minimis concepts. 
In LH/SAS, the Commission establishes that the exemption conditions intended to 
remedy the restrictive effects of cooperation do not apply to routes with a capacity of 
30 000 or fewer seats per year.152 Interestingly, the decision refers to Article 6(1) of 
Regulation 2408/92 on market access.153 This provision allowed Member States to 
restrict entry temporarily on certain regional routes. The Commission interpreted this 
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provision as a threshold below which competition is not necessarily ensured. In 
contrast to the original idea underpinning the de minimis doctrine, the above 
provision seems to function as a de minimis threshold based on the size of the total 
market rather than the position of market participants. The subsequent case law does 
not clarify further the functioning of this ‘30 000 rule’: on the contrary, it creates 
more confusion. 
One line of cases interprets and applies the 30 000 rule as a threshold for selecting 
those routes where competition is unsustainable and natural monopoly characteristics 
can be assumed.154 These cases appear to argue that there is no competition to be 
protected on these routes. At the same time, the other line of cases suggests that the 
30 000 rule serves as a true de minimis threshold connected to the overall size of the 
market.155 Routes under the threshold do not warrant antitrust scrutiny regardless of 
whether competition can be sustained or not.156 This special de minimis threshold for 
aviation appears to suggest that certain routes simply fall outside the scope of EU 
competition law. This market size-related de minimis threshold is made still more 
inconsistent with EU competition law because the appreciability requirement of the 
effect on trade criterion should in theory cover any such considerations.  
This practice looks even more problematic for object restrictions such as revenue-
sharing joint ventures. In her opinion in the Expedia case AG Kokott, finds that 
object restrictions can hardly be regarded as de minimis infringements and that it 
must be presumed that the undertakings involved always intend an appreciable effect 
irrespective of the size of their market share and turnover.157 She concludes that the 
requirements concerning proof of the appreciability of an object restriction should 
‘under no circumstances be more stringent than the requirements concerning proof of 
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an appreciable effect on trade between Member States’.158 The same approach was 
adopted by the Court of Justice in the final judgement.159 The appreciability criterion 
of the effect on trade test is satisfied in almost all cases. This contradicts any market 
size-based de minimis threshold. 
6.2.3 Restriction of competition 
In order to come under the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU, an agreement must have 
either the object or the effect of restricting competition. The meaning of restriction 
of competition has served as a crucial point for the enforcement and development of 
EU competition law particularly in the first decades of economic integration. By 
interpreting restriction of competition in an overly broad manner, the Commission 
was able to widen the application of EU competition law and exert a decisive 
influence over its development. Given the Commission’s exclusive role in applying 
Article 101(3) TFEU under the old regime of Regulation 17,160 it preserved its role 
of main protagonist in shaping EU competition law. The Commission used this 
method to ‘develop its own view of what goals EU competition law should serve’.161  
The Commission’s White Paper on Modernisation provides some insights into 
this.162 Although the Commission elucidated in the White Paper the reasons for 
centralised application of Article 101(3) TFEU, the broad interpretation of Article 
101(1) TFEU served the same purpose by enabling the application of Article 101(3) 
TFEU.  
According to the Commission, the system was ‘necessary and proved very effective 
for the establishment of a “culture of competition” in Europe’. At a time when the 
primary objective was integration of national markets the Commission’s approach 
enabled the establishment of a uniform application of competition rules and the 
promotion of market integration. Through the broad interpretation of restriction of 
competition, the Commission included many practices in its assessment that, based 
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on a purely consumer welfare test, would not have qualified as a restraint.163 The 
Commission tended to interpret any restriction on the parties’ freedom as a 
restriction also on competition in the economic sense. As a result, the focus of 
substantive assessment became Article 101(3) TFEU. This approach is often called 
the jurisdictional interpretation of Article 101(1) TFEU.164 The decentralised 
application of Article 101(3) TFEU solved the administrative difficulties arising 
from the jurisdictional approach; furthermore the internal market objective became 
less prominent in recent years as the main objectives were already achieved. 
In addition to the jurisdictional interpretation in the early decades of EU competition 
law, the substantive meaning of the restriction of competition is said to be allocative 
inefficiency.165 Odudu interprets the two methods of restricting competition as being 
when allocative inefficiency is measured or predicted (infringement by effect) or 
when it can be presumed (infringement by object).166 According to the Commission 
guidelines on Article 101(3) TFEU an agreement restricts competition by effect 
when it affects actual or potential competition to such an extent that negative effects 
on prices, output, innovation or the variety or quality of goods and services on the 
relevant market can be expected with a reasonable degree of probability.167 In short, 
whenever increased prices, decreased output or product quality can be measured, 
predicted or presumed Article 101(1) TFEU is infringed. 
However, an agreement can comply with EU competition law in two ways regardless 
of the above interpretation of restriction of competition. Firstly, an agreement can 
completely avoid the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU provided it does not have as its 
object or effect the restriction of competition. Secondly, even if an agreement does 
infringe Article 101(1) TFEU, it can benefit from the legal exception under Article 
101(3) TFEU through a block exemption regulation or individually by satisfying all 
four conditions of that provision.  
Self-assessment, the decentralised application of EU competition rules since 2004 
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and the direct applicability of Article 101(3) TFEU have all substantially eroded the 
significance of what constitutes a restriction of competition.168 Article 101 TFEU is 
applied in its totality, which makes undertakings indifferent with regard to the issues 
whether they infringed Article 101(1) TFEU but fulfilled the conditions of Article 
101(3) TFEU or in alternative they did not violate Article 101(1) TFEU in the first 
place. Still this question can be decisive due to how the burden of proof is allocated 
in antitrust cases and the bifurcated nature of Article 101 TFEU.  
Another level of interpretation of restriction of competition reveals the classification 
of conduct either as an object or effect restriction within the meaning of ‘restriction 
of competition’. This question is already closely related to the main focus of this 
thesis. The Court of Justice emphasises from the outset that object or effect should 
be read disjunctively.169 Accordingly, the alternative nature of these two 
requirements leads first to the inquiry of the object of the agreement. Only if this 
analysis does not reveal a restriction by object, should the inquiry be continued into 
the effects of the agreement. It also has the implication that ‘in deciding whether an 
agreement is prohibited by Article [101(1) TFEU], there is therefore no need to take 
account of its actual effects once it appears that its object is to prevent, restrict or 
distort competition [...]’.170 It is apparent that the distinction of infringement by 
object and infringement by effect has an important bearing on both the party alleging 
the infringement and the alleged infringer. 
Both infringement by object and infringement by effect have been defined by case 
law. Within the group of restrictions of competition, the Union Courts have 
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highlighted certain types of conduct based on their nature and generally inimical 
attitude towards competition. These are infringements by object. Other conduct can 
be classified as infringements by effect. However, in practice defining a restriction 
of competition differs from this theoretical approach. 
Case law establishes that an agreement has the object of restriction of competition 
when ‘certain forms of collusion between undertakings can be regarded, by their 
very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition’.171 
In the same vein, the Court of Justice refers to the necessary consequence of the 
agreement being to restrict competition, since the very existence of a clause may 
create the undesired effects.172 The General Court refers to ‘obvious restrictions of 
competition such as price-fixing, market-sharing or the control of outlets’ when it 
distinguishes between cases which require a full market analysis and those which do 
not.173 In addition, assessing whether an agreement has an anticompetitive object 
involves taking account of both the precise object of the agreement and its economic 
and legal context.174 AG Trstenjak considers this requirement a reason for defining 
the object restrictions more widely than simply an agreement which obviously 
restricts competition.175 Similarly, the type of agreements listed by Article 101(1) 
TFEU (a)-(e) do not constitute an exhaustive list of restrictions by object.176  
Accordingly, in Beef Industry the Court of Justice expressly rejected the argument 
that the category restriction by object should be strictly limited to conduct of which 
the anticompetitive effects are obvious. In T-Mobile Netherlands, the Court of 
Justice says that ‘it is sufficient that [the agreement] has the potential to have a 
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negative impact on competition. In other words [it] must be simply capable in an 
individual case, having regard to the specific legal and economic context, of 
resulting in the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
[internal] market’.177 According to the Commission’s approach, ‘restrictions of 
competition by object are those that by their very nature have the potential of 
restricting competition’.178 The Commission also clarifies that restrictions black-
listed in block exemption regulations or identified as hard-core restrictions provide a 
non-exhaustive list of examples for object restrictions.179 In contrast, the Court of 
Justice refuses even to use the term ‘hard-core’, arguing that neither the Treaty nor 
secondary sources use it.180  
Infringements by object identified by case law include price fixing, market sharing, 
output restrictions, and exchange of sensitive pricing information.181 These are the 
types of infringements most often dealt with in Commission cases, however, as 
established by the Union Courts, the list cannot be regarded as exhaustive, just 
because of that circumstance. When assessing whether any agreement has the object 
of restricting competition, ‘close regard must be paid in particular to the objectives 
which it intended to attain’182 and ‘to the wording of its provisions’.183 These latter 
two requirements demonstrate that it is not the subjective intention of any or all of 
the parties which determines how the agreement is classified, but rather the objective 
content and the meaning of its provisions.  
The legal and economic context, as mentioned above, might be relevant for the final 
conclusions. For example, ‘the way in which an agreement is actually implemented 
may reveal a restriction by object even where the formal agreement does not contain 
an express provision to that effect’.184 According to AG Tizzano, ‘the anti-
competitive nature of an agreement may be deduced not only, obviously, from the 
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content of its clauses but also from a series of factors including, precisely, the 
intention of the parties as it arises from the “genesis” of the agreement and/or 
manifests itself in the “circumstances in which it was implemented” and in the 
“conduct” of the companies concerned’.185 As a consequence, evidence of subjective 
intent is not a necessary condition; however, there is nothing to prevent the decision-
maker from assessing this information and taking account of it.186 Furthermore, the 
above circumstances also mean that ‘an agreement may be regarded as having a 
restrictive object even if it does not have the restriction of competition as its sole aim 
but also pursues other legitimate objectives’.187 
Whish elaborates the idea of thinking in terms of boxes: the ‘object box’ and ‘effect 
box’.188 The object box comprises particularly pernicious types of agreement. These 
agreements are generally harmful to consumers, therefore as a policy decision they 
may only be permitted if the four conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU are satisfied.189 
For the same reason it is not necessary to prove anti-competitive effects. The effect 
box comprises all other types of agreement and a full market analysis is required for 
Article 101(1) TFEU to apply. Odudu explains object restriction as those cases 
where allocative inefficiency can be presumed either inductively once there is 
sufficient experience of the conduct or based on intention.190  
Bellamy and Child indicate that certain agreements ‘of their nature’ restrict 
competition (object restrictions), while others do not necessarily. Any other 
restriction of competition is based only on the circumstance (effect restrictions).191 
Faull and Nikpay refer to agreements that, prima facie, do not have significant 
beneficial effects but do have a high potential for negative effects.192 They cite the 
provisions of the Article 101(3) guidelines and the definition based on negative 
experience with these types of practices. Goyder uses similar language when she 
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mentions that certain agreements are prima facie so likely to affect competition that 
this effect will be presumed.193  
King, on the other hand, challenges the object box approach, arguing that it is more 
like a policy approach than a representation of the case law.194 She argues for a more 
analytical approach to restrictions of competition which finds support in case law 
and avoids the straitjacketing of the object box approach. Mahtani offers a somewhat 
similar explanation when he describes restriction by object as more than the simple 
object box approach that applies rigid categorisation.195 
If the above analysis of an agreement does not reveal a ‘sufficient degree of harm to 
competition’ then the effects should be considered as the next step, given the 
alternative nature of object and effect.196 It is necessary that factors are present 
which show that competition has in fact been restricted to an appreciable extent.197 
In contrast to object cases, this requires a full market analysis where ‘account should 
be taken of the actual conditions in which they produce their effects, in particular the 
economic and legal context in which the undertakings concerned operate, the nature 
of the products or services concerned, as well as the real operating conditions and the 
structure of the market concerned’ which includes the issues of potential 
competition.198  
A key element of the analysis is the counterfactual: the competition in question 
should be assessed within the actual context in which it would occur absent the 
agreement in dispute.199 For these purposes the relevant market needs to be 
defined.200 In essence the party alleging a restriction by effect has to demonstrate 
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appreciable negative effects on prices, output, innovation or the variety or quality of 
goods and services. These effects must be established with a reasonable degree of 
probability by examining existing and potential competition which involves 
consideration of the competition situation absent the agreement.  
This type of analysis generally concentrates on the question of whether the parties to 
the agreement already have or would obtain ‘some degree of market power’ as a 
result of the agreement.201 In certain cases, however, negative effects may be shown 
directly.202 The burden of proof in demonstrating negative effects in these cases is on 
the party alleging the infringement. The other party, in contrast with object cases, 
has to raise efficiency arguments only where the negative effects are successfully 
proven and not simply presumed. This suggests that in the absence of market power, 
undertakings are unlikely to be found to have restricted competition. Odudu 
considers that allocative inefficiency can be either measured or predicted in effect 
cases with the help of economic tools.203  
Consequently, Article 101(1) TFEU is applicable if an abbreviated inquiry into the 
restrictive nature of an agreement or the subsequent full market analysis reveals 
restriction of competition to an appreciable extent. The parties to the agreement can 
avoid the consequence of voidness under Article 101(2) TFEU only by benefitting 
from the legal exception under Article 101(3) TFEU. 
6.2.3.1 The more economic approach in EU competition 
law 
The discussion of the preceding section explained that the concept of restriction by 
object serves as a presumption, where conclusions are reached based on legal forms 
(‘boxes’) without a true economic analysis that would examine the exact effects. 
However, competition laws in general, and EU competition law in particular, seem 
increasingly influenced by the importance of economic analysis and the so-called 
‘more economic approach’. 
Over the last 15 years the more economic approach has become a trend in all policy 
areas of EU competition law with widely differing effects. Differences can be found 
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both in the timing and depth of changes adopted - a process which is far from 
complete.204 Consequently, one cannot offer a uniform definition of what is meant 
by the more economic approach applicable in all relevant areas of EU competition 
law. Nevertheless, when summarising the main characteristics of this process, the 
following distinctive features can be identified. 
Firstly, the more economic approach implies a strengthened role of economic 
analysis in investigations and the increased use of sophisticated quantitative 
econometric techniques. Econometric data analysis is applied whenever possible, 
provided that the data sets needed are available. The Commission uses the best 
evidence available specific to each case.205 This can lead to either the application of 
the full econometric arsenal,206 or simply the use of qualitative evidence.207 Despite 
the development of a more economic approach, competition authorities are limited 
by the evidence available. The enhancement of economic expertise within DG 
COMP has been a top priority since the term of Commissioner Mario Monti.208 
Secondly, the more economic approach also means a departure from the legalistic 
form based assessment to an effects-based economic approach. This has often been 
described – erroneously – as moving away from the per se approach towards a rule 
of reason approach.209 It is ultimately only those types of economic behaviour which 
actually, or are highly likely to produce detrimental effects on the market that should 
be prohibited. However, following thorough analysis, efficiency-enhancing 
competitive conduct should be allowed.  
Finally, the more economic approach also represents a declared shift towards the 
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protection of consumer welfare and consumer interests when applying competition 
rules.210 It is therefore competition and not competitors that deserves protection.  
The first application of the more economic approach, in terms of the normative rules 
applied, may be considered to have been the 1997 Commission Notice on the 
Definition of the Relevant Market.211 This document covers both Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU and merger cases and describe the methodology to be used when 
identifying the competitive constraints on market players. The document introduces 
techniques based on economic analysis such as the SSNIP test. The notice refers to 
economic problems such as the cellophane fallacy and highlights various 
quantitative techniques that can be used. The more economic approach was 
developed further with regard to the different aspects of EU competition law as 
described below.212 
6.2.3.1.1 Restrictive agreements 
In 1999, the Commission radically overhauled the relevant rules on vertical restraints 
with the adoption of Commission Regulation 2790/99.213 This block exemption 
regulation functioned as a prototype for all subsequent new-style regulations. Earlier 
block exemption regulations were extremely rigid with regard to possible content.214 
They contained so-called ‘white clauses’ which had to be included, and so-called 
‘black clauses’ which were prohibited. This practice distorted the content of 
agreements and had a straight-jacket effect on them.  
In contrast, the new block exemption regulation lists only those provisions which are 
                                                
210  Monti 2004 (n 208) 3. 
211 Market definition notice (n 2). See a critique of the notice in the light of the more economic 
approach in RJ Van den Bergh, ‘Achilles uncovered: revisiting the European Commission’s 
1997 market definition notice’ (2002) 44 Antitrust Bulletin 143; RJ Van den Bergh and PD 
Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell 2006) 125-
130. 
212  The changes in EU state aid policy will not be discussed here. See eg A Bartosch, ‘Der “More 
Economic Approach” in der Entscheidungspraxis der Europäischen Kommission in 
Beihilfesachen’ (2007) 53 Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft 681; T Jaeger, ‘Systemfragen 
des More Economic Approach im Beihilferecht’ (2008) 58 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 1064. 
213 Commission Regulation (EC) 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of Article 
81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices [1999] OJ 
L336/21. See also Commission notice - Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2000] OJ C291/1.  
214 eg Commission Regulation (EEC) 1983/83 of 22 June 1983 on the application of Article 85 (3) 
of the Treaty to categories of exclusive purchasing agreements [1983] OJ L173/5; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) 1984/83 of 22 June 1983 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to 
categories of exclusive purchasing agreements [1983] OJ L173/1. 
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prohibited (black list) and provides the necessary freedom for the parties to decide 
the terms of their agreement. The regulation therefore introduced a more effects-
based approach. In principle, where their market share does not exceed 30% (a 
threshold set by the Regulation), the parties are free to choose the form and 
provisions of their cooperation aside from clauses on the black list. It is deemed that 
no anticompetitive effects can be produced below that threshold. Following the 2010 
revision of the Regulation, the general approach remained unchanged and further 
refinements were introduced based on economic thinking, eg in relation to resale 
price maintenance.215 
Following the reform of vertical restraints, the Commission continued in a similar 
vein in reforming horizontal agreements by providing more freedom for the 
undertakings, and placing greater emphasis in the assessment on market power.216 In 
subsequent years, the regulations on car distribution217 and technology transfer218 
were adjusted in the same manner, completing the adoption of a more economic 
approach with regard to restrictive agreements.  
Game theoretical insights on the functioning of anticompetitive cartels have also 
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L203/30; Commission Regulation (EU) 461/2010 of 27 May 2010 on the application of Article 
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vehicles and for the distribution of spare parts for motor vehicles [2010] OJ C138/16. 
218 Commission Regulation (EC) 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of Article 81(3) of 
the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements [2004] OJ L123/11. 
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provided a basis for elaborating the EU leniency policy219 and settlement procedures 
in recent years.220 The reform of EU procedural rules enabled the Commission to 
focus on hard-core cartels and serious abuses of dominant position, those 
infringements of competition law which represent a real threat to consumer 
welfare.221 All these changes were driven by the desire to implement the more 
economic approach and focused on both the protection of consumer welfare and 
effect instead of form. 
6.2.3.1.2 Merger control 
In relation to merger control, the more economic approach only became more 
evident somewhat later in the early 2000s. Three consecutive and embarrassing court 
defeats forced a significant refocus of the Commission’s attitude towards economic 
analysis in merger cases. Within a few years, the Commission had prohibited the 
transactions of Airtours/First Choice,222 Schneider/Legrand,223 Tetra Laval/Sidel224 
and GE/Honeywell.225 In the first three cases, the General Court reversed the 
prohibition decisions of the Commission and delivered harsh critiques of the 
economics applied by the Commission and how these mergers were treated. In the 
fourth case, GE/Honeywell, the General Court upheld the prohibition decision, 
although it annulled the Commission’s main argument of the decision on 
conglomerate effects. 
These judgments had far-reaching consequences. They led to substantial changes in 
the internal organization of DG COMP and the applicable substantive rules. In 2003, 
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the Commission created the position of the Chief Economist to provide expert 
opinion with the help of his staff on the economics used in Commission 
procedures.226 An internal peer review system has also been created to provide the 
necessary counterbalance to the views of case teams.  
In 2004, a new merger regulation was adopted at the same time as the enlargement 
of the EU.227 The new regulation replaced the earlier used dominance test with the 
‘significant impediment of effective competition’ test as the applicable substantive 
test. The new test meant that dealing with problems such as non-collusive oligopoly 
became easier compared to the previous dominance test.228 The Commission also 
adopted guidelines in the area of merger policy. The horizontal and subsequent non-
horizontal guidelines deal in detail with merger appraisal, the assessment of non-
coordinated (unilateral) and coordinated effects and the possibilities of an efficiency 
defence.229 The guidelines incorporate current economic thinking and were prepared 
in the spirit of the more economic approach. 
6.2.3.1.3 Abuse of dominant position 
Unsurprisingly, the more economic approach has only recently influenced the 
application of Article 102 TFEU. In the absence of secondary legislation in this area, 
the Commission is far less able to implement radical changes in how the Treaty rules 
are applied. In addition, the Union Courts, bound by previous jurisprudence, exert 
considerably more influence on the direction the case law should take than in other 
areas.230  
In December 2005, the Commission published its ‘Discussion Paper on exclusionary 
abuses by dominant firms’.231 Although this was only a working paper without firm 
official conclusions, it already showed the Commission’s clear openness toward the 
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effects-based approach and applied the consumer welfare standard.232 Given the 
limited room for manoeuvre described above, the whole exercise started in 2005 
culminated in the adoption of the ‘Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying Article [102] of the [TFEU] to abusive exclusionary conduct 
by dominant undertakings’ in 2009.233 In line with the general trend, the more 
economic approach tends to emphasize the potential or actual effects of dominant 
undertakings’ behaviour, thereby allowing business decisions which do not decrease 
consumer welfare. 
The fact that both documents promote protection of consumer welfare and the 
competitive process rather than competitors, can be interpreted as a significant step 
towards a more economic approach. This is arguably true even if the Discussion 
Paper or the Guidance Paper are considered merely as Commission documents 
which set out DG COMP’s unofficial thoughts or priorities in relation to the 
enforcement of Article 102 TFEU. Ultimately, it remains the duty of Union Courts to 
decide whether the infiltration of a more economic approach in other areas of 
competition law also justify a paradigm shift concerning Article 102 TFEU. 
However, what can be clearly established at present is the signal from the 
Commission that it is open to changes and ready to move in the direction of a more 
economic approach. There are signs that Union Courts may also take a similar 
view.234 
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B 
6.2.3.2 Administrability of efficient antitrust enforcement 
system 
The more economic approach aims to improve the overall efficiency of the 
enforcement system of EU competition law. It should contribute to better decisions 
that capture more precisely the realities of the marketplace. An efficient enforcement 
system can actually achieve the goals of competition law, protect competition and 
encourage competitive behaviour even among dominant undertakings. Consequently 
consumer welfare can be enhanced and the efficient allocation of resources ensured. 
Furthermore, anticompetitive conduct should be discouraged and punished to 
maintain the benefits of competition and to achieve an optimal level of deterrence for 
the business community. It is important to understand how the design and 
enforcement practice of competition provisions influences their administrability and 
the efficiency of the system as a whole. Why would the more economic approach 
contribute to these goals. 
In theory, decision-makers can commit two types of error. Firstly, they can prohibit 
behaviour that is pro-competitive and beneficial for consumers. This is a ‘false 
positive’, or ‘type I’ error. Secondly, they can falsely permit behaviour that produces 
harmful effects on the market, which is called a ‘false negative’ or ‘type II’ error. 








   anticompetitive illegal  
Figure 6.1 Errors of competition law enforcement235 
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The light grey circle ‘A’ represents conduct which can be said to be anticompetitive. 
The vertically hatched circle ‘B’ symbolises conduct which competition authorities 
identify as anticompetitive. In an ideal world the two circles would be congruent and 
only truly anticompetitive conduct would be subject to antitrust scrutiny. The 
overlapping area of ‘C’ should therefore be maximised. The area of ‘B’ without area 
‘C’ represents false positives, ie those errors where enforcers punish competitive 
behaviour of undertakings. Area ‘A’ without ‘C’ indicates false negatives, ie conduct 
that escapes the censure of competition authorities. The size of the error areas A and 
B can vary and obviously not always equals. The institutional background of 
enforcement, the design of the competition rules applied, and the standard of proof 
can all influence the outcome. 
An enforcement system which relies heavily on a judiciary system and strong 
precedents may have a tendency towards false positives. Courts in general may be 
less open to the economic arguments often raised in antitrust cases, therefore legal 
formalism may prevail over case-by-case assessment and countless economic 
debates. Similarly, form-based competition rules that focus less on the actual effect 
may also increase the proportion of false positives. On the other hand, a high 
standard of proof that requires significantly more than the ‘balance of probabilities’ 
being satisfied on a case-by-case basis, may favour the defendant undertakings and 
increase the number of false negatives.236 A high proportion of unlawful conduct 
might escape prohibition due to the failure of parties alleging an infringement to 
provide the necessary amount of evidence required by the standard of proof.  
In theory, the aim of the more economic approach is to reduce the number of false 
positives by relying on current economic thinking. It should focus investigations 
only on those cases where anticompetitive harm occurs without any increase in 
efficiency. At the same time the more complex nature of investigations should not 
increase the number of false negatives. The net effect should be an improvement of 
the enforcement system that contributes to consumer welfare. 
In spite of the foregoing, decision-makers cannot avoid errors completely in 
applying competition rules even with a more economic approach. This is due in part 
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to the fact that enforcement of competition rules occurs in an uncertain environment 
and that authorities inevitably operate with imperfect information and at significant 
costs. As Easterbrook says, ‘the costs of action and information are the limits of 
antitrust’.237 An optimal enforcement system would take account of these limitations. 
An optimal enforcement system ‘should be designed to minimize the total costs of 
(1) anticompetitive practices that escape condemnation; (2) competitive practices 
that are condemned or deterred; and (3) the system itself’.238 
It has been considered that competition law should be connected to economic 
thinking and that the design of legal concepts in this area of law should build on 
sound economic theory. Furthermore, it has been considered that competition law 
should ‘perfect the operation of competitive markets’.239 However, this requirement 
poses its own difficulties. ‘Efforts to improve markets through law aim at a moving 
target, with a paradox: if an economic institution survives long enough to be studied 
by scholars and stamped out by law, it probably should be left alone, and if an 
economic institution ought to be stamped out, it is apt to vanish by the time the 
enforcers get there’.240 The basic characteristics of economic analysis are often in 
conflict with how law works.  
Economic analysis necessitates large amounts of data and time to produce results, 
which in the end may often produce nothing more than estimates of probabilities.241 
Economic experts may disagree about these results, and some even say that ‘any 
competent economist can construct a model showing that almost any practice injures 
consumers when certain assumptions hold’.242 Furthermore, the analysis necessarily 
involves assumptions since a global inquiry invites no answers.243 Econometric tools 
and techniques should not give a false sense of complete accuracy and precision. 
However, improvements resulting from the more economic approach are not called 
into question, as decision-making retains the potential for errors, uncertainty and 
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imprecision.244 
Given the above limitations of antitrust enforcement, authorities nevertheless must 
deal with the costs of potential errors and the costs of managing or avoiding them. It 
seems obvious that errors cannot be eliminated. Legislators and authorities have to 
make a conscious choice between ‘favouring’ false positives or false negatives. 
Easterbrook clearly prefers false negatives over false positives. In his opinion, if we 
know little about the effects of a practice, it should be excused, since most of the 
cooperations are beneficial.245 In other words, when most of the examples in a 
category prove to be pro-competitive, searching for a few anticompetitive examples 
is not cost-effective.  
Easterbrook also considers it more likely that a false negative is more self-correcting 
than a false positive.246 In his opinion, monopoly prices, that arise from falsely 
acquitted collusion, attract entry, thereby stimulating competition. However, 
practices condemned as illegal are less likely to be reviewed by courts in the short-
term. Finally, it has been considered that the costs of a false positive equal the 
potential reduction of the production cost of all units of the output, while false 
negatives concern only part of the monopolist’s output.247  
Evans and Padilla examine error costs in relation to excessive pricing in dynamic 
industries.248 The cost of false positives is represented by the loss of consumer 
welfare resulting from the foregone investment into innovation and new products.249 
They also find the error cost of false negatives small due to the absence of barriers to 
entry in these industries.250 It is generally true that US courts and authorities seem to 
be less concerned by false negatives.251 
Joskow proposes a transaction cost approach to error costs.252 Accordingly, 
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enforcement institutions should take account of transaction costs in their efforts. This 
primarily includes the costs associated with the responses made by firms and the 
market in general to antitrust rules defined in cases.253 Heyer adopts an expected 
value approach, whereby decision-making is influenced by the probability of a 
particular error and the size of the error cost involved.254 He considers that taking 
greater and more explicit account of uncertainty would result in more accurate 
decisions.255 Beckner III and Salop use a decision theoretic approach to offer a 
solution to decision-making with limited information.256  
The question therefore arises of how to design competition law rules and 
enforcement mechanisms which take account of the above limitations. One extreme 
solution may be a system which relies on detailed case-by-case assessment and 
economic analysis to identify actual effects of each individual case. This would 
mean that at first glance, we may feel confident that the number of false positives are 
actually kept to a minimum. This would be achieved to the extent allowed by the 
‘precision’ of economic theory. Law enforcement would identify only behaviour 
which current mainstream economic thinking considers harmful to consumer 
welfare.  
This may be true at least at the level of specific cases. In practice, however, this 
would be either impossible to implement or only possible at prohibitively high costs. 
Pursuing detailed economic analysis in each and every case, especially in relation to 
cartels, would not result in significantly more accurate decisions. In addition, the 
process would be highly complex, increasingly expensive and to the same extent 
unpredictable.  
Unpredictability arising from a case-by-case approach would impose higher costs 
not so much in the particular case under investigation but rather from the legal 
uncertainty which would result for the business community in general. Legal 
uncertainty created by complex rules renders it difficult for undertakings to know in 
advance whether their planned business behaviour complies with competition 
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rules.257 Undertakings may be deterred from competing on the merits just to avoid 
difficulties if they do not know the exact limits of legal and illegal conduct, or the 
definition of ‘normal’ competition. This may lead to the paradox that competition 
law itself acts as a deterrent to competition.258 This would produce the same effect as 
a false positive, even without the actual application of competition rules. Certain 
pro-competitive conduct would disappear from the market by the application of 
competition rules.  
At the same time, case-by-case assessment may also produce false negatives. The 
requirement of and extreme difficulty in demonstrating actual effects as part of a 
lengthy economic analysis may deter complainants or authorities from challenging 
illegal conduct. They may also be discouraged by the prospect of endless debates 
between economic experts. These consequences would be equally undesirable. 
The other extreme design of legal rules and enforcement involves a strictly 
formalistic and prescriptive approach, where case-by-case economic analysis does 
not play a significant role. However, a formalistic approach would clearly offer the 
advantage of legal certainty. Undertakings could easily identify the limits of legal 
and illegal activities at relatively low-costs and without the need for detailed 
economic assessment. The administrative costs of operating the system would be 
limited due to the simplicity of competition rules. A formalistic approach necessarily 
entails some categorisation of anticompetitive conduct, which also simplifies how 
the rules are applied.  
Formalism and categorisation may result in false positives, since categorisation 
necessarily includes exceptions, where actual effects are absent. Complainants or 
competition authorities may easily prove infringements of competition rules. The 
error cost of false positives may prove substantial both in specific cases and in 
general. Undertakings would be forced to align their conduct with formalistic rules 
without paying any attention to the realities of the market. 
Although both of the above extremes offer some advantages, overall, neither 
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provides an administrable system where the total cost of to some extent inevitable 
false positives and false negatives are kept to a minimum. The ideal solution may 
differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction depending on the characteristics of the legal 
system concerned, the development phase of the competition law regime in question 
and the institutional background of the enforcement authorities. For example, Arthur 
defines the following criteria for a workable legal standard: (1) consistent 
enforcement; (2) no overly broad definition; (3) minimising error cost; (4) the 
standard should be within the institutional competence of the decision-maker; and 
(5) applicable at reasonable expenses.259 
An administrable and efficient enforcement system combines the elements of these 
two extremes, and apply a flexible approach to suit the characteristics of different 
categories of potentially illegal conduct. Such a system would require a detailed 
economic assessment only in a limited number of cases, where it can be expected 
that the thorough analysis may be decisive at the level of the individual case. In other 
cases, the system should apply filters, presumptions and informational shortcuts to 
preserve administrative or judicial efforts, and avoid losses in procedural efficiency 
and the costs of unnecessarily detailed investigations.260 Ideally, these filters, 
presumptions and informational shortcuts are elaborated on the basis of mainstream 
economic thinking and the general experience of particular types of business 
behaviour. They should work as generalised conclusions of economics.  
The allocation of the burden of proof, and the standard of proof required should 
reflect the authority’s perception and evaluation of potential false positives and 
negatives. The way the system is constructed is a policy matter.261 Authorities can 
avoid in this way most of the pitfalls of categorisation and the errors associated with 
legal formalism. A solution like this contributes to the administrative efficiency of 
enforcement, while preserving the benefits of economic analysis.  
Various jurisdictions provide different answers for these issues in the light of their 
approach to competition policy, but they all face similar problems. Although the 
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experiences of the US and the EU are markedly different, certain comparisons can 
provide useful insights for the purposes of the thesis question discussed in this work. 
Therefore in the following section the per se versus rule of reason and object versus 
effect distinctions will be presented and discussed. 
6.2.3.2.1 The US experience 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act establishes that ‘every contract combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among 
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal’.262 This provision 
was further developed by case law. The conceptual framework developed by courts 
in the first half of the 20th century and dominant until the 1970s-1980s was 
characterised by the dichotomy of the per se and rule of reason approaches. Courts 
clarified that the text of Section 1 should not be interpreted in its literal sense and 
certain restraints can escape its scope.  
In Standard Oil v the United States, the US Supreme Court distinguished ‘undue’ or 
‘unreasonable’ restraints, and held that only those restraints should fall within the 
scope of the general prohibition of Section 1.263  It defined the test to be applied in 
rule of reason cases in Chicago Board of Trade:264 
 ‘The true test of illegality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely 
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may 
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must 
ordinarily consider facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is 
applied: its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of 
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the 
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose 
or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.’265 
This standard requires a fully-fledged economic analysis of all the circumstances 
surrounding a conduct, where the party alleging the infringement almost never 
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wins.266 Rule of reason cases are considered expensive, lengthy and uncertain in 
their outcome.267 Consequently, these cases are often viewed as per se legal268 and a 
defendants’ paradise.269  
The above difficulties with the applicable test, and the experience gained with 
certain categories of agreements over the years led the Supreme Court to develop the 
per se rule in a series of cases.270 Under the per se approach, certain conduct may be 
condemned without the need for elaborate economic analysis, or demonstrating 
actual effects. Once a certain amount is known about a practice, judgement on its 
legality can be made without further inquiry into the details.271 The parties to the 
agreement cannot argue a lack of restriction of competition. The infringement is 
established simply by proving the existence of an agreement belonging to a category 
prohibited per se. The investigation into the details of a case is cut off at a relatively 
early stage based on experience with the type of conduct.  
The reasoning offered by the Supreme Court for this provides that as certain 
agreements aim for and result in the elimination of competition, they ‘may well be 
held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful, without the necessity of minute 
inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed […]’.272 The 
‘pernicious effect on competition and the lack of any redeeming virtue are 
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate 
inquiry as to the precise harm [the agreements] have caused or the business excuse 
for their use’.273 The Supreme Court clearly refers to the ‘incredibly complicated and 
prolonged economic investigation […] so often wholly fruitless when 
undertaken’.274 Accordingly, it explains that while ‘cases that do fit the 
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generalization may arise but a per se rule reflects the judgement that such cases are 
not sufficiently common or important to justify the time and expense necessary to 
identify them’.275 The application of the per se prohibition predominated for several 
decades, but has been challenged and continuously reduced over recent decades.276 
These two approaches in their original form may be at tension due to the 
administrative costs of the rule of reason approach and the error risk of the per se 
approach.277 The sharp distinction between the per se and the rule of reason 
approaches has provoked extensive debate since the 1970s expressly because of the 
costs of the system.278 The per se approach is considered too arbitrary, and the rule 
of reason too ambiguous.279 This is precisely the issue highlighted by the above 
discussion of an administrability.  
The courts and authorities which recognised this difficulty tried to adopt more 
structured approaches to capture the benefits and avoid the pitfalls of the dichotomy 
system. Since the late 1970s the Supreme Court has decided several cases where it 
acknowledged the limitations of the dichotomy model and offered alternatives 
between the two extremes. For example, National Society of Professional 
Engineers,280 NCAA v Board of Regents,281 or Indiana Federation of Dentists282 are 
all regarded as providing examples of approaches that do not apply the rule of reason 
in full, but nevertheless allow analysis beyond the formalism of the per se approach.  
The different variations often referred to as ‘quick look’, ‘abbreviated’, ‘truncated’, 
‘structured’, or ‘flexible’ rule of reason and share the characteristics of applying 
filters, presumptions or shortcuts to avoid full-blown economic analysis. The factors 
taken into account include the nature of the conduct, the intent of the parties, market 
power, potential efficiencies or how compelling the theory of harm is.283 Depending 
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on the test, efficiency arguments may receive attention first, while in other cases the 
focus is on market power or harm.284 Areeda and Turner identify three variations of 
the summary approach of the rule of reason: ‘almost instantaneous balancing’ made 
in the ‘twinkling of an eye’, ‘facial unreasonableness’ and ‘categorical or 
presumptive rules’.285 
In its judgment in California Dental Association, the Supreme Court rejects the quick 
look approach and tries to differentiate the case from the aforementioned 
judgments.286 In fact, the Supreme Court took pains to emphasise that an 
infringement can be found even without exhaustive economic inquiry.287 It states 
that the ‘categories of analysis are less fixed than terms like “per se”, “quick look”, 
and “rule of reason” tend to make them appear’.288 As the Supreme Court says by 
quoting Areeda: ‘there is always something of a sliding scale’ and ‘what is required 
is […] an inquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details, and the 
logic of a restraint’.289 This latter approach does not contradict the improved 
approach abandoning the strict per se versus rule of reason dichotomy. Rather, it 
considers the per se and rule of reason restrictions as points along a continuum, 
where the detail of information and necessary assessment depends on the 
circumstances of the case. In certain cases the inquiry ends at a relatively early stage, 
while other cases involve more elaborate assessment.  
The literature on the per se versus rule of reason distinction has long advocated a 
similar sliding scale approach with filters and presumptions. One of the most notable 
alternatives was proposed by Areeda and Turner.290 It involves an approach with a 
set of propositions and questions to be answered instead of the misleading per se/rule 
of reason dichotomy.  
In the first step it has to be answered whether the restraint can be regarded as very 
serious without recognised redeeming virtues. The next step involves identifying 
justifications of the kind which, at the level of arguments alone, appear to be 
                                                
284  Beckner III and Salop (n 256) 67. 
285  P Areeda, DF Turner and H Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, an analysis of antitrust principles and 
their application (Aspen Law & Business 1998) (Areeda Hovenkamp) ¶1508, 403-408. 
286  California Dental Association v FTC 526 US 756 (1999) (CDA). 
287  Gellhorn 2004 (n 278) 261. 
288  CDA (n 286) 22. 
289  ibid 23-24. 
290  Areeda Hovenkamp (n 285) ¶1511, 427-430. 
 184 
legitimate in principle. If the case satisfies the criteria at this stage, the magnitude of 
the restraint is examined. This element can be fulfilled by showing proof of actual 
effects, or by proving market power as a surrogate. Proof of actual effects or 
significant market power triggers the other party’s obligation to demonstrate in detail 
the efficiencies achieved by the restraint. The party alleging the restriction has the 
burden of proving that the efficiencies can be achieved by a significantly less 
restrictive alternative. Should it fail to do so, and the practice in question produces 
both benefits and anticompetitive harm, the court is required to balance these two 
opposing effects.  
The analysis can end after any step of the process if the party bearing the burden of 
providing the adequate answer is unable to do so. Those cases which end after a few 
steps can be regarded as per se, while the ones requiring all or most of the steps in 
the process fit the rule of reason approach.291 It is important to understand that per se 
and rule of reason are more like elements within the same spectrum than a sharp 
dichotomy. This approach allows more than just the two extremes: in the words of 
the Supreme Court, it is more like a sliding scale.292 
In this system there can be shortcuts, and there is no need to go through all the 
elements sequentially.293 For example, if the answer at one step is inconclusive and 
another can be more decisive then that can be examined instead. The process should 
be characterised by the shift back and forth between the parties of the burden of 
proof depending on the general assessment and the view of the issue in question.294 
The inherent difficulty to know what would have happened had the practice not been 
adopted warrants the use of presumptions and the allocation of the burden of proof 
based on the plausibility of the claim.  
Presumptions should favour the general experience with the type of conduct, while 
the burden of proof should be on those arguing against it.295 This should reflect the 
policy decision about how the enforcement system deals with uncertainty and the 
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cost implications of a potential case-by-case assessment. Cases might differ as to 
which elements of competition analysis gain significance. In certain cases the harm 
appears obvious and requires strong arguments for efficiencies; while in other cases 
the benefits appear clear so harm would be plausible only with significant market 
power. Different steps of the assessment therefore prove to be crucial. 
Easterbrook proposes a similar approach. He argues for presumptions that structure 
antitrust inquiry.296 Simple rules and presumptions should filter the category of 
probably beneficial practices leaving only behaviour with potentially significant 
harm for detailed analysis.297 In a series of sequential steps, it should be 
demonstrated that there is market power and incentives to behave in an 
anticompetitive way or that output is reduced.298 Only practices that pass these filters 
should be examined under the detailed inquiry of rule of reason. According to 
Easterbrook the use of filters will cut the inquiry short in most cases.299 
Piraino also acknowledges the difficulties of the strict per se versus rule of reason 
dichotomy. Instead of using them as ‘opposite theoretical approaches’ he proposes 
that they be treated as different evidentiary standards.300 This suggests that they 
differ only in the amount of analysis needed to reach a conclusion. He suggests that 
market conduct be divided into three categories with evidentiary presumptions.301  
At the one end of this continuum (eg horizontal price fixing), enforcers should apply 
a presumption of illegality. In the case of vertical restraints, as the other extreme, a 
presumption of legality seems appropriate. Finally, conduct in the middle would 
necessitate a detailed analysis of market power. Within the category of presumed 
illegality, the party alleging the infringement would be excused from demonstrating 
market power and the burden should shift to the other party to show pro-competitive 
justifications.302 In the middle category, market power should be demonstrated, 
while the other side could rebut potential negative effects by presenting efficiency 
arguments. Presumed legality would focus on the ancillarity of a particular restraint 
                                                
296  Easterbrook 1984 (n 237) 14. 
297  ibid 17. 
298  ibid 19-38. 
299  ibid 18. 
300  Piraino 1994 (n 267) 1769. 
301  ibid 1771. 
302  ibid 1778-1779. 
 186 
irrespective of the number and size of undertakings involved or the restrictions 
imposed. Solutions ancillary to the efficiency benefits would be presumed legal. 
Arthur also describes a structured, multi-step decision framework as a workable rule 
of reason.303 Beckner III and Salop offer a decision theoretic approach by applying a 
multi-stage decision process.304 At each stage of the process the court can decide on 
the case or gather further information taking into account the costs and benefits of 
obtaining this additional information.305 This corresponds to filters used in the other 
approaches described above.  
Finally, the views of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) also merit consideration. 
The FTC’s first attempt to establish its own structured rule of reason approach was 
the 1988 Massachusetts Board of Registration in Optometry case where it applied a 
quick look-style approach.306 With regard to ‘inherently suspect’ conduct, it allowed 
efficiency justifications to be advanced. In the case of plausible efficiencies it 
proposed to mandate a detailed inquiry into these arguments. Should the party 
succeed with the detailed efficiency arguments, the case should be assessed under 
the full balancing of the rule of reason.  
In its more recent Polygram Holding decision the FTC revisited its analytical 
framework.307 Accordingly, while demonstrating inherently suspect conduct may 
help to avoid a full rule of reason analysis, it triggers a need to advance plausible 
efficiency justifications by the other party at the same time. If it is successful, the 
burden shifts back, requiring a more detailed demonstration that the restraints at 
issue are indeed likely to harm competition. However, it is still not necessary to 
pursue ‘the fullest market analysis’; rather a flexible analysis appropriate to the case. 
Arguments can be raised regarding less restrictive means of achieving the 
efficiencies or in response to more detailed justifications. The fuller review of 
efficiency arguments is carried out only to the degree necessary in light of likely 
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anticompetitive effects being demonstrated.308 
To conclude, the US experience of enforcing antitrust rules provides a good 
illustration of the difficulties to establish an administrable and at the same time 
efficient enforcement system. The overall aim of minimising the total cost of false 
positives and negatives and the system itself inevitably requires in certain cases the 
application of generalised rules as opposed to case-by-case assessment. However, 
overly broad application of those rules remains important to hinder. The ideal 
solution should combine the advantages of the two extremes and apply a flexible 
method based on presumptions, where the burden of proof is allocated based on the 
general experience on probabilities of likely harm. 
6.2.3.2.2 Comparison with the EU approach  
The issues related to the administrability of an efficient enforcement system, which 
are closely connected to the more economic approach, can equally be discussed in 
relation to EU competition law. EU competition law faces similar enforcement 
problems as the US or any other jurisdiction. Legal certainty, predictability, and the 
need to minimise error and administrative costs should be priorities, although 
assessment of the importance of these individual elements may differ.  
Based on the principles and experience described above, it seems evident that 
administrative enforcement resources would also be constrained in the EU, even if 
they are substantially different to those of the US. Another circumstance to be taken 
into account is the cost of obtaining information and gathering evidence that is 
needed in a procedure to enable the decision-maker to reach the correct decision. 
Europe does not differ in this respect either. This leads to certain levels of 
characterisation just as in the US. EU law clearly distinguishes between 
infringements by object and effect. The Court of Justice clarified the distinction by 
emphasising the alternative nature of these requirements (object or effect) in 
restricting competition. It also emphasised the distinction by the lack of a 
requirement to consider the actual effects of the conduct which has the object of 
restricting competition. 
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In explaining this characterisation Union Courts refer to the fact that certain forms of 
collusion can be regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the proper 
functioning of normal competition,309 sufficiently harmful310 or deleterious311 for 
competition. The General Court uses the phrase ‘obvious restrictions’ in ENS and 
even lists these.312 More insight is provided by the AG opinions. AG Kokott 
expressly mentions the procedural efficiencies of the object characterisation. She 
cites the aforementioned ‘by their very nature’ argument of Beef Industry, and she 
refers to legal certainty and the sensible conservation of competition authority and 
justice system resources.313 She compares object restrictions with risk offences of 
criminal law to explain the justification of the lack of requirement to establish the 
actual anticompetitive impact.314 Therefore object restrictions are not to be 
interpreted as a presumption that may be rebutted if no effects are demonstrated.  
In the subsequent Glaxo case, AG Trstenjak uses the term ‘inchoate offence’ and 
refers to the classification of certain types of agreements based on existing 
experience.315 She also emphasises the legal certainty argument. She had already 
raised the issue of categorisation of restrictions in Beef Industry, indicating that it 
may be helpful for undertakings and their legal advisors, especially in the system of 
self-assessment, ie for reasons of legal certainty.316 At the same time she expressed 
reservations regarding excessive categorisation of restrictions of competition.317 
The Commission’s practice also fully endorses this characterisation approach based 
on certain types of agreements having a negative potential for competition by their 
nature. It is the high potential for negative effects that justifies the application of 
Article 101(1) TFEU without the need to demonstrate actual effects.318 The 
Commission practice builds on the serious nature of, and the experience with these 
agreements, gives a list of most common object restrictions and refers to black-listed 
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items of block exemptions or hard-core restrictions as additional examples. 
As described above, the widely-accepted object box approach by Whish also entails 
the above categorisation of restrictions of competition. The most serious and 
potentially harmful practices are allocated to the object box without the need to 
investigate further their actual effects and with the only possibility of avoiding 
prohibition being to demonstrate efficiencies under Article 101(3) TFEU. Bailey 
identifies the economic, legal and practical reasons of object restrictions as 
follows.319 The economic justification is provided by the serious and well-known 
nature of certain restrictions as accepted by both the case law and economic 
literature.320 He also writes about the risk offence argument and the role played by 
experience in creating the object category in EU competition law. Since the object 
category existed right from beginning as an element of the Treaty text of Article 
101(1) TFEU, he offers insights from industrial organisation, experience of other 
jurisdictions and policy judgment as an alternative explanation.321 Legal certainty 
and optimal deterrence provide the legal reasons, while administrability clarifies the 
practical motivation for creating a presumption of restriction with expressly no 
requirement of demonstrating actual effects.322 
Odudu describes object restrictions as either induction or intent-based 
presumptions.323 Experience of certain types of agreements can serve as a basis to 
establish inductively the presumption. The particularly serious and highly likely 
consequences of certain agreements, ie obvious restrictions, justify this approach. He 
also emphasises that intent seems to explain object restrictions since any outcome 
that is intended is also more likely to occur in fact.324 
Kolstad summarises restriction by object as a presumption-based rule, which releases 
the party alleging the infringement from costly proof requirements, since actual 
effects are irrelevant.325  
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King, in contrast, criticises the bright-line object box approach, arguing that it has 
remarkably little support in case law.326 She also questions the ‘necessary effect’ 
argument connected to this approach and used by the Commission in its Article 
101(3) guidelines as a justification for the lack of requirement to show actual effects 
for object category cases.327 Instead, in her opinion, merely having the aim or 
purpose to restrict competition is enough for the object classification. The simplified 
nature of the object box approach has difficulties in explaining certain cases, where 
seemingly object box restrictions escape the restriction by object qualification.328 
These cases can be better explained by the Union Courts’ more flexible approach in 
taking account of the legal and economic context of agreements, which seems 
necessary. This can result in potentially any restriction of competition being an 
infringement by object.329 
Mahtani also indicates the shortcomings of the object box approach and discusses 
examples where object box restrictions either avoid identification as object 
restriction,330 or are identified as such without express reference to a generally 
accepted category of object restrictions.331 As a structured solution, he proposes 
three means of defining object restrictions: a category of specific restraints; the aim 
of the parties to the restriction; or the result of an abridged effect analysis.332  
It seems clear that European competition law also applies some sort of categorisation 
where sufficiently deleterious agreements do not require proof of actual effects, as 
extensive market analysis is required for other potentially anticompetitive practices. 
The Commission’s practice and recent case law, and especially the opinions of 
Advocate Generals suggest that the benefits for legal certainty and administrative 
purposes could justify the distinction between restriction by object and restriction by 
effect. This is a similarity with the US system and generally in line with the 
requirement of an administrable and efficient enforcement system. The comparison 
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between the US per se versus rule of reason and EU object versus effect restrictions 
seems unavoidable due to these similarities, just as the assessment of how the two 
jurisdictions cope with the difficulties of imperfect information and enforcement 
costs due to error and administrative costs. 
Although both jurisdictions offer similar justifications for isolating certain by their 
nature serious restrictions for abstract, rule-based assessment, it would be seriously 
misleading to equate per se and object, or rule of reason and effect restrictions. The 
function of these distinctions seems partly similar, yet the way they function and the 
environment they operate in is significantly different. On the one hand, when 
determining the legality of an agreement, US courts apply the substantive test 
contained in Section 1 of the Sherman Act which has been applied in its totality from 
the beginning both in public and private law enforcement (which is more prevalent). 
In Europe, on the other hand, Article 101 TFEU has a bifurcated structure with the 
two substantive parts of Article 101(1) and 101(3) TFEU which were applied for 
many years in their totality only by the Commission. It is important to consider the 
consequences of this approach.  
A per se treatment reflects the assessment of the totality of an agreement’s effects. 
When US law applies the per se approach it is assumed that the agreement has such 
‘pernicious effects on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue’ that an 
economic analysis can be avoided as this can be ‘so often wholly fruitless when 
undertaken’.333 These restrictions are called ‘naked’ restraints in the US or known as 
‘hard-core’ restrictions in other parts of the world. The lack of beneficial effects is 
always the distinctive element in definitions of hard-core restrictions.334 Per se 
illegality means that the court refuses to consider one or more factors that would be 
otherwise decisive for the decision on illegality.335 In practice, this could exclude 
any inquiry into the reasonability of fixed prices, or the existence of effects or 
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market power, or claims with regard to possible justifications.336 
Restriction by object, in contrast, forms only part of Article 101(1) TFEU and the 
possibility of beneficial effects are assessed subsequently under Article 101(3) 
TFEU. Consequently, an object restriction can still benefit from Article 101(3) 
TFEU and thus avoid the prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU. An object 
classification, compared to the US per se approach, is only the first half of the 
assessment.337 In theory any restriction could escape the prohibition of Article 
101(1) TFEU if the conditions of the legal exception under Article 101(3) TFEU are 
fulfilled.338 This is an important distinction between the two concepts.  
In the same vein, a US rule of reason analysis takes account of all aspects of an 
investigated agreement. It applies Section 1 of the Sherman Act in its totality, 
examining both allocative and productive efficiencies and inefficiencies and 
balancing these where necessary. In contrast, European effect analysis only 
considers limited aspects, ie allocative inefficiency.339 The balancing exercise with 
pro-competitive effects occurs only under the Article 101(3) TFEU part of the 
assessment and is not within the ambit of effect analysis of Article 101(1) TFEU.340 
The bifurcated nature of Article 101 TFEU does not provide any other solution for 
EU competition law. If the full competitive assessment is carried out under Article 
101(1) TFEU, the role of Article 101(3) TFEU would be redundant. This is a 
fundamental difference between the US rule of reason approach and the European 
effect analysis. Therefore any call for a European rule of reason would be against the 
logic of this provision.341 
                                                
336  ibid. 
337  See Beef Industry (n 136) para 21. 
338  Case T-17/93 Matra Hachette v Commission [1994] ECR II-595 (Matra Hachette) para 85. 
339  O Odudu, ‘A new economic approach to Article 81(1)?’ (2002) 27 European Law Review 100. 
340  O2 (n 197) paras 69-70; Case C-235/92 P Montecatini v Commission [1999] ECR I-4539, para 
133; Case T-112/99 M6 and Others v Commission [2001] ECR II-2459 paras 72-77; and Case 
T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods v Commission [2002] ECR II-4653, paras 106-107. 
341  One of the reasons for arguing more scope for taking into account pro-competitive effects under 
Article 101(1) TFEU was the need to avoid the Commission’s burdensome exemption 
procedures under Article 101(3) TFEU that were in force till 2004. The related debate on the 
exact scope of restriction of competition is more related to the bifurcated nature of Article 101 
TFEU. See more in detail eg in: R Nazzini, ‘Article 81 EC between time present and time past: a 
normative critique of “restriction of competition” in EU law’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law 
Review 497; R Whish and B Sufrin, ‘Article 85 an the Rule of Reason’ (1987) 7 Yearbook of 
European Law 12; M Marquis, ‘O2 (Germany) v Commission and the exotic mysteries of 
Article 81(1) EC’ (2007) 32(1) European Law Review 29; B Robertson, ‘What is a Restriction 
 193 
The direct comparison between per se versus rule of reason and object versus effect 
is misplaced due to the above considerations. Still, if these concepts must be 
considered as parallels, it can be established that, from a procedural point of view, 
EU competition law has no comparable concept with per se restrictions. On the other 
hand, both object and effect analysis functions as a sort of rule of reason approach 
where the final conclusion is reached after the assessment of both anti-competitive 
and pro-competitive effects.342  
Object restrictions show similarities with the various ‘quick look’, ‘abbreviated’, 
‘truncated’, ‘structured’, or ‘flexible’ rule of reason methods of the US.343 In those 
cases, once an ‘inherently suspect’ restriction is identified, the analysis can proceed 
directly to the efficiency arguments and possible justifications without actual 
demonstration of anti-competitive effects or market power. Object restrictions seem 
to work in a comparable manner. Restrictions that are by their nature injurious to the 
proper functioning of normal competition can escape the prohibition of Article 
101(1) TFEU only by satisfying the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU. In other 
words, parties must present efficiencies that would outweigh the negative effects that 
are presumed. Finally, the European equivalent of a full-scale rule of reason might 
be the effect approach of EU competition law. An extensive market analysis should 
be conducted in both cases, identifying and balancing both positive and negative 
effects on competition. 
If the application of the ‘quick look’ rule of reason and object methodologies is 
compared, it can be seen that the initial burden of proving ‘inherently suspect’ or ‘by 
their nature’ restrictions is always with the party alleging the infringement. After 
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discharging this burden, the party alleging the infringement will prevail unless the 
other party can demonstrate the possibility of efficiencies. In the latter case the other 
side is required to show actual negative effects, or in the EU ‘to provide an 
explanation or justification, failing which it is permissible to conclude that the 
burden of proof has been discharged’.344  
In other words, whenever the parties to an agreement rely on facts that offer a 
plausible explanation as to why ‘the occurrence of the appreciable objective 
advantage is sufficiently likely’,345 the party alleging the infringement has to explain 
why those advantages do not outweigh negative effects or can be achieved by less 
restrictive means. Furthermore, in ‘effect’ and ‘full-scale rule of reason’ cases the 
party alleging the infringement needs to demonstrate negative effects and market 
power, while the other side has to submit appropriate efficiency justifications to 
demonstrate the pro-competitive nature of the agreement. In both jurisdictions 
proven harm and benefits should ultimately be balanced against each other.  
Finally, European competition law has the peculiarity of market integration as an 
objective which is non-existent in US antitrust law. Both the Commission and Union 
Courts emphasised the pre-eminent role that EU competition law has played in 
market integration. This is reflected by the treatment of certain vertical restrictions as 
object restrictions right from the beginning. EU case law, for example, regards resale 
price maintenance as an object restriction. In the US, on the other hand, the Supreme 
Court’s judgment in Leegin changed the long-established per se treatment of resale 
price maintenance to the rule of reason approach. However, as discussed in the 
previous paragraph, as the EU object approach can be viewed as a type of rule of 
reason approach, the US may be considered to have aligned its practice to European 
standards.  
The differences described of the US per se versus rule of reason and European object 
versus effect distinction may suggest that this leads to diverse outcomes in many 
cases. For example, agreements such as naked or hard-core restrictions would be 
prohibited in the US, whilst they may be authorised in Europe. It can also be argued 
that vertical restraints may receive harsher treatment in Europe. In fact, in most of 
                                                
344  Glaxo (n 174) para 83. 
345  ibid para 93. 
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the cases, authorities or courts could reach the same conclusion on both sides of the 
Atlantic, albeit using different methods or logic.  
Take the example of naked/hard-core restrictions. In the US, previous experience 
suggests that truly naked restraints receive a per se treatment with no possibility of 
justifying or assessing effects due to the inherent lack of redeeming virtues. In the 
EU, these agreements have the object of restricting competition and the conditions of 
Article 101(3) TFEU may be examined. However, this does not necessarily also 
mean that they would be exempted. Just as under US antitrust law, the lack of any 
beneficial effects would lead ultimately to the prohibition of these practices. Article 
101(3) TFEU requires that efficiencies are passed on to consumers without 
eliminating competition and in the least restrictive way. The  aforementioned 
paragraph 85 of the Matra Hachette judgment of the General Court confirms this: ‘in 
principle, no anti-competitive practice can exist which, whatever the extent of its 
effects on a given market, cannot be exempted, provided that all the conditions laid 
down in Article [101(3)] of the Treaty are satisfied’.  
However, it is also unlikely that an agreement which creates true benefits for 
consumers by integrating assets would be per se prohibited in the US just because it 
included eg price fixing or other hard-core restrictions in their literal sense.346 Often 
certain claimed justifications need to be considered or rejected in determining 
whether the practice really falls within the per se rule, ie into the category where no 
justification would be available. Accordingly, even in the US, practices that 
demonstrate appropriate justifications may be classified outside the strict per se 
domain and provide a case for a quick look or truncated analysis. 
In the case of vertical restraints, and in particular resale price maintenance, the 
general principle of Matra Hachette applies, but the vertical guidelines expressly 
highlight the possibility of exempting even object restrictions, such as resale price 
maintenance.347 If applied properly, the formally different approaches of object and 
rule of reason should not result in strikingly divergent outcomes here either. 
As discussed above, an administrable and efficient competition law enforcement 
                                                
346  See eg Broadcasting Music Inc v Columbia Broadcasting System Inc 441 US 1 (1979), or NCAA 
(n 276). 
347  Vertical guidelines (n 215) paras 47, 64 and 223. 
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system combines both the rule-based abstract categorical approach and the 
individual case-by-case approach. It aims to minimise the total costs of false 
positives and false negatives just like the cost of administering the system itself. The 
legal design of EU competition law and the practice developed by the Union Courts 
shows advantages and similarities learned from the US experience of requiring 
significant efforts to deal with administrability issues in its history of more than 100 
years.  
In fact, the system of EU competition law seems to be less predetermined by the 
object versus effect dichotomy than US antitrust law is by the equivalent per se 
versus rule of reason dichotomy. The bifurcated structure of Article 101 TFEU, and 
the consequence that restriction by object or effect forms part of Article 101(1) 
TFEU, while both forms of restriction can benefit from the legal exception under 
Article 101(3) TFEU, brings the whole system more into line with the ideal systems 
proposed in the literature on administrability and procedural efficiency. The per se 
restriction provides a generalised and conclusive application of the rule of reason for 
a whole class of practices. The object classification, in contrast, provides more of an 
inconclusive burden-shifting presumption that can be rebutted by the demonstration 
of pro-competitive effects under Article 101(3) TFEU. The object classification also 
reflects the policy choice that certain practices might be allowed only if 
accompanied by proven efficiencies. Otherwise, this limited category of practices is 
regarded as undesirable, even in the absence of actual effects (risk offence nature). 
Under Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003, the burden of proving an infringement of 
Article 101(1) TFEU is on the party or authority alleging the infringement, while the 
alleged infringer must establish that it can benefit from the legal exception of Article 
101(3) TFEU if it wants to argue the inapplicability of the general prohibition of 
Article 101(1).348 In conjunction with the case law on object and effect restrictions, 
these rules establish that in most of the cases (restrictions by effect) the initial burden 
of showing the infringement rests heavily on the party alleging the infringement. 
They should be advised to pursue a full market analysis and identify negative effects 
on prices, output or product quality. The alleged infringer’s obligations to justify its 
                                                
348  Regulation 1/2003 (n 221). See also for example case 42/84 Remia and others v Commission 
[1985] ECR 2545, para 45; or joined cases 43/82 and 63/82 VBVB and VBBB v Commission 
[1984] ECR 19 (VBBB) para 52. 
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market practice by verified efficiencies arises only after the success of this usually 
challenging and uncertain process.  
In the limited cases of object restrictions, however, this first step is more easily 
surpassed by way of the policy decision that effects do not have to be considered. 
Demonstrating that the agreement has the object of restricting competition shifts the 
burden immediately to the alleged infringer which must demonstrate efficiencies. 
The object qualification does not cut off the inquiry into the assessment of the 
practice as the per se approach but just shifts the burden.349 This takes into account 
the fact that evidence is neither perfect nor complete, which is particularly true for 
competition law cases where economic analysis plays a crucial role.350 The 
assignment of the burden of proof should reflect the policy judgement as to who 
should bear the consequences of any possible evidentiary failures.351 It enables the 
creation of  procedural shortcuts that favour the most plausible claim based on 
previous experience or policy aims such as market integration.352  
Ideally, the filters, presumptions and shortcuts are elaborated on the basis of 
economic thinking and general experience with particular types of business 
behaviour. The allocation of the burden of proof and the standard of proof required 
should reflect the perception and evaluation of potential false positives and 
negatives. This would mean that applying generalised rules and case-by-case 
assessments are not contradictory approaches traded off against each other by the 
enforcer. If generalised rules are also based on economic thinking and experience 
with certain practices, then they are part of the more economic approach and not the 
target of it.353 A solution like this contributes to the administrative efficiency of 
enforcement, preserving at the same time the benefits of economic analysis.  
                                                
349  See also Areeda Hovenkamp (n 285) ¶1914d. 
350  Hovenkamp 2005 (n 271) 267. 
351  ibid. 
352  ibid 268. 
353  Christiansen and Kerber (n 257) 237. Others interpret the recent Court of Justice judgments of T-
Mobile (n 171) and Beef Industry (n 136) as a firm statement that economisation of EU 
competition law should not change the law to the detriment of legal certainty. Gerbrandy argues 
that the object/effect dichotomy stands firm, even if economics question it.  See: A Gerbrandy, 
‘Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands BV, KPN Mobile NV, Orange Nederland NV, Vodafone 
Libertel NV v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, Judgment of the 
Court of Justice (Third Chamber) of 4 June 2009’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 
1199, 1209. As discussed, the conflict between the more economic approach and the application 
of categorisation or presumptions is artificial, if the costs of errors and administration are also 
taken into account. 
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Odudu discusses the burden-shifting interpretation of the object category but rejects 
it on the following grounds.354 Firstly, the approach does not explain why the burden 
can only be satisfied under Article 101(3) TFEU. Secondly, he considers that if the 
classification criterion is the necessary consequence of restricting competition, then 
the distinction between burden-shifting and the necessary consequence rationale 
collapses. Finally, he refers to the difficulty of balancing unmeasured allocative 
inefficiency under Article 101(1) TFEU with productive efficiency of Article 101(3) 
TFEU. 
However, these arguments do not necessarily call into question the burden-shifting 
function of the object category. As a burden-shifting tool the object classification 
does no more than to invert the usual order of bringing forward evidence.355 Using 
the arguments of AG Kokott, it can be seen that certain practices which by their very 
nature are injurious to normal competition are prohibited similarly as risk offences. 
The presumption of negative effects is not to be rebutted at the stage of Article 
101(1) TFEU. It conserves administrative resources based on the experience of the 
social effects of these practices. In an ideal situation, the presumption reflects the 
fact that in the majority of the cases the outcome of the assessment would not be 
substantially different even where a detailed case-by-case assessment is conducted, 
although this would be substantially more costly and resource-intensive.  
These circumstances justify the policy choice that Article 101(3) TFEU should be 
invoked in each object case. All object restrictions which do not result in efficiencies 
are prohibited. Or to put it differently, whenever an object restriction creates positive 
effects, these can, and should be examined.  
The risk offence argument also answers the ‘necessary effect’ issue raised by Odudu. 
To use the above mentioned example of the AG Kokott, drink driving constitutes a 
criminal offence regardless of whether the driver causes a road accident or endangers 
anyone. However, it is indeed possible that certain agreements do not create any 
allocative inefficiency but still, by way of the presumption and the absence of effect 
                                                
354  O Odudu, ‘Interpreting Article 81(1): the object requirement revisited’ (2001) 26 European Law 
Review 379, 382-383. 
355  See also L Peeperkorn, ‘Revised EU competition rules for supply and distribution agreements’ 
210, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2011_10_en.pdf> accessed 
31 December 2012. 
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analysis they should bear the burden of showing efficiencies. For example, the 
parties could lack any market power on the relevant market, and therefore their 
practice has no actual effect. Nevertheless, even in these cases, a prohibition does 
not ‘sacrifice’ any benefit for society as a whole. Rather, it condemns parties that 
‘tried to harm the public but were mistaken in their ability to do so’.356  
A similar approach can be seen in the opinion of AG Kokott in Expedia.357 In 
paragraph 50 of her opinion, she argues that undertakings entering into an agreement 
with a restrictive object are presumed to always intend an appreciable effect on 
competition, irrespective of the size of their market share and turnover. In other 
words, the lack of market power does not save an agreement from the general 
prohibition. The Court of Justice confirmed this approach in its judgement.358 
Finally, since the object category only shifts the burden to the other party, ie reverses 
the usual order for adducing evidence, it does not enable the party alleging the 
infringement to argue for prohibition without demonstrating allocative inefficiency. 
Paragraph 83 of the Glaxo judgment mentioned above clearly provides that although 
the burden of proof falls on the undertaking arguing for the legal exception under 
Article 101(3) TFEU, ‘the facts relied on by that undertaking may be such as to 
oblige the other party to provide an explanation or justification, failing which it is 
permissible to conclude that the burden of proof has been discharged’.  
Consequently, whenever the burden shifts to the undertakings party to the agreement 
and they rely on a plausible theory of how the restrictions would create efficiencies, 
the party alleging the infringement is required to explain why those efficiencies 
would be insufficient for the purposes of balancing the anti-competitive and pro-
competitive effects of the practice. This necessitates effective assessment of the 
likely negative impacts on competition before the final balancing.359 As the 
Commission explains, ‘although, in legal terms, these are two distinct steps, they 
may in practice be an iterative process where the parties and Commission in several 
                                                
356  Areeda Hovenkamp (n 285) ¶1509, 411. 
357  Expedia (n 157). 
358  ibid para 37. 
359  Vertical guidelines (n 215) paras 47 and 223. 
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steps enhance and improve their respective arguments’.360 
In an enforcement system such as that of the EU described above, it is important that 
the efficient outcome of cases is not distorted by an uneven allocation of the burden 
of proof or the excessively high standard of proof required from only one of the 
parties. This follows from the more economic approach, ie from the need to 
minimise false positives and false negatives.  
Unbalanced rules may either make it too easy to prove an infringement thereby 
leading to false positives or, if it is too difficult to prove an infringement, this may 
produce false negatives. An undesirably distortive effect would arise if the party 
alleging the infringement only needs to demonstrate the object classification while 
the parties to the agreement would be required to conduct a detailed efficiency 
analysis. In clear-cut cartel cases, demonstrating mere object classification is a 
difficult task on its own due to the clandestine nature of these practices. On the other 
hand, information about horizontal cooperation agreements is often easily available 
in the public domain, so the mere demonstration of an object restriction can be 
straightforward. The burden-shifting function of the object category ensures that 
whenever the parties to an agreement discharge the heavy burden of showing 
positive effects, the other side will also have to demonstrate harm to an equal 
standard and not just as a presumption.  
The standard of proof element is closely connected to the allocation of the burden of 
proof within this framework. The balanced allocation of the burden of proof would 
serve no purpose if any of the parties faced an insurmountable difficulty in meeting 
the standard of proof. In relation to object restrictions this translates into the 
necessity that benefitting from the application of Article 101(3) TFEU should not be 
just a theoretical possibility but rather a realistic outcome. There should not be any 
presumption of illegality under Article 101(3) TFEU against object restrictions nor 
any evidentiary requirements that would make it virtually impossible to demonstrate 
efficiencies. The application of Article 101(3) TFEU should stand on its own and not 
be predetermined by any conclusions reached under Article 101(1) TFEU. In other 
words, certain practices should not avoid the object classification in order to 
facilitate the application of Article 101(3) TFEU (or the object category should not 
                                                
360  ibid footnote 2 on page 12. 
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be defined narrowly just because Article 101(3) TFEU seems inappropriate to 
exempt object restrictions).361  
Based on EU case law, object restrictions are in no way defined by their possible 
treatment under Article 101(3) TFEU, just as the application of Article 101(3) TFEU 
is not limited by the assessment under Article 101(1) TFEU. In his case comment on 
the Glaxo judgment, Völcker sets out the theory that the General Court might have 
classified Glaxo’s dual pricing system as an effect restriction in order to avoid 
unduly prejudicing analysis under Article 101(3) TFEU.362 He concludes, however, 
that the Court of Justice gave no weight to the object classification in its own Article 
101(3) TFEU assessment, accordingly no harder line would be taken even in cases 
such as Beef Industry or other object restrictions.363  
The more economic approach should be reflected in the approach of both paragraphs 
of Article 101 TFEU. The Article works as a whole through the combined effect of 
its elements. The analysis of these provisions and the conclusions on its 
administrability and the costs of errors and the system itself takes into account the 
effects of both paragraphs. 
Kjølbye criticises the new Commission guidelines on horizontal cooperation 
agreements for the reason that it extends the object category to include non-hard-
core restrictions which therefore enables it to find an Article 101(1) TFEU 
infringement without a thorough effects analysis.364 He also fears that the finding of 
an object restriction will adversely affect any subsequent effects analysis.365 He uses 
the example of the oneworld alliance to highlight the high level of integration and 
clear potential for efficiencies. However, potential for efficiencies is not an argument 
against the object qualification but rather a factor to be assessed under Article 101(3) 
                                                
361  See the example of Visa-International Multilateral Interchange Fee (Case COMP/29.373) 
Commission Decision 2002/914/EC [2002] OJ L318/17, which is often referred by 
commentators as a case where the Commission classified a price fixing as an effect restriction 
just to enable the exemption of it under Article 101(3) TFEU. 
362  SB Völcker, ‘Case law: Joined cases C-501, 513, 515 & 519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services 
Unlimited v Commission, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Third Chamber) of 6 October 2009, 
[ECR] I-9291’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 175 (Völcker 2011) 182. 
363  ibid 184. 
364  L Kjølbye, ‘Escaping effects analysis: the Commission’s new approach to restrictions by object’ 
(2011) CPI Antitrust Journal 2 (Kjølbye 2011). 
365  ibid 4. 
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TFEU. This is established in Beef Industry, for example.366 In addition, as previously 
established, the object qualification does not hinder the application of legal 
exception under Article 101(3) TFEU, and should not have any adverse effect on the 
outcome. 
Jones raises the criticism that the object category is defined too broadly and that the 
presumption of illegality is extremely hard to rebut under Article 101(3) TFEU.367 
She refers to the fact that in object cases the presumption of illegality is strong, while 
jurisprudence that should clarify the approach of Article 101 TFEU is non-existent 
after Modernisation.368 Furthermore, the only guidance provided by the Commission 
in its Article 101(3) guidelines369 raises the standard of proof to very high levels, 
which are highly unlikely to be met. Combined with the uncertainty due to the lack 
of current case law on Article 101(3) TFEU, an undertaking would try to avoid the 
use of any hard-core restrictions, even if potential benefits are apparent.370 The lack 
of any current decisions on the conditions of applying Article 101(3) TFEU may be 
regarded as a problematic consequence of Modernisation. This is especially true 
given the seemingly differing views of the General Court and the Court of Justice in 
the Glaxo case compared to those of the Commission in the Article 101(3) 
guidelines. 
6.2.3.3 Conclusion 
The EU system in the form described above seems to serve the more economic 
approach and contribute to minimising false positives and false negatives at 
reasonable costs. The object/effect distinction of Article 101(1) TFEU provides 
flexibility to save administrative resources in certain cases. At the same time, it 
enables that whenever agreements with anticompetitive effects also demonstrate 
potential for substantial efficiencies, the cooperation may survive the scrutiny of 
competition authorities.  
                                                
366  Beef Industry (n 136) para 21. See also paras 55-58 of the opinion of AG Trstenjak in the same 
case. 
367  A Jones, ‘Left behind by modernisation? Restrictions by object under Article 101(1)’ (2010) 6 
European Competition Journal 649 (Jones 2010) 655-656. 
368  ibid 669. See also A Jones, ‘Analysis of agreements under U.S. and EC antitrust law – 
Convergence or divergence?’ (2006) 51 The Antitrust Bulletin 691 (Jones 2006) 760-761. 
369  Article 101(3) guidelines (n 167). 
370  Jones 2010 (n 367) 670.  
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The classification as an object restriction initially shifts the burden of proof without 
effect analysis to the parties to an agreement complained of. It does nothing more, 
however, than to change the usual order of adducing evidence. This reflects the 
policy decision that certain agreements should be allowed only if accompanied by 
proven efficiencies. The consequences of any evidentiary failure in this respect 
should be attributed to the undertakings party to the agreement with the object of 
restricting competition. Should they discharge this burden, it shifts back to the party 
alleging the infringement, who in turn has to demonstrate already likely negative 
effects instead of mere presumptions. The balancing of negative and positive effects 
occurs only after the successful fulfilment of this task. 
6.2.4 Legal and economic context of airline alliances 
Understanding the legal and economic context is essential for the competition law 
analysis of airline alliances. Chapter 3 provided a general overview of strategic 
alliances. At first glance, the definition of a strategic alliance appears pro-
competitive and, as a form of cooperation, alliances appear desirable for the market. 
As defined in Chapter 3, a strategic alliance is a cooperation for the mutual benefit of 
the partners which is intended to last for a longer period and pursue strategic aims 
whilst the partners remain independent. It envisages integration which is achieved by 
the contribution of assets or knowledge to the alliance.  
For undertakings, competition in a global economy requires a larger scale and scope 
of operations. They need to be able to react quickly in an unpredictable market 
environment. As described in Chapter 5, airlines have to tackle the increased 
pressure of liberalised markets. In particular they need to cope with the widespread 
regional operations of low-cost airlines, a new business model challenging the 
traditional form of the airline industry. In response, many airlines have chosen 
international expansion in the form of network extension. Strategic alliances enable 
them to overcome ownership restrictions to access additional markets and quickly 
achieve economies of traffic density, scope and scale. With the help of alliances, 
airlines share the risk and costs of global networks and form part of a ‘club’ which 
usually enables them to compete more effectively than on a stand-alone basis. They 
gain access to crucial traffic feeds and infrastructure which is limited by congestion.  
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Chapter 3 described the general approach of competition law and competition 
authorities to strategic alliances. Accordingly, although strategic alliances are said to 
be a new phenomenon of globalisation, authorities can apply their traditional 
competition law concepts while also taking into account the economic and legal 
environment. The general attitude is not hostile towards strategic alliances, 
especially in the absence of market power. The approach openly acknowledges the 
possibilities of efficiencies, therefore pro-competitive agreements can benefit from 
the application of Article 101(3) TFEU.  
Finally, Chapter 4 described the relevant legal environment. Although most of the 
regulatory restrictions were dismantled on a regional basis, considerable restrictions 
still exist at a global level. The airline industry is deprived of the benefits of 
operating at a truly global level with the freedom to invest in foreign markets as any 
other industry (which such operation would entail). Against this background, 
cooperation in the airline industry can be regarded, in general, as advantageous and 
sometimes even necessary. However, as discussed in Chapter 5, airline cooperation 
and strategic alliances represent various levels of integration and intensity, ranging 
from looser forms of cooperation to almost merger-like integration. Case-by-case 
and route-by-route assessment is necessary to reach a definitive conclusion of the 
effects. 
For a better understanding of the nature of competition in this sector, one must also 
refer to the relevant competition parameters. Depending on the business model used 
by the airlines or the market they operate in, competition takes place on the basis of 
various parameters. Price, schedule, frequency, quality, network characteristics, sales 
and distribution all can be main factors of competition.  
Pricing plays a crucial role in short haul markets, especially after the rapid and 
unprecedented expansion of low-cost airlines. The unstoppable development of low-
cost airlines, such as Southwest in the US or Ryanair in Europe, not only introduced 
a new approach to airline pricing, but also forced network airlines to rethink their 
pricing policies. Network airlines offer seats at varying prices. Liberalisation led to 
the proliferation of fare categories, where the cheapest tickets cost a fraction of the 
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most expensive tickets for the same flight.371 Revenue management is the practice of 
controlling the availability of seats for sale at different fares and subject to different 
conditions, with a view to maximising revenue. Airlines discriminate both between 
and within cabin classes. With the help of sophisticated revenue management 
systems, airlines try to allocate seats to those passengers who value them the most, 
while remaining seats are sold at deeply discounted prices to avoid empty seats. 
Fare competition occurs at various levels of airline pricing. The most visible prices 
are published fares which are made available in computerised reservation systems 
(CRSs). Published fares are either normal or full-price fares (without restrictions) or 
special or discounted (restricted tickets).372 Airlines offer these latter fares to 
passengers who are willing to modify their behaviour to suit the airlines’ cost and 
revenue management objectives.373 Airlines also assume that these restrictions reveal 
the identity of high-yield business passengers who can be charged higher prices. The 
proportion of seats allocated to each of these categories varies according to the 
intensity of competition. In lower demand periods, or when faced with a 
competitor’s promotion campaign, airlines can increase the offer of discount fares 
simply to adjust their pricing.  
Low-cost airlines generally have a significantly less complicated fare structure, 
which does not make extensive use of restrictions but which offers the possibility of 
one-way fares. This also forces network airlines to simplify their fare structures in 
short-haul markets. It became inevitable that network airlines would have to abandon 
their traditional fare structure, particularly with the widespread use of the internet 
and the many price-comparison sites. 
Unpublished fares also represent an important element of price competition, at least 
for network airlines. Unpublished fares serve specific distribution channels like 
travel agents or corporate customers.374 Prices depend here on the identity and 
position of the particular customer. Corporate customers contract with airlines 
directly or through specialised travel agents. Discounts are connected to predefined 
                                                
371  See S Borenstein and NL Rose, ‘Competition and price dispersion in the US airline industry’ 
(1994) 102 The Journal of Political Economy 653. 
372  On airline tariff structures see S Holloway, Straight and level: practical airline economics (3rd 
edn Ashgate Publishing 2008) (Holloway 2008) 143-146. 
373  ibid 134. 
374  ibid 135. 
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travel volumes of the undertaking concerned and can be set for particular routes, 
countries or regions. Low-cost airlines, as a rule, refrain from corporate or travel 
agent deals, since they sell almost all their tickets through their own websites.375 
Corporate customers and, to a certain extent travel agents, are extremely important 
for network airlines, since they provide direct access to the most valuable business 
passengers who are so essential for the business model of network airlines.376 
Corporate customers also take into account the network coverage an airline or 
alliance can provide, ie whether the particular offer covers their annual or 
multiannual travel needs.377 
The next parameter of airline competition is schedule. A convenient schedule can 
make a significant contribution to the competitiveness of an airline’s product. 
Business passengers find it essential to have at least the possibility of flying 
outbound in the early morning and inbound in the evening. This provides the most 
efficient way of spending a business day.  
With regard to long-haul flights, the schedule might also be crucial depending on the 
differences between time zones. With a convenient schedule, flying on eastbound 
services (US-EU) enables the passenger to spend the night on the aircraft, ie travel 
takes place when the passenger would be asleep anyway. Services at unattractive 
times can prove a competitive disadvantage compared to better-timed services 
offered by competitors. The importance of schedule as a competition parameter also 
depends on the group of customers targeted by the airline. Low-cost airlines often fly 
at less advantageous times, however their lower yield, price-sensitive passengers are 
ready to accept this condition in exchange for substantially lower prices. 
Flight frequency is a related parameter of competition which is important for 
business passengers. The more flights offered by the airlines, the better the chances 
that a particular flight time will suit the passenger’s needs ie the less time they will 
                                                
375  easyJet announced that it has reached a group contract with the House of Lords, thereby giving 
up its previous policy not to have corporate deals. See in Airline Weekly issue no. 399 (24 
September 2012) 5. 
376  See section 5.1.1. 
377  Despite the importance and distinctive characteristics of this group of customers, separate 
markets have not been defined in any of the competition law cases thus far. See section 6.1.1.1 
Network market definition. 
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have to wait.378 The alternative value for business passengers to sitting at an airport 
or being stuck in a city is particularly costly. A higher frequency can provide a 
disproportionate advantage for airlines due to the ‘S-curve effect’, thereby securing 
the competitive edge in competition.379 The frequency advantage may benefit 
airlines, especially in short-haul services, but also to a limited extent in long-haul 
markets.  
Quality refers to both the ‘airline product’ and the service offered during a flight. 
This may comprise various aspects beginning with the aircraft type used, the seat 
configurations, on-board amenities, food served, connected ground services (eg 
lounges, priority boarding, extra baggage allowance, limousine service), etc. Quality 
may be more important on long-haul routes where the passengers can spend as many 
as 23 hours in an aircraft.380 It is not surprising that airlines highlight the distinctive 
comfort features of their services on these routes. British Airways introduced the 
first flatbed seat in 1996 which has since become the industry standard. In the same 
vein, Airbus promotes its new A350XWB aircraft as a jet, the cabin of which ‘[…] 
provides the widest seats in its category’.381  
On short haul routes air transport is more commodified, however the use of primary 
airports compared to secondary airports, on time performance, seat pitch, guaranteed 
absence of fuel surcharges or allowed free baggage can all be quality aspects 
decisive in short-haul markets. The quality element of competition might be evident 
when it acts like a barrier to entry on routes.  
A special quality aspect of air transport services is the coverage of the airlines’ 
network and whether it connects the most important travel generating geographic 
areas. The ability to fly ‘from anywhere to everywhere’ increases the attractiveness 
of the service, especially in competition for corporate customers. The attractiveness 
of FFPs is directly related to the available network for earning and redeeming ‘air 
miles’. A strong FFP can be decisive in the customers’ decision which airline to 
                                                
378  See the explanation of frequency and stochastic delay in section 4.4.2 Supply-side characteristics 
of air transport. 
379  See discussion in section 4.4.1 Drivers and characteristics of air transport demand. 
380  British Airways direct flight from London to Sydney leaves at 21.15 and arrives two day later in 
in the early morning hours at 5.15 with a total net flight time of 23 hours. 
381  <http://www.airbus.com/aircraftfamilies/passengeraircraft/a350xwbfamily/> 
accessed 31 December 2012.  
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choose for the trip. Passengers sometimes seem to be ready even to choose the more 
expensive or less attractive flight option just to maximise their FFP benefits. 
Airline distribution systems have been transformed radically over recent years by 
widespread use of the internet. Direct sales rapidly increase, according to a 2010 
forecast they will soon represent 58% of all airline ticket sales.382 The traditional 
sales channels declined continuously due to changing consumer behaviour reinforced 
by the airlines’ efforts to reduce distribution costs in this more competitive 
environment. In long-haul routes, on the other hand, the strength of indirect 
distribution channels still matters. Travel agents still preserve their role for the 
access by business passengers. Airlines compete on the discounts offered and other 
incentives paid to travel agents. The competitive advantage of local airlines and their 
unrivalled access to the most lucrative local passenger groups make it difficult to 
compete against them. 
The above competition parameters provide the context for airline cooperation, the 
framework upon competition takes place. On the other hand, before discussing the 
positive and negative effects of airline alliances, it is useful to consider the economic 
analytical framework of alliances. The model of Brueckner offers a good explanation 
of airline alliances’ operating methods and features often used in the literature.383 
                                                
382  Executive summary, The airline IT trands survey 2011, (2011) SITA 5. Available at: 
 <http://www.sita.aero/content/airline-it-trends-survey-2011>  accessed 31 December 2012. 
383  JK Brueckner, ‘The economics of international codesharing: an analysis of airline alliances’ 
(2001) 19 International Journal of Industrial Organization 1475, (Brueckner 2001) 1479; JK 
Brueckner and WT Whalen, ‘The Price Effects of International Airline Alliances’ (2000) 43 
Journal of Law and Economics 503 (Brueckner and Whalen 2000); See also JK Brueckner and 
WT Whalen, ‘The Price Effects of International Airline Alliances’ (1998) Working Paper WP67, 
Institute of Government and Public Affairs University of Illinois available at: 
<http://igpa.uillinois.edu/system/files/WP67-alliance.pdf> accessed 31 December 2012. 
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Figure 6.2 Model of alliance cooperation 
According to the model, airline 1 operates a hub at airport H connecting A, B and K 
as a network. Airline 2 flies out of K as its hub airport serving the airports D, E and 
H. To illustrate this more clearly, H can be New York and airline 1 American 
Airlines, while K would be London and airline 2 would be British Airways. Both 
airlines have their own domestic network and a transatlantic hub-to-hub flight 
between New-York and London. The London-New York route can be undertaken 
with both airlines. However, behind-beyond routes, eg Vermont-New York-London-
Budapest, require interlining.384  
Cooperation on the New York-London route would mean a parallel alliance, while 
cooperation on behind-beyond routes creates a complementary alliance. The former 
mean that actual competitors cooperate on the route, while in complementary 
alliances participating airlines do not compete with each other, and at the most may 
be potential competitors. Also, whereas parallel alliances tend to increase prices, 
complementary alliances exert a downward pressure on them.  
Oum, Park and Zhang examined these issues in detail.385 Basically, in a 
complementary alliance airlines maximise joint profit by taking into consideration 
the full itinerary and not just their own segment of it.386 Together, both airlines will 
                                                
384  See the definition of interlining in section 5.3. 
385  TH Oum, J-H Park and A Zhang, Globalization and strategic alliances: the case of the airline 
industry (Pergamon 2000) (Oum, Park and Zhang 2000) 59-81; J-H Park, A Zhang and Y 
Zhang, ‘Analytical models of international alliances in the airline industry’ (2001) 35 
Transportation Research Part B 865. 
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choose a higher output than they would individually because they recognise that the 
externalities of their decision can be internalised through the alliance.387 Both 
airlines will increase output and jointly maximise their profit. The cooperation 
improves quality, efficiency and decreases prices and raise total traffic too. In 
contrast, in parallel alliances, total output is likely to decrease.388 This happens 
because the alliance partners try to maximise profits in the segment where they both 
operate and cooperate. The two partners behave as one, as a monopoly because this 
maximises profit, which reduces output. 
As shown by Brueckner’s model, most airline alliances are not purely 
complementary or parallel but rather a combination of those two. The overall effect 
depends on the magnitude of the countervailing effects of complementary and 
parallel cooperation, and the extent to which the cooperating airlines’ networks 
overlap or complement each other. These negative and positive effects from airline 
cooperation will be discussed separately more in detail below. 
6.2.4.1 Negative effects of airline alliances 
In this part, the focus is mainly on the effects of revenue-sharing joint ventures as the 
most integrated form of alliance. The most obvious negative effect of these airline 
alliances arises from the loss of direct competition between earlier competing 
airlines on overlap routes. Due to network characteristics, these overlaps almost 
always affect the routes connecting the partner airlines’ hub airports, so-called ‘trunk 
routes’. Following this logic, the conclusion that the loss of direct competition has 
negative effect on prices or output makes perfect sense. 
6.2.4.1.1 Elimination of horizontal competition 
The effect of market concentration and decrease in the number of competitors has 
been subject to extensive empirical research. Morrison and Winston examine the 
economic effects of airline mergers in 1989.389 They find that the effect of losing 
actual competitors ranges from 2 to 32% and can increase to 55% when there are 
                                                
387  ibid 66. 
388  ibid 67. 
389  S Morrison and C Winston, ‘Enhancing the performance of the deregulated air transportation 
system’ (1989) Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics 61.  
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‘hub effects’.390 Gloria and others find that the merger of the only two airlines in a 
market can result in an 11.9-33% increase in yields (revenue per RPM), while a 
three-to-two transaction may result in a 4.1-12.4% rise.391 Werden and others 
examine two mergers from the 1980s and measure an increase of 4.5-5.6% in prices 
with regard to overlap routes.392 Borenstein also establishes a connection between 
the market share of the individual airline and its ability to raise its own prices.393 
Accordingly, an increase of market share through a merger may strengthen an 
airline’s ability to raise prices.  
In a later article, Borenstein, by examining the mergers assessed by Werden and 
others, finds on average 11% and 8% price increases, while on certain individual 
routes as much as 23%.394 Brueckner and others examine the effects of two mergers 
and find on average a price increase of 4.7% and 5.2% on the routes where a 
monopoly was created, but an increase of only 0.5% and 1% on routes with only one 
or two remaining competitors.395 In a further paper, the authors again find price-
increasing effects from the reduction of the number of competitors.396  
Peters examines six US mergers from the 1980s and finds average price changes 
ranging from 6.5 to 29.4%.397 Kim and Singal study the price effects of airline 
mergers between 1985 and 1988 and find price increases on the affected merger 
routes.398 Kwoka and Shumilkina analyse the effects of the USAir/Piedmont Airlines 
merger and distinguish between the price effects of eliminating a sizeable competitor 
                                                
390  ibid 73. 
391  GJ Hurdle, RL Johnson, AS Joskow, GJ Werden and MA Williams, ‘Concentration, potential 
entry and performance in the airline industry’ (1989) 38 The Journal of Industrial Economics 
119, 132. 
392  GJ Werden, AS Joskow and RL Johnson, ‘The effects of mergers on price and output: two case 
studies from the airline industry’ (1991) 12 Managerial and Decision Economics 341, 345-346. 
393  S Borenstein, ‘Hubs and high fares: dominance and market power in the US airline industry’ 
(1989) 20 RAND Journal of Economics 344 (Borenstein 1989) 357. 
394  S Borenstein, ‘The evolution of US airline competition’ (1992) 6 Journal of Economic 
Perspective 45, 57. 
395  Brueckner, NJ Dyer and PT Spiller, ‘Fare determination in airline hub-and-spoke networks’ 
(1992) 23 The RAND Journal of Economics 309 (Brueckner, Dyer and Spiller) 329. 
396  JK Brueckner and PT Spiller, ‘Economies of traffic density in the deregulated airline industry’ 
(1994) 37 Journal of Law and Economics 379 (Brueckner and Spiller) 409. 
397  C Peters, ‘Evaluating the performance of merger simulation: evidence from the US airline 
industry’ (2003) US DOJ Antitrust Division Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper EAG 
03-1 19. 
398  EH Kim and V Singal, ‘Mergers and market power: evidence from the airline industry’ (1993) 
83 The American Economic Review 549 (Kim and Singal 1993). 
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and small competitors.399 The results show a 12.1% increase for the elimination of a 
sizeable competitor and 8.7% for a small one.400 
In a comprehensive study updating previous research, Brueckner and others examine 
the price effect of competition and also incorporate the impact of low-cost airlines.401 
The authors argue that previous studies relied on data which was already 20-30 years 
old, therefore failed to take into account the substantial changes that took place in the 
airline industry over recent years.  
The results suggest that the nature of competition has been transformed over the 
years. The elimination of traditional network airlines as competitors has no, or only a 
very moderate statistically significant effect on prices.402 In contrast, the presence of 
low-cost airlines in a market, and especially Southwest, has substantial positive 
effects on prices. The authors also rerun their model with data from 2000. The 
results of the study are even more revealing when compared with the results of this 
latter exercise. The price effects of the network airlines’ presence was significantly 
higher with data from 2000.403  
The authors explain these changes with important trends of the aviation industry 
from recent years.404 In domestic markets, low-cost airlines irreversibly gained 
substantial market shares, thereby providing the most important competitive force in 
the market. Internet penetration also significantly increased with the direct 
consequences of continuously expanding internet sales of airline tickets. Price 
transparency through specialised online travel agencies and price comparison sites 
significantly restricts airlines’ ability to impose price premiums. Finally, with the 
end of the ‘golden’ years of the 1990s, customers’ travel policies changed on a 
permanent basis, depriving network airlines from their ‘easy’ revenue. 
In addition to the elimination of actual competition, several papers dealt with the 
effect on prices caused by elimination of potential competition. Kwoka and 
                                                
399  K Kwoka and E Shumilkina, ‘The price effect of eliminating potential competition: evidence 
from an airline merger’ (2010) 58 The Journal of Industrial Economics 767 (Kwoka 2010). 
400  ibid 790. 
401  JK Brueckner, D Lee and E Singer, ‘Airline competition and domestic US fares: a 
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402  ibid 4 and 16. 
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Shumilkina identified a price-increasing effect of between 5.9% and 6.1% depending 
on whether the potential competitor was present at only one or both endpoints of the 
route.405 Morrison deals with the aggregate effect of low-cost airline Southwest in 
US domestic markets. He considers the effect of Southwest to be as much as 33% 
when the airline is present at both endpoint airports of the route of concern but not 
on the route itself.406 In addition, in the weakest form of potential competition, 
Southwest is responsible for a decrease in prices by 6.5%. Goolsbee and Syverson 
observe a 17% price decrease on the incumbent airlines’ side even before the actual 
entry of Southwest onto the route.407 The above results demonstrate that as even the 
elimination of a potential competitor may have a price-raising effect, it follows that 
alliances between potential competitors might have the same effect. 
The economic literature and empirical analysis undertaken in alliance cases also 
specifically deals with the price effects of alliances. Brueckner and Whalen examine 
the alliance effects on hub-to-hub or trunk routes408 and find negative effects in the 
range of 4-6%, although the results are not statistically significant.409 Subsequently, 
in another paper Brueckner again identifies negative effects on hub-to-hub routes.410  
Kamita analyses the effects of antitrust immunity granted for a short period of time 
to Hawaiian airlines.411 Depending on the benchmark used, the prices increased 
between 8 and 25%.412 Bilotkach finds a price-increasing effect on hub-to-hub routes 
in the same magnitude (7%) as Brueckner and Whalen.413 Wan and others, however, 
find either moderate effects on hub-to-hub routes or, in their explanation, negative 
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effects offset by efficiencies.414 Brueckner and Proost discuss the potential of 
anticompetitive effects on hub-to-hub routes and even mention that this effect may 
emerge while connecting traffic using the same route rises.415 However, they also 
emphasise that there is no measured fare impact on hub-to-hub routes so far.  
Armantier and Richard study the US domestic alliance between Continental and 
Northwest.416 They find that in those markets where both airlines operate non-stop 
flights, prices increased even in the absence of collusion.417 The explanation offered 
for this was that an increase in the number of products in the market increases the 
pool of passengers that can buy the seats thereby enabling the extraction of higher 
prices.418 In a follow-up article Armantier and Richard concluded that alliance 
effects on prices might be neutral, but if other service attributes are also taken into 
account, the assessment does not remain as positive.419 
During the DOT’s assessment of the Star Alliance and oneworld joint ventures in 
2008-2009, the DOJ provides comments based on its empirical analysis of the effects 
of these joint ventures on transatlantic routes.420 The DOJ argues that its cross-
sectional analysis of third quarter 2008 fare data indicates a 15% increase in prices 
when the number of non-stop competitors is reduced from two to one, 6.6% for the 
three to two scenario,421 and 6.3% in four to three cases.422 This price effect was 
large and statistically significant compared to earlier findings.  
Cross-sectional analysis is intended to demonstrate the variation of average fare 
variation across transatlantic routes depending on the number of airlines operating on 
the route, controlling for all other factors that may affect prices.423 The oneworld 
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comment by the DOJ referred to the same fare effects and empirical analysis.424 In a 
recent paper, the DOJ economists involved in alliance cases assessed the competitive 
effects of global airline alliances.425 In their cross-section analysis, each reduction by 
one in the number of non-stop competitors represents a 7% average fare increase.426 
In its own proceedings against oneworld, the European Commission prepared an 
empirical analysis of fare data on a large sample of transatlantic routes.427 The 
analysis was intended to show the association between price and market 
concentration (ie the number of competitors). It was demonstrated that an average 
increase of prices by 2.2% for fully flexible business tickets and 5.4% of restricted 
economy tickets can be expected where the number of competitors is reduced by 
one. 
With regard to negative effects on output, Oum, Park and Zhang tested their model 
on parallel alliances empirically with data of transatlantic alliances in the 1990s. The 
results confirmed their theoretical predictions. Following parallel alliances, traffic 
dropped by an average of 11-15 per cent.428 The alliance between Delta, Swissair 
and Sabena, which could be classified as a parallel alliance, decreased aggregate 
demand.429 
Based on the above findings, the elimination of horizontal competition between 
alliance members leads to negative effects on prices and output. This is the effect on 
all those hub-to-hub routes where alliance members were actual competitors before 
their cooperation. This also occurs in the case of revenue-sharing joint ventures 
where the partner airlines stop competing, ie align their incentives completely.  
6.2.4.1.2 Hub dominance 
Airline alliances may have the potential to negatively affect prices not only by 
increasing the concentration on a particular route but also through strengthening their 
joint position at their hub airports. This concern is made all the more legitimate in 
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the liberalised environment by traditional network airlines beginning to restructure 
their networks and concentrate the overwhelming majority of their operations at one 
or only a handful of hub airports.430  
As discussed earlier, the theoretical foundations of deregulation and in particular the 
theory of contestable markets proved to be invalid in air transport.431 Hubs and hub-
and-spoke networks provide the dominant operator at the airport with numerous 
advantages. Economies of scope, scale and density reinforced by computerised 
reservation systems (CRS), frequent flyer programmes (FFP) and other loyalty 
schemes, revenue management systems and airport congestion have all made airlines 
more resistant to competition at their hub airports.432 Several commentators 
examined the issues of whether dominant hub airlines are able to use their market 
power to deter entry and extract higher prices.433 
One of the most influential studies in this field was written by Borenstein in 1989.434 
He concludes that an airline’s market share from the traffic of an airport or on a 
particular route influences its ability to charge higher prices to consumers. 
Furthermore, the dominant airline’s ability to charge higher prices is unique and does 
not allow smaller airlines to follow suit.435 He estimates that an airline with 50% of 
the traffic at the origin and destination airport would be able to charge prices with a 
premium of 12% over those of smaller competitors (airlines with 10%).436  
He describes the factors giving rise to this ability as follows. FFPs increasingly 
induce consumer loyalty in the case of a dominant hub airline. The FFP of the 
dominant airline offers the most possibilities to collect air miles and also the most 
valuable reward due to the most extensive network for spending them.437 FFPs also 
raise barriers to entry for new entrants. These can only be competitive where they 
offer sufficiently low prices to compensate for the cost of switching from the 
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incumbent (lost benefit from not travelling with the incumbent).438 Alliances can 
strengthen these barriers. For the same loyalty reasons, travel agency commission 
override programmes (TACOs) tend to concentrate the efforts of agents with the 
dominant airline.  
Providing most of the services from a particular city also biases ticket sales made 
through CRSs due to the ‘crowding-out’ or ‘screen padding’ effect. When alliances 
cooperate and apply codeshare agreements, the same flight can appear under 
different airlines’ codes taking much of the space from competitors’ flights on the 
CRS display. Given the fact that most of the bookings are made from the first 
display page of CRSs, the range and large number of services favours the dominant 
airline or alliance.439  
Finally, limited airport infrastructure also dominated by the hub airline makes it 
difficult for competitors to get access at competitive conditions.440 The control of 
suitable peak hour slots by the hub airline hinders competitors in offering equally 
competitive services. A market concentration due to the formation of alliances may 
have the same negative price effect at hub airports.441 
The analysis by Borenstein already included other factors that may explain part of 
this price premium, however subsequent research tried to control for all these 
additional factors that may be the reason for higher prices. Routes to or from hub 
airports may be shorter than other routes, unit costs may be higher or the mix of 
passengers could be different, eg a higher proportion of business passengers, could 
all result in higher prices.442 Borenstein also indicates natural factors such as 
reputation and information spill-overs as a factor, and concludes that any advantage 
from loyalty enhancing marketing devices increases the minimum scale needed for 
new entrants.443 Local passengers may also value higher quality in the form of a 
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larger number of direct connections and the wide choice of destinations.444  
Berry, Carnall and Spiller concluded that the hub premium is largely limited to the 
segment of business passengers.445 Lee and Luengo-Prado find for example that 
much of the hub premiums can be explained by passenger mix if controlled for 
directly.446 Lederman attributes a large part of hub premium to the dominant airlines’ 
FFP.447 Bilotkach assessed airport dominance in international transatlantic markets 
and demonstrated that this effect applies to these markets too and not just to US 
domestic markets.448 Lijesen and others examine specifically the European hub 
airlines’ practice and find that at least some European airlines charge hub premiums 
of a similar magnitude as their US counterparts.449  
In a more recent work, Bilotkach and Pai distinguished between a market power and 
a quality component within the airport dominance effect.450 While the former may be 
criticised, the latter is legitimately reflected in higher prices. Based on their results, 
Bilotkach and Pai consider that the market power-based premium derives from 
average passengers, since the premium of high yield passengers is quality-based.451 
As an explanation, they claim that business passengers place greater value on the 
higher quality services of a hub airline, such as more non-stop flights.452  
Borenstein rejects the arguments raised in the defence of higher prices at hub 
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airports.453 Even if these other factors explain part of the premiums paid by hub city 
passengers, they cannot explain the whole amount. In 2005, Borenstein, on the other 
hand, took note of the fact that the hub premium paid decreased substantially over 
the years,454 which he confirmed as an ongoing trend in 2008.455 He also discusses 
the possibility of the substantial expansion of low-cost airlines as an explanation. 
In summary, through an alliance the existing strong position of member airlines can 
be further strengthened at their hub airports. The above examples come from the US 
domestic market, although it has been confirmed that similar effects can be expected 
on transatlantic routes and the associated airports, including in Europe. Keeping in 
mind the more restricted environment in international aviation and the more difficult 
operational characteristics of these markets, hub premiums can also be assumed to 
exist in these cases. The magnitude of any such airport dominance effect is 
uncertain. As shown by the US examples, network airlines’ ability to charge hub 
premiums diminishes more and more. The substantial changes in aviation seem to 
restructure the competitive forces of the market. However, the probable spill-over 
effects into international long-haul markets of the tendencies of the US domestic and 
intra-EU markets will only be seen in a few years’ time. Accordingly, hub 
dominance effects may still exert some negative effects in the case of airline 
alliances. 
6.2.4.1.3 Vertical foreclosure 
Besides the negative effects from the loss of horizontal competition between the 
parties, airline alliances may also produce adverse effects in vertical relation, ie on 
competition between the alliance parties and third parties. The hub-and-spoke 
networks of traditional airlines and the combination of passengers travelling on 
different O&D city pairs for part of their journey offer the possibility of refusing the 
most important input (connecting passengers) to competitors or at least of raising 
their costs. This strategy can foreclose competitors or weaken the competitive 
constraint they provide. The most obvious example would be when a hub airline, 
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which is particularly strong in a certain region, after entering an alliance, gives 
preferential treatment to its partner airline but refuses to provide the same input to 
competitors. 
In its 1999 report on the US airline industry, the National Research Council’s 
Transportation Research Board (TRB) already indicated both concerns in relation to 
horizontal overlaps on hub-to-hub routes and vertical concerns.456 The TRB feared 
that in the longer term, unallied airlines would find it difficult to interline, ie get the 
input of passenger feed at hub airports. This may weaken their position and threaten 
their survival.457  
Reitzes and Moss argue that revenue-sharing joint ventures may raise rivals’ costs by 
making the access conditions for connecting passengers less advantageous than the 
ones they offer to their alliance partners.458 The effects of such an anticompetitive 
strategy not only directly affect the competitors’ ability to compete in the connecting 
behind or beyond market but also indirectly threaten their competitive position on 
hub-to-hub markets. Reitzes and others use as an illustration the example of 
American Airlines’ and Air France’s position at Paris CDG and the consequences on 
Paris CDG-US transatlantic markets.459  
American Airlines is a member of oneworld, while Air France cooperates with Delta 
in SkyTeam. American flies from Boston to Paris, Air France’s hub airport where 
passengers can connect to or from many short-haul European destinations. If 
unallied with any of the US airlines, Air France has an incentive to offer traffic feed, 
ie connecting passengers travelling for example on Paris-Budapest or Paris-Prague 
routes. Its only concern is maximisation of its own profits.460  
In an alliance setting, Air France benefits from lowering its input prices to its 
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SkyTeam partner Delta, since through the revenue-sharing agreement between them, 
it internalises the effects of lower prices. Air France will be aware of the fact that 
lower prices increase the joint traffic with Delta, for example on the route Boston-
Budapest and through revenue-sharing they both benefit from this. However, due to 
the same sharing of revenue, it will also be incentivised to raise prices for American 
Airlines.  
Higher input prices (the cost for American Airlines for its passengers flying on Air 
France’s Paris-Budapest flights) result in higher overall prices for American’s tickets 
for Boston-Budapest flights. The increased prices of American Airlines make 
passengers switch to Air France/Delta’s cheaper tickets. Through the revenue-
sharing between Air France and Delta, the former directly benefits from the 
additional revenue of switching passengers caused by the price increase it imposed 
on American Airlines. Finally, since the profitability of connecting services and the 
number of connecting passengers has a direct effect on the hub-to-hub services’ 
profitability and capacity, Air France’s strategy can lead to an American Airlines 
capacity reduction or even complete withdrawal from the Boston-Paris route.  
Such a vertical foreclosure strategy would be successful only if certain conditions 
are met.461 The airline offering the connecting services should have a strong position 
at the hub airport leaving few alternatives for the airline intending to cooperate. It is 
also essential that the particular behind and beyond destinations should have limited 
accessibility from other hubs and the proportion of connecting passengers is 
significant.  
Translating these conditions to the example of American and Air France would mean 
the following. Air France should have a particularly strong position at Paris CDG 
offering a short-haul network that is unmatched by competing alliances operating 
through London or Frankfurt. Finally, the passengers travelling on such short-haul 
flights should provide an essential contribution to the operational economics of 
transatlantic flights out of Paris. Using the example of Boston-Paris-Budapest, it 
would be necessary for Budapest to be almost exclusively served from Paris where 
Air France is the dominant operator, while the lack of Budapest passengers on the 
Boston-Paris segment would endanger the economic viability of American’s service 
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on the route.462  
In their submission in the same SkyTeam I case where American’s representatives 
Reitzes and others argued vertical foreclosure, Kasper and Lee seem to rebut 
American’s allegation. They refer to the fact that American actually diverted 
significant traffic towards its alliance partner’s London hub.463 The decrease in 
traffic on Paris routes, therefore, appears to be a natural consequence of alliance 
formation. In addition, Air France does not seem to have an unavoidable role for the 
great majority of short-haul connecting European routes. 
Bilotkach and Hüschelrath, based on frequency and passenger numbers, try to reveal 
foreclosure effects of airline alliances with antitrust immunity on transatlantic 
markets.464 They find evidence that non-allied airlines’ frequency and passenger 
numbers decrease on routes from non-hub airports to newly-immunised hubs and 
weak indications that the traffic between competing hubs also decreases.465 This 
seems to suggest vertical foreclosure effects created by alliances, since the partner 
airlines prefer to channel passengers to their partners’ flights thereby putting 
competitors at a competitive disadvantage. On the other hand, the authors emphasise 
that the analysis did not take into account the effects on costs and efficiencies, which 
may counter the negative effects of their conduct.466 Chen and Gayle present a model 
where code-sharing can lead to the foreclosure of non-integrated third party 
airlines.467 
Besides the theoretical possibility of vertical foreclosure discussed above, the EU 
Commission has preliminarily raised vertical foreclosure concerns in relation to the 
oneworld alliance on the London-Chicago and London-Miami routes.468 The 
Commission noted that most airlines would not be able to start or sustain 
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transatlantic long-haul operations without the appropriate number of connecting 
passengers.469 This passenger volume can either come from self-feed or from third 
parties operating at the airport. The parties proved to be an important source of 
traffic feed in these two markets.  
The Commission considered the alliance partners’ strong position on the routes 
themselves and the extensive range of short- and medium-haul routes feeding traffic 
into these transatlantic routes. It assessed the overall importance of connecting 
passengers for these transatlantic operations, whether the competitor can replace this 
input with traffic feed from other airlines and finally the possible consequences of  
successful foreclosure for competition on these routes.470 The assessment of 
foreclosure issues, therefore, requires consideration of the parties’ ability and 
incentives to restrict access to connecting traffic, as well as the likely impact.471 The 
incentive to foreclose depends on the degree to which foreclosure would be 
profitable.472 In essence, this is a trade-off between the sales lost in the upstream 
market (by not providing traffic feed) and the extra revenue generated in the 
downstream market (by eliminating a competitor). Whenever downstream 
competitors play an important role in downstream competition, significant harm can 
be expected to result from the foreclosure. 
Foreclosure may occur not only by imposing higher prices for connecting passengers 
but also by the disadvantageous alteration of access conditions. Providing access to 
fare classes which do not correspond to the requirements of the other airline, 
requiring long connection times, or minimum sales from the other airline all produce 
the same negative effects as imposing  price conditions. 
To conclude, the fact that airlines within alliances concentrate on cooperation with 
their competitors is not anticompetitive in itself. Alliances may intensify competition 
by improving services and achieving efficiencies. However, when an alliance is 
weaker in a certain geographic region, while another is dominant, such practices may 
restrict competition to the detriment of consumers. In addition, airlines operating 
independently of alliances may be weakened, forced to enter alliances or even 
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eliminated. 
6.2.4.1.4 Multimarket contact 
The airline industry, where airlines operate on thousands of separate but interrelated 
O&D markets, can be an ideal environment for multimarket contacts that soften the 
competitive forces.473 When airlines or airline alliances face each other on various 
markets, their behaviour can ‘be conditioned by both the firm’s internal structure and 
by extended interdependence from intermarket contacts (that is, any action taken 
against multipoint competitors could generate reactions in other jointly contested 
markets)’.474 When deciding on strategy, the fact that a particular market action can 
provoke reactions in a large number of other markets where the undertaking faces 
the same competitor could be a factor.  
Multimarket contacts, market transparency, the possibility of rapid reactions by 
using CRSs, the inherently oligopolistic market structure of the airline industry, and 
the absence of lumpy orders and big buyers may favour the emergence of 
oligopolistic interdependence.475 The analysis by Evans and Kessides reveal the 
presence of statistically significant and quantitatively important multimarket 
effects.476 They find that fares are higher in markets served by airlines with extensive 
multimarket contacts.477 
Kim and Singal also identify price-increasing effects arising from multimarket 
contacts when studying airline mergers in the period of 1985-1988.478 They 
emphasise that while market power resulting from concentration may be countered 
by increased efficiencies, ‘market power due to multimarket contact has no 
redeeming features’.479 In a follow-up article, Singal explores further the issues of 
multimarket contacts.480 He finds positive correlated changes in prices with the 
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changes in multimarket contacts for long-distance routes.481 These include an 
increase in fares whenever there is an increase in multimarket contact, even if 
concentration decreases at the same time.482  
Fournier and Zuehlke conclude that multimarket contacts reduce the risk of fare wars 
between competing airlines.483 Bilotkach examines the effect of increased 
multimarket contacts on non-price product characteristics such as frequency and 
aircraft size in relation to the US Airways/America West merger and finds negative 
effects on competition.484 
Multimarket contacts can be important in the case of global airline alliances which, 
combined, control almost 58% of global air transport.485 Airline alliances strive to 
include members from each of the important travel-generating regions of the world: 
on a global level they compete on tens of thousands of markets. More specifically, 
revenue-sharing alliances on the transatlantic market compete head-to-head on 
thousands of O&D city pairs. Although this has not been examined so far, the fact 
that three dominant alliance groups rule these markets may entail the risk of 
anticompetitive effects due to multimarket contacts. With the advance of airline 
consolidation and alliance integration, it has been considered that competition policy 
analysis should pay increasing attention to the effects of multimarket contacts.486 
6.2.4.2 Benefits of airline alliances 
Chapter 4 discussed cost constraints and demand and supply-side characteristics of 
airline operations. It also described how the regulatory environment changed with 
deregulation and liberalisation. In Chapter 5, the different responses given by airlines 
to these circumstances were considered, as were the emergence of airline alliances 
due the competition and changing consumer preferences in a globalised market. In 
the following section, the issue of whether alliances fulfil their role to realise pro-
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competitive benefits, besides the obvious potential for negative effects mentioned 
above, will be discussed. Given the role played by airline alliances in dealing with 
the operational constraints of air transport and responding to consumer needs, 
benefits should be relevant either for the supply side or the demand side of aviation. 
6.2.4.2.1 Supply-side benefits 
Elimination of double marginalisation 
As mentioned above, airlines with largely complementary networks may benefit 
from cooperation when demand exists for services across networks. In a 
complementary alliance, partner airlines consider the full itinerary and maximise 
joint profit instead of having regard only to their own segment. Accordingly, both 
airlines will set lower prices than they would choose individually because they 
recognise that the externalities of their pricing decision (increase in demand) can be 
internalised through the alliance. Both airlines will increase output and jointly 
maximise their profit. In the literature this is called the ‘elimination of double 
marginalisation’.  
In theory, the deeper the cooperation between the parties, the more they can align 
their prices and eliminate double marginalisation. Without bilateral cooperation 
between two airlines, travelling on the network of different airlines occurs under the 
conditions of the IATA Multilateral Interlining Traffic Agreement (MITA) or 
multilateral prorate agreement. This agreement determines on a multilateral basis the 
amount that the operating airline will charge the other airline for conveying further 
the latter’s passenger. By the very nature of the agreement, the conditions of the 
MITA are less advantageous since they take into account the interest of multiple 
airlines and do not allow for an individualised approach. The adoption of an IATA 
fare requires unanimity, therefore prices will be skewed and correspond to the costs 
of the less efficient airline taking part in the process.487  
In a simple code-share agreement, airlines can achieve lower prices due to the 
bilateral nature of their relationship, however the own profit maximisation element 
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for the separate segments cannot be eliminated completely. Finally, when the parties 
fully cooperate on prices and jointly determine them, they achieve the above-
mentioned elimination of double marginalisation. 
The literature includes extensive discussion of the elimination of double 
marginalisation in aviation and several studies estimate or (and) quantify the effect 
of it. Brueckner and Whalen find extremely robust results indicating that airline 
alliances decrease interline fares, ie the prices connecting passengers pay, by 25% 
compared to the fares of non-allied airlines.488 The reduction comes from elimination 
of double marginalisation which in turn increases demand and thereby traffic on the 
routes concerned. Increased traffic enables the realisation of economies of traffic 
density putting further downward pressure on prices. Oum, Park and Zhang also find 
that complementary alliances are likely to decrease the full price.489 Airlines tend to 
adopt more competitive pricing behaviour after entering an alliance. Partner airlines 
lower their prices by an average of 1.3% in a new alliance to enhance their 
competitive positions.490  
Oum, Park and Zhang also examine empirically older cooperations from the early 
1990s and find 22 and 19% reductions in the period after the creation of alliances.491 
In a theoretical paper, Brueckner demonstrates what has been shown by the 
empirical analysis of Brueckner and Whalen, namely that prices on complementary 
routes decrease while traffic increases, while on routes with a parallel alliance prices 
increase and traffic decreases.492 However, when economies of density are accounted 
for, these can produce price lowering-effects even on the parallel routes. 
In a follow-up study based on more recent data, Brueckner extends the results of 
Brueckner and Whalen.493 He distinguishes between the effect of code-share 
agreements and antitrust immunity. The results show that code-sharing reduces 
prices by 8-17%, antitrust immunity by 13-21%, while the combined effect of the 
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two results in a 17-30% drop.494 Brueckner’s other follow-up article demonstrates 
price decreases of similar magnitude.495 He finds a 4% effect for simple alliance 
membership, 7% for code-sharing and 16% for antitrust immunity, totalling a 27% 
reduction in prices compared to no cooperation.496  
Whalen also extends these earlier results by using better data for his research and 
still finds robust results, although with somewhat moderate figures.497 The results 
show that alliance prices with antitrust immunity are 18.6-19.5% lower than non-
alliance prices, while the same figures for code-sharing are 8.8-10.5%.498 He also 
concludes that immunised alliance prices are very close to those prices when one 
airline offers both legs of the journey (online price). In his 2007 article, Whalen 
further develops the research of alliance effects on connecting services by using data 
from an 11-year period that covers the formation and sometimes termination of 
alliances too.499 This approach is more robust. As in his previous work, he finds 
price effects which are smaller but still in the same magnitude. The effect of code-
sharing is 5-9%, while that of antitrust immunity 13-20%, while he again shows that 
immunised alliance fares are close to those of online prices.500 
In contrast to the above research, Bilotkach applies a different approach and instead 
of the Cournot-type model, uses a Bertrand competition model.501 Although he 
identifies similar effects of airline cooperation, in his model the price decrease for 
connecting passengers does not depend on antitrust immunity.502 Instead, price 
competition between alliances can equally eliminate the double marginalisation 
effect arising from non-cooperation. Bilotkach’s theoretical model finds support 
from his later empirical research. He argues that the source of the 28-30% total 
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price-decreasing effect is only alliance cooperation and code-sharing without 
antitrust immunity.503 Gillespie and Richard come to similar conclusions about the 
ineffectiveness of antitrust immunity by analysing transatlantic fare data.504 Finally, 
Brueckner, Lee and Singer re-examine the price effects of international alliances, 
and although they find smaller effects for alliance membership, code-sharing and 
antitrust immunity, the general price-deceasing effect has gained support.505 
Besides the most relevant experience of international alliances, the economic 
literature also includes extensive discussion of US domestic alliances, which concern 
only code-sharing.  
Bamberger, Carlton and Neumann examine the Continental/America West and 
Northwest/Alaska code-share alliances and find 7.1-8.2% and 5.1-6.1% price-
decreasing effects respectively.506 Even with regard to code-sharing, they mention 
the elimination of double marginalisation as a potential price benefit. Ito and Lee 
analyse the US domestic phenomenon of ‘virtual code-sharing’ where cooperation 
consists of putting one airline’s code on the other’s service without providing any 
segment of the services.507 They observe lower prices for these services which they 
associate with the airlines’ practice of product differentiation. In a follow-up paper, 
they confirm this finding and also identify an 11.6% price-decreasing effect from 
traditional code-sharing that reduces double marginalisation.508 Armantier and 
Richard find similar results by showing a price decrease of 3.2% as a result of code-
sharing in the Continental/Northwest alliance.509 
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Increased output 
Lower prices through the elimination of double marginalisation lead to increased 
demand and measured traffic increases. The theoretical models of Brueckner and 
Bilotkach demonstrate the positive effects on traffic development through better 
prices being imposed on connecting behind-beyond routes.510 Empirical results 
support these findings. Oum, Park and Zhang examine empirical data from 
transatlantic alliances from the 1990s. Following the formation of complementary 
alliances, total traffic increased by an average of 11-17%.511 British Airways/USAir, 
KLM/Northwest and Lufthansa/United increased aggregate demand on their 
respective alliance routes confirming that complementary alliances raise total 
output.512  
Brueckner and Whalen indicate traffic stimulation by lower prices,513 while Whalen 
associates the switch on a route from a non-alliance to immunised services with an 
increase of 77.2-87.5% in output (21.7-43.7% for code-sharing).514 The US General 
Accounting Office (GAO) and the DOT pursued several surveys on the actual effects 
of airline alliances in the early years of alliance formation.515 They all observed 
impressive traffic growth and demand stimulation due to alliances, especially in 
connecting markets. Finally, concerning the US domestic markets, several studies 
reached similar conclusions on traffic developments due to airline cooperations in 
connecting markets. Bamberger and others observe a 6.5% increase of total traffic,516 
just as Armantier and Richard, who estimate 12.3%.517 
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Economies of traffic density 
The increased traffic due to cooperation creates economies of density. These arise 
when unit cost declines as the volume of traffic carried within an unchanged network 
increases.518 The higher volume of traffic enables advantages to be derived from 
aircraft size and improved utilisation; airlines can achieve higher load factors, and 
deploy bigger aircraft on the routes with an increased frequency.  
Caves and others were among the first to show economies of density for airlines of 
all sizes.519 They distinguish between economies of scale and economies of traffic 
density. While former seems to be constant, they find increasing economies of traffic 
density.520 A 1% increase in output leads to a 0.80% increase in cost.521 In 
comparing trunk and local airlines’ unit costs,522 they concluded that increasing scale 
will not change the locals’ unit costs, but rather the longer stage length and higher 
density.523 Airline alliance cooperation helps to achieve exactly these goals. For 
example, an Airbus A380 enables operators to usually fly more than 500 passengers 
(up to 853) to a distance of up to 15 700km.524 The combination of passengers at hub 
airports through traffic feed from partners is the key to filling these giant aircraft.  
Brueckner and Spiller construct a model which suggests that in the presence of 
strong economies of density, the elimination of competition on a leg of a hub-and-
spoke system increases welfare and lowers prices throughout the system.525 
Accordingly, an alliance between a hub-and-spoke airline and a competitor on feeder 
routes may improve the cost efficiency of the parties through the achievement of 
economies of density. Brueckner, Dyer and Spiller test the above model empirically 
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and confirm the conclusions.526 Brueckner and Spiller also identify economies of 
density which are even stronger than those identified by Caves and others.527 
Airlines can also realise economies of scale and scope through their cooperation in 
ground handling, sales, procurement, infrastructure use, IT development, etc.528 By 
cooperating within alliances, airlines may realise substantial supply-side benefits in 
the form of cost efficiencies. In a sufficiently competitive environment they will pass 
on these benefits to consumers in the form of lower prices and higher output. 
6.2.4.2.2 Demand-side benefits 
Airline alliances create a lot of benefits that increase consumer convenience and 
represent actual monetary value, especially for time-sensitive business passengers. 
These elements improve the service level and try to align it to those comparable with 
the services of a single operator. They aim to harmonise the consumer experience, 
irrespective of the airline used or the geographic region concerned. 
Airline alliances create new connections, direct routes, alternative routings, higher 
frequency, and better spread frequencies. The creation of new connections does not 
require much explanation. For example, the alliance of a US and a European airline 
immediately creates connections to US domestic destinations for European 
passengers, which would otherwise not be available due to the regulatory restrictions 
of air transport. This possibility largely contributed to the widespread use of 
alliances in aviation. The creation of direct routes may only occur due to the support 
from the partner airline’s traffic feed. Especially on transatlantic markets where the 
proportion of connecting passengers can be substantial, the increased access to 
connecting passengers at the other end of a route may provide crucial contribution to 
the economic viability of the service. For example, before their cooperation began in 
the early 1990s, neither KLM nor Northwest had direct service to the partner’s hub 
airport.  
Sometimes the new service is created by the altered incentives of the partner airlines 
to do so, because otherwise they would not be interested in entering the route. With a 
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simple code-sharing agreement, connecting passengers may be available to the 
partner airline. However, in terms of routing, own profit-maximising incentives may 
prove decisive, thereby hindering new services.  
A good example is provided by Delta’s alliance with Australia’s Virgin Blue 
Group.529 In this case, Delta operated a direct flight to Sydney from Los Angeles. 
With only a code-share agreement, they would want to serve any other city in 
Australia solely indirectly through connections in Sydney. This would mean that the 
majority of the service is flown on Delta aircraft, so the revenue would remain with 
Delta. In a revenue-sharing environment, they would want to sell tickets on a direct 
flight between Brisbane and Los Angeles too. With revenue-sharing, even if Virgin 
Blue subsidiary V Australia operates the service, the partners are not concerned 
about the ‘metal’ used for the service as they would sell tickets on each other’s 
flights. In this way the cooperation can make the operation of new routes viable. 
Cooperation within an alliance may substantially increase the available itineraries 
between the same origin and destination. This means that consumers have a wider 
choice or, in the case of unexpected difficulties at certain airports, alternative options 
to still reach their destination on time. Alliances may enable additional frequencies 
on the routes of cooperation. Elimination of double marginalisation leads to lower 
prices which in turn stimulate demand. Increased demand justifies additional 
frequencies.  
Even in the absence of additional demand, an alliance allows fare combinability, 
where the passenger can combine the fares and services of partners on the same 
route.530 Suppose a route where airlines A and B both have two daily flights. 
Without cooperation, a passenger usually does not have the option of combining 
separate flight legs of different operators or only at prohibitively high prices. The 
passenger buying an outbound ticket with airline A would have only two inbound 
options, namely those of airline A. Through the cooperation, passengers may 
combine the different outbound and inbound services of the partner airlines, in this 
example the outbound service of airline A can be combined with two additional 
                                                
529  ACCC authorisation A91151, A91152, A91172 and A91173 of 10 December 2009 on Virgin 
Blue Airlines Pty & others’ application. 
530  Transatlantic airline alliance report (n 6) 22. 
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services of airline B too. Instead of the two return time options, the passenger would 
have four possibilities.  
Cooperation may also allow airlines to spread their frequencies more evenly 
throughout the day.531 Revenue-sharing alters the partners’ incentives for scheduling; 
they may choose more optimal timings from the passengers’ point of view than in a 
competitive environment where airlines’ objective is profit maximisation based on 
their own services. More available frequencies and better flight bundles decrease 
frequency delay, a service improvement highly valued by time-sensitive, business 
passengers. The net benefit of these service improvements can be determined 
through the calculation of average time-savings from increased frequencies or flight 
options and by applying the time values determined in the literature.532 
Within an alliance, the quality of services is higher for connecting passengers than in 
a non-allied environment. Even if interlining were available between the services of 
two airlines in the multilateral IATA framework, the alliance cooperation has many 
characteristics that make the service better aligned to an airline’s own online service. 
Alliance cooperations aim to achieve a seamless travel experience. The partners can 
issue a single ticket for the entire journey that involves the segment of the partner 
airline too. Upon departure, passengers can check-in for all the segments of the 
journey, so they will have all the necessary boarding cards and do not have to 
reclaim their luggage at the transfer airport.  
The incoming and outgoing flight banks or waves at hub airports are more 
coordinated between the partners which creates not only shorter connection times, 
but also shorter total travel times.533 This again is a service feature which increases 
quality and reduces the difference compared to the non-stop (direct) services which 
are usually preferred. The more integrated nature of the service also means that the 
passenger will be waited for or at least taken care of in cases of delay or other 
schedule disruptions. Finally, alliance partners also co-locate their services at their 
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respective hub airports, using the same airport terminal which also decreases 
connection times and shortens the distances passengers have to walk within the 
airport.534 Through all these benefits, passengers can enjoy almost the same level of 
service as a single airline would provide, just on a much larger, global scale in the 
spirit of ‘from anywhere to everywhere’. 
Airline alliances usually also involve some sort of cooperation in relation to FFPs. 
These programmes started in the US after the deregulation. The first airline that 
introduced an FFP was American Airlines in 1981 with its programme called 
‘AAdvantage’.535 An FFP is actually a loyalty scheme, a type of competition that 
rewards repeated purchases of passengers by giving them points according to 
distance travelled and the cabin class chosen. When the passenger has collected 
sufficient points, he/she can redeem them for free or upgraded tickets, higher 
allowed baggage weight, lounge access and several other services. As FFPs tend to 
achieve their objective, empirical studies show that business passengers are heavily 
influenced by their FFP membership when they decide which airline’s service they 
want to use.536 They are likely to choose for their own benefit, to build up their FFP 
points, even if their decision under normal conditions would be different. FFPs can 
encourage unnecessary travel, or travel at higher fares over more circuitous 
routings.537  
One of the main objectives of airline alliances, as previously mentioned, is the 
integration of partner airlines’ FFPs, which means that airlines can offer significantly 
more destinations for collecting and redeeming FFP points than they actually 
physically serve. This enhanced FFP is more attractive for business passengers who 
will have an even more reduced willingness to change airline if they are already 
member of an FFP. The creation of an alliance can have the beneficial effect of 
making a switch between airlines more advantageous for the passenger.  
An FFP reciprocity agreement between partner airlines would ensure the passengers 
have the same benefits irrespective of which airline they fly with. The possibility of 
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earning FFP points on all alliance services increases the flight options and the 
availability of flight bundles just as fare combinability. Accordingly, passengers can 
derive similar monetary benefits from the cooperation through time-savings. FFP 
reciprocity also entitles passengers to enjoy the same benefits as provided by the 
partner airline to its own FFP members. Ie they can enter airport lounges, upgrade 
services in the partner’s network. 
Access to airport lounges can be an important benefit on its own. Using hub-and-
spoke systems requires passengers to spend considerable time at airports before 
departure or between the connecting flights. Time-sensitive business passengers 
place particular value on time spent at airports not being completely wasted so they 
can work or relax as they wish. Alliance cooperation may provide access to 
passengers to partner lounges all over the world, extending the number of available 
lounges significantly. 
To conclude, airline alliances can create many benefits for passengers which are 
directly passed on, immediately after the commencement of any cooperation. These 
quality improvements, even those that are not expressed in monetary terms, may 
provide passengers with more value. 
6.2.5 Different assessment standards of revenue-sharing joint ventures 
and airline mergers 
As discussed in the relevant parts of Chapter 5, airline alliances often imitate 
mergers, thereby overcoming international regulatory barriers which still exist.538 
Metal-neutral cooperations in particular try to align the parties’ incentives in all 
possible areas of their operations completely. This form of cooperation involves a 
high level of integration with substantial investment from the airlines involved.539 
Referring to these circumstances, Kjølbye argues that despite the far-reaching 
merger-like integration of economic activity, airline joint ventures are treated very 
differently from actual mergers.540 Under Article 101(1) TFEU, these joint ventures 
qualify as an object restriction where the presumption of negative effects prevails, 
while if they were mergers, authorities would have to demonstrate significant 
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adverse effects on competition. In his opinion there seems to be no reason to apply a 
stricter standard under the rules on restrictive agreements. 
The question arises of whether the more severe treatment can be justified despite the 
similarities in objectives and effects. In EU competition law, there is a significant 
difference in the substantive tests of the EUMR and Article 101 TFEU. Although the 
EUMR applies the ‘substantial impediment of effective competition’ test, it has been 
established that most of the problematic cases will continue to be based upon a 
finding of dominance.541 Accordingly, the assessment of mergers - just as cases of 
abuse of dominant position - requires substantial market power as a prequisite. As 
stated on several occasions, although all instruments of EU competition law are 
basically concerned with market power, the degree of market power normally 
required for the finding of an infringement under Article 101(1) TFEU is less than 
the degree of market power required for a finding of dominance under Article 102 
TFEU (or the EUMR).542 This can be explained by the fundamental differences 
between a multilateral activity on the one hand, and a merger and unilateral activities 
on the other.  
Although airlines conclude alliances on a long-term basis, these agreements are still 
limited in time, with the possibility of terminating them at relatively short notice. 
Mergers, on the other hand, are intended to be of indefinite duration and a permanent 
change in the marketplace. This influences the member airlines’ incentives for long-
term commitments and partner-specific investments. Notwithstanding the fact that 
alliances involve significant commitments from partners, airlines tend to keep 
alternative strategic options open in case of a derailed cooperation.543 It is, therefore, 
not surprising that the aircraft manufacturing industry has not witnessed any 
significant joint orders from airline alliances thus far and that the largest orders come 
from individual airlines.544  
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In this regard it is also relevant that an agreement does not result in any change in 
control. None of the parties acquires control over the partner. Partners retain their 
independence as legal entities. Although alliances operate with numerous 
committees which include different levels of management personnel, these function 
in a manner similar to the forums of cooperation responsible for coordinating 
member airlines’ activities. The joint venture itself never decides on behalf of the 
member airlines, nor does it exert control over the combined assets of these airlines.  
Separate management boards remain in charge of each airline subject to their own 
interests, declared or hidden agendas and financial capabilities. The extensive 
coordination does not change this setting. As a consequence, although metal-neutral 
cooperation substantially aligns the airlines’ market incentives, it will never achieve 
a level of integration identical to that of a merged entity under the control of a single 
management board. The consultative decision-making of alliances compared to the 
hierarchical control of undertakings decreases the potential of efficiencies arising 
from asset integration. At the same time, their effects arising from elimination of 
competition are comparable.  
As mentioned above, it is often argued that alliances are simply merger substitutes, 
where the partners are bound to cooperate and they would immediately merge 
provided the legal environment would allow it. Consequently, they represent just 
another form of concentration, which should be treated in the same, generally 
lenient, way. However, several examples provide evidence to the contrary. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, as the level of integration increases, alliances become more 
lasting and the partners become interdependent.545 On the other hand, alliances can 
be disbanded even at these stages. The recent example of British Airways and 
Qantas provides an excellent example of this. The two airlines have been in close 
relationship since 1995546 and in a revenue-sharing metal-neutral alliance for over a 
decade.547 In September 2012, however, the long-standing alliance between the 
                                                                                                                                     
December 2012. 
545  See section 5.4. 
546  See ACCC authorisation A90595 of May 1995 on Qantas’ and British Airways’ application. 
547  ACCC authorisation A30202 of 10 May 2000 on Qantas’ and British Airways’ application; 
ACCC authorisation A30226 and A30227 of 8 February 2005 on Qantas’ and British Airways’ 
application; ACCC authorisation A91195 and A91196 of 31 March 2010 on Qantas’ and British 
Airways’ application; ACCC authorisation A91265 and A91266 of 29 September 2011 on 
Qantas’ and British Airways’ application. 
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parties was terminated and Qantas chose Emirates as its new partner.548 Merger 
activity may also result in significant changes in alliance memberships, leading 
airlines to switch alliances.549  
The research by Iatrou offers interesting insights in the differences which exist 
between the two forms of concentration.550 He carried out a survey among alliance 
member airlines with a response rate of 97%. Even at the time of the survey in 2006, 
almost 90% of the respondents found consolidation to be an inevitable trend.551 
Despite this clear indication, however, over 60% considered that alliances would 
either stay as they are (35%) or would develop and move to closer integration 
without proceeding to mergers (26%).552 When asked about the role of alliances in 
their strategic plans, only 6% considered mergers to prevail over alliances, while the 
majority answered that alliances were more important (36%) or equally as important 
as mergers for the future (36%).553  
With regard to the positive effects, mergers clearly seem to outweigh alliances in 
most categories, even if the questions did not concentrate on the comparison of 
metal-neutral cooperations and mergers.554 Iatrou concludes that alliances fail to 
produce significant benefits in the area of cost synergies compared to mergers.555  
Hierarchical control within a firm enables the rationalisation or commitment needed 
for the decisions with most impact on costs. Metal-neutral alliances close this gap in 
potential cost synergies definitely by aligning incentives. Nevertheless, the 
cooperative nature of alliances hinders the complete elimination of the gap.  
The lack of change in control also deprives society of other beneficial effects 
associated with mergers. Alliances can also facilitate the spread of superior 
managerial or technical skills, although the potential of mergers for this seems higher 
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due to the hierarchical control.556 The positive management incentivising effect of 
possible hostile takeovers also cannot prevail in a cooperation, just like freedom of 
easy entry and exit to/from an industry.557 Mergers are always more costly and time-
consuming to implement. United and Continental announced their merger on 3 May 
2010, but the two airlines operated under their different operating licences till March 
2012, and even after this date full integration has yet to be completed totally.558 In 
contrast to this, a horizontal agreement, such as an alliance is quicker and cheaper to 
realise. Therefore any potential anticompetitive objectives can be made more 
profitable and accordingly more tempting for airlines. Furthermore, even the most 
integrated metal-neutral alliances can easily involve more than two airlines, which 
rarely occurs in a merger case. In their widest form, all three global alliances include 
a double digit number of airlines. This also increases the potential for more negative 
effects. 
Given the fact that merger analysis relies mainly on dominance, the differences 
between agreements and unilateral conduct also provide explanation for the diverse 
assessment. Although the Commission is not required to show future abuses of a 
dominant position in its investigations under the EUMR,559 it aims to prevent 
substantial increases in market power and mainly raises concerns about creating, or 
strengthening of a dominant position. The merged entity would take control of all the 
assets of both merging parties and decide internally on prices, output, investment 
based on the directions of a single management board. A merged entity would have 
the incentive to eliminate non-efficient parts of its own internal organisation, and it 
would also possess the necessary means to achieve that.  
In an alliance, as discussed above, any decision is the result of extensive 
coordination between separate legal entities, where management boards have their 
own agenda. The analysis examines the market situation post-transaction with a view 
to the future and not as a constant collusion based on the merger contract between 
independent undertakings. While mergers have other beneficial functions in an 
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economy, they may distort competition if they acquire substantial market power. 
Absent substantial market power, therefore, they rarely raise any problems.  
Agreements between direct competitors, on the other hand, are always suspicious 
and only permitted on the grounds that they create benefits. With regard to certain 
practices, this approach entails a presumption of negative effects due to procedural 
efficiency reasons, while in other cases the threshold for raising concerns is simply 
lower. All these circumstances justify a different approach to airline alliances 
compared to mergers despite the substantial similarities between the effects of these 
two forms of concentration. Finally, the different treatment of alliances compared to 
mergers is not derived solely from the potential object classification of certain airline 
practices. Even in an effect case under Article 101(1) TFEU, the party alleging an 
infringement has to demonstrate a lower degree of market power than in a merger 
case.560 
6.2.6 Airline alliances under Article 101(1) TFEU 
In the section on market definition, it was concluded that defining the relevant 
market seeks to restrict attention to those services which have a significant impact on 
competition.561 Therefore, for the purposes of competition law analysis, airline 
competition takes place in O&D city pairs. This method was considered the most 
appropriate way to capture competitive effects, even if this means that some other 
aspects form part of the competitive assessment only at a later stage. Consequently, 
as a starting point of any analysis, those routes where concerns can be raised as a 
result of the alliance agreement have to be identified: these are the affected markets. 
The Commission’s practice is to distinguish between overlap and non-overlap routes. 
This corresponds to the distinction between routes with actual and potential 
competition concerns.  
On overlap routes prior to the creation of an alliance, parties operate in direct 
competition and are actual competitors. In non-overlap markets prior to an alliance, 
only one of the parties operates, while the other airline is a potential competitor. 
Within overlap routes, the practice differentiates between direct-direct, direct-
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indirect and indirect-indirect overlaps.562 A direct-direct overlap indicates an overlap 
between the parties’ non-stop (direct) services, while direct-indirect between the 
non-stop (direct) and one-stop (indirect) services. Finally, indirect-indirect refers to 
thin routes where none of the parties provide a non-stop service. Within non-overlap 
routes the AF/Alitalia decision identifies routes linked to the hub of the operating 
party, non-overlap routes linked to the hub of the non-operating party and routes not 
linked to any hubs.563 In an alliance case, this method can lead to a large number of 
affected markets and each can include a different route of concern which has to be 
investigated individually. 
To decide whether an alliance agreement restricts competition under Article 101(1) 
TFEU, it is necessary to examine whether it has an object or effect which restricts 
competition. Following the case law of the Union Courts the precise purpose of the 
agreement first needs to be considered in the economic context in which it is to be 
applied.564 ‘The competition in question must be understood within the actual 
context in which it would occur in the absence of the agreement in dispute’.565 The 
restriction of competition ‘must result from all or some of the clauses of the 
agreement itself’.566 If it can be inferred ‘merely from a reading of the terms’ of the 
agreement that it restricts competition, then it may have the object of restricting 
competition.567 To that end, close regard must be paid to the objectives which it 
intended to attain and the wording of its provisions. 
Although all alliance joint ventures asked for a confidential treatment of the 
agreements that serve as a basis of their metal-neutral cooperation, their antitrust 
immunity applications in the US reveal the essence of these agreements. For 
example, the oneworld parties described the agreement as a means of removing 
‘each carrier’s incentive to act opportunistically in ways that inure to the short-term 
financial benefit of one carrier, but which reduce the efficiency and consumer 
benefits delivered by the alliance. By broadly sharing revenue on a metal-neutral 
foundation, the JBA will ensure that each carrier acts for the benefit of – and is 
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compensated for its contribution to – the alliance as a whole.’568 SkyTeam refers to 
the creation of common economic interests through the alignment of economic 
incentives.569 Finally, the Star Alliance highlights the indifference of partners as to 
which airline’s aircraft carries the passenger, as each airline will focus on winning 
customers for the joint venture.570  
This alignment of incentives is achieved through the coordination of prices, capacity, 
schedules, network planning, marketing and sales, FFPs and revenue-sharing, ie all 
the relevant parameters of competition. From these descriptions it can be seen that 
the partner airlines undertake all possible means to eliminate their incentives on the 
market and focus on the common interest of the alliance, namely to behave as a 
single entity. They no longer determine independently the policy they intend to adopt 
on the market; indeed, all competition parameters are affected by coordination.  
The whole concept of metal-neutrality and incentive alignment ‘conflicts patently 
with the concept inherent in the [TFEU] provisions relating to competition’ since 
they substitute full cooperation for the risk of competition that would occur due to 
the different incentives of individual airlines.571 The fact that partners aim to align 
their incentives suggests that, absent the agreement, they would compete. The mere 
wording of these agreements and the whole structure of the cooperation reveals the 
object of restricting competition. By their very nature these agreements intend to 
restrict competition. In addition, ‘the means put in place to attain the objective […] 
include restrictions whose object is anti-competitive’,572 eg price and capacity-fixing. 
Although a restriction by object may be presumed based on the wording of these 
agreements, the examination of the economic and legal context of which it forms a 
part may not be entirely dispensed with.573 However, the legal and economic context 
does not reveal anything to the contrary. They do not include any factors that would 
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be ‘capable of casting doubt on the existence of a restriction of competition’.574 
What this demonstrates is merely the pro-competitive potential of these agreements 
and the advantages they can provide under certain circumstances. They can create 
both supply-side and demand-side benefits, or remedy some of the legal 
shortcomings of the international regulatory framework.  
Nevertheless, these are effects to be taken into account only under the analysis of 
Article 101(3) TFEU.575 Metal-neutral cooperation may be necessary for achieving a 
particular level of efficiencies; however that would be an issue for consideration in 
relation to indispensability under the third condition of Article 101(3) TFEU. 
Attaining these benefits may even be a parallel aim of an agreement but nothing in 
the legal and economic context suggests that the complete elimination of all 
incentives to compete would not be at the same time an elimination of 
competition.576 For the purposes of Article 101(1) TFEU, the relevant aspects are 
those contributing to the restriction of competition or those that would cast doubt on 
it. These conclusions should not prejudice the analysis under Article 101(3) TFEU in 
any way. 
Airline alliances can be best described as production agreements, where airlines 
cooperate to create the joint alliance product. The Commission’s guidelines on 
horizontal cooperation agreements deal with production agreements. Under these 
rules, agreements involving price-fixing, output limitation, or sharing markets should 
be generally classified as restrictions by object.577  
The guidelines contain two exceptions from this general approach. An effect analysis 
is required either if the parties agree on the output directly concerned by the 
production agreement, provided that the other parameters of competition are not 
eliminated; or when a production agreement sets sales prices for the joint product, 
provided that the cooperation also includes distribution and the parties would not 
otherwise have an incentive to enter into the agreement.578 Revenue-sharing joint 
ventures do not satisfy these conditions. As previously discussed, these alliances 
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eliminate all parameters of competition and align member airlines’ incentives 
completely. It is also not fulfilled that without the cooperation on distribution the 
parties would not have entered the metal-neutral cooperation in the first place.  
With regard to possible theories of harm, the guidelines mention direct limitation of 
competition between the parties. The production joint venture may lead to the 
alignment of output, quality, prices for the joint venture product or other 
competitively important parameters.579 By cooperating, metal-neutral joint ventures 
succeed in achieving their aim of producing these effects. The guidelines also refer 
to the possible coordination of competitive behavior and foreclosure of third parties 
as potential competition risks.580 In the previous discussion of negative effects it was 
noted that airline alliances may foreclose competitors by not providing access to 
traffic feed(s) at their hub airports. 
Although the Commission has investigated several alliance agreements over the 
years and investigates or investigated all three metal-neutral transatlantic joint 
ventures, the decisions are few and relatively old. With the exception of the 
oneworld case,581 there are no recent decisions which would provide specific 
guidance for airline cooperations in the system of legal exception introduced by 
Modernisation in 2004.  
The 1995 general cooperation agreement between SAS and Lufthansa is not 
classified either as an object or effect restriction. The decision refers only to 
appreciable restriction of competition due to the extensive cooperation on capacities, 
frequencies, fares and marketing through a joint venture.582 A few years later, 
concerning Lufthansa’s and Austrian’s joint venture, the Commission concludes 
again that the parties restrict competition without making any reference to restriction 
by object or effect.583 However, it can be argued that the limited analysis presented 
in the decisions, and the fact that both cases involve joint ventures and cooperation 
on all important competition parameters suggests that these cases are object cases.  
A slightly different approach can be seen in the case of British Airways and SN 
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Brussels Airlines, where the Commission finds that, due to cooperation on prices, 
schedule and frequency across the parties’ network competition is restricted ‘in 
principle’.584 In the British Airways, Iberia and GB Airways alliance case, the 
Commission uses a different wording when it states that ‘there is no doubt’ 
concerning the restriction of competition.585 Since the cooperation involves prices, 
sales, revenue and cost sharing, and coordination on frequencies, schedules and 
capacity, the Commission concludes that all competition will end between the 
parties.  
Again, the circumstances of these cases and the wording used suggests restrictions of 
competition by object even if these are not mentioned explicitly. Finally, in the case 
of Air France/Alitalia, the Commission expressly uses the terminology that the 
agreement has the object of restricting competition.586 The parties cooperate on 
prices, share revenue and aim to achieve a very close integration of key competition 
parameters, therefore the Commission concludes that as a matter of fact and law all 
competition is eliminated. 
In its commitment decision on the oneworld joint venture, the Commission refers to 
a preliminary conclusion of potential restriction by object since the extensive level of 
cooperation eliminates competition on key parameters of competition. Consequently, 
the agreements aim at restricting competition by their very nature.587 The 
Commission seems to follow the same approach in its ongoing investigation of the 
Star Alliance.588 
The Commission’s practice, even if not always explicit, seems to suggest that these 
types of close cooperations restrict competition by object, notwithstanding their clear 
potential for efficiencies. In the phrasing of the horizontal guidelines, horizontal co-
operation agreements can lead to substantial economic benefits, be a means to share 
risk, save costs, increase investments, pool know-how, enhance product quality and 
variety, and launch innovation more quickly. As discussed in the section on effects 
of alliances, cooperation in the airline industry may produce exactly these benefits, 
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however, the negative and positive effects appear at the same time in most cases. 
This raises the issue that the category of object restrictions is wider than just 
hardcore restrictions with no redeeming virtues. Kjølbye sees a tendency towards a 
widening of the object category compared with the more effects-based approach of 
the previous horizontal guidelines, which he considers a development to make life 
easier for the Commission.589 Jones also finds it problematic that the object category 
is relatively broad, claiming that this area of law is left behind by Modernisation and 
the more economic approach.590 Finally, the judgments of the Court of Justice in 
Beef Industry, Glaxo and T-Mobile Netherlands are also regarded by many as 
reverting to formalism, where the effect analysis of the more economic approach is 
wrongly avoided. 
By using the example of airline alliances it can be demonstrated that the above 
criticism regarding the definition of object restrictions is not necessarily legitimate. 
The criticism emphasises the distortive consequences of object classification for the 
outcome of the Article 101 TFEU analysis as a whole, and refers to the resulting 
inefficiency in the enforcement of EU competition law.591 The risk of false positives 
arises when undertakings intentionally avoid object restrictions and choose 
suboptimal forms of cooperation due to the fear of condemnation and fines. As 
discussed earlier, the object/effect dichotomy seems to serve the more economic 
approach and contributes to minimising false positives and false negatives at 
reasonable costs.592 Classification as an object restriction without analysis of effects 
initially shifts the burden of proof to the parties to the agreement complained of. It 
does nothing more, however, than to change the usual order of adducing evidence. 
This reflects the policy decision that certain agreements should be allowed only if 
accompanied by proven efficiencies.  
The metal-neutral airline joint ventures examined previously show potential for 
efficiencies, although it has also been demonstrated that they can have serious 
negative effects and eliminate all competition between the partners. It can be 
accepted that the parties must first demonstrate the existence of efficiencies, 
considering the legitimate concerns towards horizontal collusions and the justified 
                                                
589  Kjølbye 2011 (n 364) 6. 
590  Jones 2010 (n 367). 
591  Kjølbye 2011 (n 364) 6; Jones 2010 (n 367) 675. 
592  See section 6.2.3.2.2. 
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lower threshold for policy interventions in this area. In the same spirit, considering 
the nature of these restrictions, it is also acceptable to attribute any evidentiary 
failure to the undertakings party to the agreement even if this leads to infringements 
in the absence of any market power and therefore significant effects. This is a policy 
decision in order to achieve administrability. 
Should the parties discharge the burden of demonstrating efficiencies, this shifts 
back to the party alleging the infringement, who in turn has to demonstrate an 
existing likelihood of negative effects, not just mere presumptions. The balancing of 
negative and positive effects occurs only after the successful fulfilment of this task. 
This is because an object classification merely shifts the burden to the other party, ie 
reverses the usual order for adducing evidence, but does not enable the party alleging 
the infringement to argue for prohibition without demonstrating allocative 
inefficiency.593 This necessitates effective assessment of the likely negative impacts 
on competition before the final balancing.  
However, such an allocation of the burden of proof would serve no purpose if any of 
the parties faced an insurmountable difficulty in meeting the standard of proof. In 
relation to object restrictions this translates into the necessity that benefitting from 
the application of Article 101(3) TFEU should not simply be a theoretical possibility 
but rather a realistic outcome. There should not be any presumption of illegality 
under Article 101(3) TFEU against object restrictions nor any evidentiary 
requirements that would make it virtually impossible to demonstrate efficiencies. 
The application of Article 101(3) TFEU should stand on its own where its only 
connection to the Article 101(1) TFEU analysis should be that the latter’s outcome 
results in the need to examine the conditions of the former.  
In the following section, the application of Article 101(3) TFEU will be considered 
in light of the requirements discussed above to ensure an administrable enforcement 
system. 
6.2.7 Assessment under Article 101(3) TFEU 
The application of Article 101(3) TFEU is crucial for the enforcement of the Article 
                                                
593  See Glaxo (n 174) para 83. 
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as a whole, due to its symbiotic relationship with Article 101(1) TFEU. These two 
paragraphs should therefore play a balanced role in the analysis of competition under 
Article 101 TFEU, with the burden of proof allocated in such a way as to avoid both 
false positives and negatives. In other words, each paragraph should have a separate 
role. Considering the object restriction determined in the alliance cases examined 
previously and the large potential for efficiencies arising from these cooperations, 
Article 101(3) TFEU has to ensure that such benefits are taken into account properly. 
Criticism of the wider application of object restrictions refers mainly to the concern 
that it would lead to false positives. Using the example of airline alliances, which 
clearly have potential for efficiencies, an object classification may distort the 
outcome of the analysis, because of the prejudice against object restrictions under 
Article 101(3) TFEU and the difficulty of proving all four of the provision’s 
conditions. Accordingly, the inherent difficulty of object restrictions benefiting from 
the Article 101(3) TFEU exception raises questions about the correctness of the 
object classification in the first place.594  
These views are not without reason. The Article 101(3) guidelines, besides stating 
that a priori no type of agreement is excluded from the scope of the Article, strongly 
suggest that severe restrictions (black listed and hard core restrictions from block 
exemption regulations) do not benefit from its application.595 The guidelines aim to 
define a fairly narrow scope of Article 101(1) TFEU with a correspondingly narrow 
scope of Article 101(3) TFEU.596  
At the same time, paragraph 47 of the current vertical guidelines expressly refers to 
the possibility of exempting hard core (or, more specifically, ‘object’) restrictions, 
but also sets a presumption against them. In its submission to the 2011 OECD 
Global Forum meeting, the Commission examines in detail the possible use of the 
legal exception under Article 101(3) TFEU in the case of crisis cartels based on its 
amicus curiae opinion given in the national proceedings of the Beef Industry case.597 
                                                
594  eg Bailey 2012 (n 319) 595, the author refers to the opinions that doubt whether restrictions by 
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595  Article 101(3) guidelines (n 167) para 46.  
596  Kjølbye 2004 (n 342) 570. 
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This can cause some confusion as to the policy line to be followed. Another 
legitimate argument raised is the fact that in the system of legal exceptions, where 
the enforcement of EU competition law focuses on the pursuit of cartels, there are 
hardly any decisions which would shed light on the issues.598  
Finally, several commentators refer to the increased standard of proof introduced by 
the Article 101(3) guidelines for efficiency arguments compared to the practice of 
previous decades. The Commission’s effort to create a narrower and more realistic 
scope of Article 101(3) TFEU resulted in a highly detailed quantitative process. The 
party arguing the creation of efficiencies has to demonstrate the nature, the 
likelihood and magnitude of the efficiencies, as well as their link with the agreement 
in question and the timeframe and method of realisation.599  
Lugard and Hancher argue that the framework for assessing efficiencies goes 
significantly beyond the requirements of the past.600 They doubt whether in practice 
there is a realistic possibility for undertakings to argue efficiencies under the new 
test.601 They find the issue especially problematic considering that the previous 
jurisprudence becomes less useful and for the future there will not be further 
guidance. Bourgeois and Bocken speak about a dauntingly high standard of proof, 
which will be impossible to meet unless at great cost.602 Pheasant and Rab 
summarise the experience of the first five years of applying the new rules and 
describe the standard as ‘intimidating’ for parties.603 At the same time, Faull and 
Nikpay emphasise that assessing efficiencies is far from being an exact science, 
therefore ‘the obligation imposed is one of best efforts’.604 
The application of Article 101(3) TFEU and its elements will be analysed against the 
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above background by concentrating on the specificities of this analysis in relation to 
airline alliances. Article 101(3) TFEU establishes four conditions that have to be 
fulfilled by the parties claiming the benefits of its application. There are two positive 
conditions, namely: 
(a) the agreement must contribute to improving the production or distribution 
of goods or contribute to promoting technical or economic progress, 
(b) and consumers must receive a fair share of the resulting benefits. 
There are also two negative conditions, namely the agreement must not: 
(c) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives, and  
(d) afford the parties the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the products in question. 
All four conditions have to be met therefore it is unnecessary to examine the 
remaining conditions once an assessment reveals a failure to meet any of them.605 
6.2.7.1 Efficiencies 
Efficiencies have to be objective, verifiable and transaction-specific.606 As 
mentioned above, efficiency claims have to provide information on the nature, 
likelihood, and magnitude of the efficiency, the timeframe and method of expected 
attainment of the efficiency. The guidelines differentiate between cost and 
qualitative efficiencies. Cost efficiencies can take the form of synergies, economies 
of scale and scope, and cost reductions.607 New or improved goods, services, higher 
quality, quicker introduction of products or introduction at lower prices can all be 
qualitative efficiencies.608 In a number of cases, qualitative efficiencies provide the 
main source of enhancement potential of the agreement therefore these may be of 
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equal or greater importance than cost efficiencies.609 
Examining the few cases available publicly, it appears that in the past airlines 
submitted, and the Commission accepted, mainly qualitative efficiencies under the 
first condition of Article 101(3) TFEU. The following examples were found for 
qualitative efficiencies in Commission cases:610 establishment of a more extensive 
European network;611 reorganisation and expansion of the parties’ existing network, 
increased network competition, exchange of know-how;612 a more competitive 
network;613 expanded and improved transatlantic services;614 complementary 
networks and improved efficiency;615 a more efficient, extended network with better 
connections;616 an integrated and improved network;617 complementary networks, 
new or improved airline services, more efficient use of resources;618 or a more 
extensive network.619 Cost efficiencies were less frequently mentioned, and if 
referred to, included cost savings, economies of traffic density, and joint 
purchases.620 
It is understood that in its latest alliance cases the Commission applies the 
framework of the Article 101(3) guidelines on efficiencies. For example, in the 
oneworld case, the parties argued the elimination of double marginalisation and cost 
savings arising from economies of density as cost efficiency and indicated further 
qualitative efficiencies in the form of supplying a higher quality schedule, 
reciprocity of FFPs, fare combinability, and joint corporate contracts.621 Despite 
several rounds of discussion, the Commission provisionally concluded that the 
parties had not produced sufficient evidence demonstrating efficiencies to the 
required standards.622 The Commission no longer accepts efficiency claims at face 
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value. In the particular case of oneworld, the parties may have also decided to pursue 
the commitment path, instead of the detailed analysis of efficiencies, since this 
provided them with a faster solution. In contrast, Star parties are said to choose the 
efficiency defence due to the more complementary nature of the joint venture 
partners’ networks. 
The benefits of alliances discussed in section 6.2.4.2 may be regarded as efficiencies 
under Article 101(3) TFEU, where supply-side benefits correspond to cost 
efficiencies and demand-side benefits to qualitative efficiencies. The most important 
supply-side benefits are elimination of double marginalisation and economies of 
traffic density, which both contribute to increased traffic throughout the route 
network. Double marginalisation arises when absence close alliance cooperation 
both airlines in a supply relationship mark up the prices they charge their respective 
partner airline above their repsective marginal cost, which leads to high prices and 
lower output. When, however, these airlines enter in a close cooperation, these mark-
pus are substantially reduced, leading to lower prices for connecting passengers 
thereby increasing output too.623 Economies of traffic density arise when unit cost 
declines as the volume of traffic carried within an unchanged network increases, eg 
due to close cooperation within an alliance.624 
Demand-side benefits take the form of newly created or improved connections, 
alternative routings, higher or better spread frequencies. Efficiencies to consumers 
are also realised through cooperation of airlines in relation to frequent flier 
programmes and the increased access to airport lounges.625 
The analysis of efficiencies raises various issues under Article 101(3) TFEU. The 
first is the standard of proof for efficiency analysis, and whether the framework of 
the Article 101(3) guidelines renders it practically impossible to prove the creation 
of efficiencies. The standard of proof refers to ‘the amount and quality of evidence 
that law requires for a party to prove an allegation’,626 in this example, the amount 
and quality of evidence on economies of density, scope, scale or other benefits 
created by airlines’ cooperation.  
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Ortiz Blanco considers different standards for different instruments of EU 
competition law and proposes a reinforced civil standard such as ‘firm 
conviction’.627 He considers that the Commission applies different standards 
depending on the type of case.628 Lowe emphasises the difference between ex post 
and ex ante assessment and generally refers to the requirement to produce 
‘sufficiently precise, convincing and consistent evidence’ in support of Commission 
decisions.629 He acknowledges that the more economic approach inevitably leads to 
an increase of the de facto standard of proof. However, if combined with ex ante 
guidance, he considers that on balance uncertainty does not increase for the 
parties.630 Hellström concludes that the practice points more towards the ‘intime 
conviction’ approach, where the emphasis is on the case-by-case convincing nature 
of evidence rather than a uniform standard of proof.631 A similar approach is 
advocated by Gippini-Fournier, who considers ‘intime conviction’ as a sliding scale 
with certain explanatory factors that influence the persuasive effect of evidence, ie 
evidentiary demands.632 
It is undoubted that, compared to the pre-modernisation decisions of the 
Commission, the analytical framework of the Article 101(3) guidelines increases the 
standard of proof and evidentiary requirements. This is particularly true for air 
transport cases. Cooperation in the airline industry seems to yield potentially 
significant efficiencies both of a cost and qualitative nature. Considering the 
potential also for negative effects and the complete elimination of competition 
involved, it is legitimate to first require the substantiation of any such efficiency 
claims. Aviation is also characterised by the availability of a myriad of industry data, 
which enables extensive effect analysis. Under these circumstances, an in-depth 
examination of efficiency claims and the high evidentiary requirements do not seem 
excessive in principle. 
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However, since the adoption of the Article 101(3) guidelines, both the General Court 
and the Court of Justice had the opportunity to deal with the application of Article 
101(3) TFEU which has ensured that its application remains realistic and available 
for object restrictions too.633 Völcker considers that the judgment in Glaxo upholding 
the General Court’s assessment may invite the Commission to revisit some aspects 
of the Article 101(3) guidelines.634  
Although the Court of Justice and the General Court disagreed on the issue of 
whether the Commission was right to argue an object restriction in its underlying 
decision,635 both courts came to the same conclusions on Article 101(3) TFEU. The 
Commission argued before the Court of Justice that the General Court had 
committed an error of law in finding it sufficient for an application of the legal 
exception of Article 101(3) TFEU to argue that efficiency gains may probably 
occur.636 The Court of Justice disagreed and considered it sufficient to ‘arrive at the 
conviction that the occurrence of the appreciable objective advantage is sufficiently 
likely in order to presume that the agreement entails such an advantage’.637 Given 
the prospective nature of the analysis, it only has to be assessed whether it seems 
more likely that the efficiency will be realised.638  
The AG Trestenjak’s opinion referred to a high degree of probability concerning the 
required likelihood,639 however neither of the courts mentions this as a decisive 
factor. The Commission has admitted several times before the General Court that the 
process is more like a question of probabilities.640 This suggests that arguing 
efficiencies remains a realistic process which also incorporates higher standards of 
the more economic approach. In theory, undertakings are required to meet only 
reasonably possible requirements.641 
The Court of Justice has also confirmed that any analysis of efficiency claims must 
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be undertaken in the light of the legal and economic context of the sector in 
question.642 This conclusion proves to be particularly relevant for the efficiency 
arguments raised by airlines. As discussed previously, for the purposes of 
competition law analysis, competition involves an O&D city pair, which may consist 
of non-stop or one-stop routes to the same airports or to airports with overlapping 
catchment areas.643 This represents the relevant market where the restriction of 
competition is established. However, the efficiencies described in the section on the 
benefits of alliances often appear at a network level, and are not limited to one 
particular O&D route.  
For example, the elimination of double marginalisation and the subsequent increase 
in traffic density exerts its beneficial effects throughout the whole hub-and-spoke 
network. As explained earlier, cooperation on part of the network may benefit and 
contribute to the efficiency of all other connecting spoke routes. Restrictions on hub-
to-hub routes may benefit connecting passengers on thousands of other routes, which 
include the hub-to-hub route as a segment. On a flight between hub airports, the 
proportion of connecting passengers may even exceed 90% which makes the case for 
benefits to non-local passengers even more appealing.  
The question then arises as to what extent would it be possible to consider these 
benefits in the balancing process of Article 101(3) TFEU allied to a particular O&D 
route. It has to be examined whether there is a causal link between the restriction of 
competition and the efficiency, and whether this link is direct or indirect. The extent 
to which the benefits in one market can be balanced against the negative effects in 
another market may therefore become a crucial issue in airline alliance cases. 
Paragraph 43 of the Article 101(3) guidelines establishes that ‘negative effects on 
consumers in one geographic market or product market cannot normally be balanced 
against, and compensated by, positive effects for consumers in another, unrelated 
geographic or product market’ (‘out-of-market’ efficiencies). The guidelines also 
provide that the causal link between the agreement and the claimed efficiency must 
normally be direct.644 If these requirements are translated to any of the transatlantic 
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alliance joint venture cases, the question remains as to whether the complete loss of 
competition for local passengers (eg London-New York, Frankfurt-Washington) may 
be offset or balanced against the benefits to behind-beyond passengers (eg Budapest-
Milwaukee). 
The Article 101(3) guidelines provide a limited exception to the general rule in 
paragraph 43 when it refers to related markets and the requirement that the group of 
consumers affected by the restriction and benefitting from the efficiency should be 
substantially the same. It is not guaranteed that passengers travelling on the hub-to-
hub routes are substantially the same as those using behind-beyond itineraries as 
well. And even if they are the same, it is not evident how the criteria of ‘substantially 
the same’ can be demonstrated in practice. It can be seen that such a test may have 
serious consequences for the assessment of alliances. Even if numerous consumer 
benefits are created throughout the network, due to a limited number of O&D routes 
where negative effects dominate, antitrust intervention substantially affects the 
whole system of efficiencies. Consequently, in the absence of countervailing benefits 
in the same relevant market, authorities may prohibit cooperation either just in these 
markets or completely.  
In its antitrust immunity proceedings, the US DOT often applies so-called ‘carve-
outs’ for the problematic hub-to-hub routes, which basically means that the parties’ 
cooperation remains subject to antitrust rules on these routes, and they can cooperate 
solely on behind-beyond markets.645 The experience with carve-outs is ambiguous 
and in its most recent decisions on the three metal-neutral joint ventures, the DOT 
abandoned the use of such remedies, since they ‘inhibit the realization of efficiencies 
and thereby the consumer benefits resulting from those efficiencies’.646 The 
economics and benefits of these cooperations clearly demonstrate network level 
(‘out-of-market’) efficiencies that are connected to the restriction of competition on 
certain routes. A restricted view of efficiencies limited by the boundaries of 
narrowly-defined relevant markets under competition rules would fail to 
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acknowledge the benefits of these cooperations. 
This restricted approach towards out-of-market efficiencies also finds little support 
in the case law of the Union Courts. The judgments of Shaw and Publishers 
Association suggest that the assessment of efficiencies should be made within the 
same analytical framework as that used to analyse negative effects647 and in the 
majority of cases this would also be appropriate. However, other judgments 
undoubtedly provide the possibility to take into account out of market efficiencies.  
In Compagnie Générale Maritime the General Court expressly states that, in 
appropriate cases, regard should be taken of the efficiencies not just in the relevant 
market but in every other market in which the agreement might have benefits, and 
even, in a more general sense, for any service the quality or efficiency of which 
might be improved by the existence of that agreement.648 The benefit of Article 
101(3) TFEU is available for agreements which contribute to promoting technical or 
economic progress, without requiring a specific link with the relevant market.649  
The General Court repeated this finding in the CMA CGM case.650 Besides these 
judgments on maritime transport, both the General Court and the Court of Justice 
confirmed the possibility of out-of-market efficiencies in Glaxo.651 In the most 
recent Mastercard judgment, the General Court again accepts in principle the 
concept of out-of-market efficiencies by citing Compagnie Générale Maritime, but 
due to the parties’ failure to prove the ‘fair share’ criteria of Article 101(3) TFEU, it 
rejects the parties’ argument.652 In the Article 101(3) guidelines, the Commission 
refers to the fact that although two separate markets were defined in Compagnie 
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Générale Maritime, the customers, shippers, were substantially the same.653 
However, in the subsequent cases of Glaxo and Mastercard, the customer groups in 
question are evidently different. In the former case these are customers of different 
drugs, while in the Mastercard case, the different customers are cardholders and 
merchants. 
Accordingly, in view of the proven potential for alliances to create benefits even in 
the form of out-of-market efficiencies and other indirect economic advantages, the 
analysis must be undertaken in the light of this legal and economic context of 
aviation. The overly restrictive paragraph 43 of the Article 101(3) guidelines 
conflicts with the above case law and disregard the economic and legal reality of the 
environment airline alliances operate in. Although the theoretical possibility for 
object restrictions to benefit from the application of Article 101(3) TFEU was stated 
several times in case law,654 the Court of Justice’s most important message from 
Glaxo is the message it never put down on paper.  
Despite the Court of Justice clearly rejecting the idea that the restriction of parallel 
trade is only an infringement by effect, it upholds the General Court’s Article 101(3) 
TFEU analysis.655 This confirms that the object classification of a practice under 
Article 101(1) TFEU has no effect on the outcome of the efficiency analysis under 
Article 101(3) TFEU. The airline industry provides the example that, even in the 
case of object restrictions, the benefit of 101(3) TFEU should be, and based on case 
law, can be available, whenever parties to an agreement present their efficiency 
claims convincingly, substantiated by detailed analysis of both price and qualitative 
efficiencies.  
As the above review of alliances’ negative and positive effects demonstrated, the 
literature dealt extensively with the empirical analysis of the effects of alliances, 
which suggests that the more economic approach would work. Most importantly, the 
more economic approach should not mean an endless debate between economic 
experts, where the party arguing efficiency claims bears the burden of demonstration 
to unrealistically high standards. The analysis should take note of the economic and 
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legal reality of the industry and require a realistic analysis which acknowledges the 
circumstances of the case. 
6.2.7.2 Fair share to consumers 
Under the second condition of Article 101(3) TFEU, consumers must at least be 
compensated for the actual or likely negative impact caused by the restriction of 
competition and, as such, the net effect should be neutral.656 It is not required that 
consumers receive a fair share of every efficiency, and compensation can take the 
form of increased quality in exchange for higher prices. Furthermore, under Article 
101(3) TFEU, ‘it is the beneficial nature of the effect on all consumers in the 
relevant markets that must be taken into consideration, not the effect on each 
member of that category of consumers’.657 This can be interpreted as the effects on 
the average consumer having to be considered.  
The assessment of pass-on is a sliding scale approach where the greater the 
restriction and the later the pass-on to consumers, the greater the efficiency and the 
pass-on must be.658 The pass-on of efficiencies is inevitably related to the fourth 
criterion of Article 101(3) TFEU, no elimination of competition. If an agreement 
eliminates competition under the fourth criterion then it is impossible for any 
efficiencies to be passed on to consumers. However, the reverse situation does not 
necessarily produce an equivalent conclusion: ie the fact that competition is not 
eliminated does not automatically entail a pass-on. Residual competition plays a 
decisive role, and the greater the degree of it, the more likely the efficiency will be 
passed on.659  
The Commission prefers a cost reduction in variable and marginal costs as opposed 
to lowering fixed costs. In any case, the incentive to raise prices arising out of an 
increase in market power must be balanced against the incentive to reduce prices 
arising from enhancements in efficiency.660 The function of the pass-on test is to 
filter efficiencies not available in the end for consumers, therefore only those 
efficiencies that actually benefit consumers should be balanced against the negative 
                                                
656  Article 101(3) guidelines (n 167) para 85. 
657  Case C-238/05 Asnef-Equifax, SISC, SL v Ausbanc [2006] ECR I-11125 para 70. 
658  Article 101(3) guidelines (n 167) para 90. 
659  ibid para 97. 
660  ibid para 101. 
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effects. 
The actual pass-on of efficiencies produced by alliances varies according to the type 
of efficiency. Newly-created connections, increased frequencies and better timing 
immediately benefits passengers, as does reciprocal access to airport lounges and 
compatibility of FFPs. Given their nature, these efficiencies will be passed on 
completely irrespective of residual competition.661  
However, cost efficiencies work in a different way. The elimination of double 
marginalisation on connecting markets lowers prices thereby increasing demand 
which helps to achieve economies of density throughout the network. This has a 
positive effect both on hub-to-hub routes and on the connected behind-beyond 
routes.662 Economies of density lower unit costs on these routes. It has to be seen that 
the cost effects throughout the network are interrelated and any improvement in one 
part of the network creates positive effects also for other parts.663 Depending on 
residual competition, lower unit costs will translate to lower prices for passengers. 
Subject to the methods used to consider out-of-market efficiencies, the benefits 
deriving from behind-beyond routes can make a difference in pass-on concerning 
hub-to-hub routes. 
Generally, in the old case law, little has been said about pass-on. In LH/SAS for 
example, paragraph 74 simply states that the consumers will benefit from the higher-
quality services, which are geographically more extensive. In the same case, the 
Commission mentions that conditions have to be imposed to ensure the pass-on of 
cost reductions, just like it did in AuA/LH.664 In bmi/LH/SAS, the parties explain the 
pass-on by the fact that the alliance itself was created to enhance market position 
against British Airways on the London market. It is the alliance which allows them 
to compete more vigorously.665 BA/SN argues for a pass-on because of the wider 
choice of destination, better scheduling, coordinated gate allocation or FFP benefits 
generated by the alliance agreement.666 Finally in AF/Alitalia, in addition to the 
general arguments concerning unit cost reduction the parties were not able to 
                                                
661  See in detail in section 6.2.4.1 Demand-side benefits. 
662  See in detail in section 6.2.4.1 Supply-side benefits - Elimination of double marginalisation. 
663  See in detail in section 6.2.4.1 Supply-side benefits – Economies of traffic density. 
664  LH/SAS (n 16) para 74; AuA/LH (n 19) para 93. 
665  bmi/LH/SAS (n 107) para 2. 
666  BA/SN (n 19) paras 57-59. 
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substantiate their claim.667  
6.2.7.3 Indispensability 
Indispensability requires that a restrictive agreement as such must be reasonably 
necessary in order to achieve efficiencies. In addition, individual restrictions of 
competition which flow from the agreement must also be reasonably necessary for 
the attainment of efficiencies.668 The relevant question is not whether, in the absence 
of the restriction, the agreement would not have been concluded, but whether more 
efficiencies are produced by the agreement or restriction than in the absence of it.669 
Concerning the indispensability of the agreement as such the question is whether 
there are less restrictive but economically practicable solutions for attaining a similar 
level of claimed benefits or, to put it differently, whether such a solution would 
create significantly less efficiencies.670 It may be necessary to ask whether the parties 
could have achieved the efficiency on their own.671 
When assessing realistic and less restrictive alternatives to revenue-sharing joint 
ventures under the indispensability condition, it is necessary to explore alternatives 
in at least two directions. Firstly, it must be established whether cooperations of 
lower intensity actually achieve significantly less efficiencies and whether this 
would hold true for cooperations of smaller geographic scope. In other words, could 
a similar level of the claimed efficiencies be achieved for example by a simple code-
sharing agreement, or is it necessary to include in the cooperation hub-to-hub routes 
with high potential for restrictions, ie would behind-beyond cooperation be 
sufficient? Can the elimination of double marginalisation or economies of traffic 
density be achieved to the same extent without the full elimination of competition 
through metal-neutral revenue-sharing airline allinaces? These questions can be 
decided on a case-by-case basis by considering the specific circumstances.  
There is no doubt that several of the demand-side benefits, such as lounge access, 
cooperation on frequent flier programmes or new connections can be created also by 
less intensive forms of cooperation. On the other hand, certain efficiencies that 
                                                
667  AF/Alitalia (n 19) para 137. 
668  Article 101(3) guidelines (n 167) para 73. 
669  ibid para 74. 
670  ibid para 75. 
671  ibid para 76. 
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would require the alignment of airlines’ economic incentives would not be possible 
to realise through simple alliance membership cooperations. These include for 
example better spread frequencies or routes created after joint profit maximisation.672 
Furthermore, the majority of studies on the economic effects of alliances suggests 
that full cooperation is needed to be able to eliminate double marginalisation 
completely, since less intense forms such as code-sharing, produce benefits but these 
are significantly lower than those produced by revenue-sharing.673  
Secondly, certain authors, having used different models, concluded that double 
marginalisation can be almost eliminated by other means such as code-sharing, 
therefore the more restrictive metal-neutral cooperation is not needed.674  
Finally, the literature has also dealt with the effects of carve-outs and finds that it 
might be necessary to include hub-to-hub routes in the cooperation as well; 
otherwise the parties will still be incentivised to favour their own transatlantic 
flights, thereby destroying efficiencies.675 
6.2.7.4 No elimination of competition 
The last criterion of Article 101(3) TFEU requires that the agreement must not afford 
the parties the possibility of substantially eliminating competition. This condition 
recognises the fact that rivalry between undertakings is an essential driver of 
economic efficiency and recognises that the protection of rivalry is given priority 
over potentially pro-competitive efficiency gains.676 Its application requires a 
realistic analysis of various sources of actual and potential competition where the 
starting point is market share, however extensive qualitative and quantitative 
analysis is required.677  
Elimination of competition under Article 101(3) TFEU is an autonomous Union law 
concept that is narrower than that of the existence or acquisition of a dominant 
                                                
672  See the example of Delta and Virgin Blue’s cooperation in section 6.2.4.1 Demand-side benefits. 
673  See Brueckner 2003 (n 487); Brueckner 2003b (n 495); Whalen 2003 (n 497); Whalen 2007 (n 
499); Brueckner, Lee and Singer (n 505). More in detail in section 6.2.4.1 Supply-side benefits - 
Elimination of double marginalisation. 
674  Bilotkach 2005 (n 501); Bilotkach 2007 (n 503); Gillespie and Richard 2011 (n 425). 
675  Brueckner and Proost 2010 (n 415). 
676  Article 101(3) guidelines (n 167) para 105. 
677  ibid paras 108-109. 
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position.678 Its application depends on the competition existing prior to the 
agreement in question; in a competitive situation which is already weak, even a 
small reduction of competition can result in the elimination of competition.679 The 
analysis requires the assessment of alliance partners’ market position, the barriers to 
entry and the real economic possibilities of competing with the undertakings already 
established in the market.  
This would include analysing the availability of slots at airports on the route and 
other congestion issues, examining the effects of FFPs, TACOs, CRS effects, 
possible regulatory barriers to entry (traffic rights), the parties’ advantages derived 
from operating a hub and the likelihood of predatory response to market entry.680 In 
this assessment, the aspects dealt with in detail under market definition and the 
potential sources of competition may be particularly important.681 It might be 
relevant how realistic the entry of a competitor with a one-stop service can be and 
whether a service like this would be attractive enough for business and economy 
passengers travelling on the route.682 Analysis may also cover the issue whether 
entry and services from nearby alternative airports would be competitive enough to 
provide an alternative to the alliance partners’ services.683 
  
                                                
678  ibid para 106. 
679  ibid para 107. 
680  See for example LH/SAS (n 16) paras 82-85; AuA/LH (n 19) paras 96-104; BA/SN (n 19) paras 
62-74; BA/IB/GB (n 19) paras 50-70; AF/Alitalia (n 19) paras 142-159. 
681  See section 6.1 market definition in air transport cases. 
682  See in detail section 6.1.1.3 Non-stop and one-stop flights. 
683  See in detail section 6.1.1.2 Airport substitution. 
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7 Conclusion 
Having examined the economic and legal aspects of strategic alliances in general, 
those of airline alliances with regard to EU competition law, and after considering 
the features of an optimal enforcement regime, and evaluating the design of EU 
competition law, the findings of the thesis are summarised. This thesis examines 
whether, in the light of the more economic approach, it is correct to classify airline 
alliances as restrictive of competition by object and interpret this concept in a wider 
sense under Article 101(1) TFEU. By exploring the example of airline alliances and 
in particular metal-neutral alliances, the thesis argues that the wider interpretation of 
object restrictions is correct and, as such, does not conflict with the more economic 
approach of EU competition law. Furthermore, this wider interpretation of object 
restrictions must be complemented by a realistic application of Article 101(3) TFEU, 
in order to achieve the desired outcome of an administrable and efficient 
enforcement regime that minimises error costs. 
In order to answer the thesis question, the analysis covered the economic and legal 
aspects of strategic alliances to reveal the general purpose of alliance agreements and 
whether the economic environment really induces undertakings to cooperate with 
their competitors in pursuing efficiency enhancements. The aim was similar with the 
analysis of the same issues in relation to airline alliances. The motivations behind 
airlines entering strategic alliances and the form of these cooperations were 
examined. The legal background of the aviation industry facilitates an understanding 
of the legal framework of alliance formation that contributed to the widespread use 
of this strategy. It also explains the environment that will ensure that these 
cooperative forms will stay with us for several more years to come.  
The section on the economics of air transportation illustrates the principles that 
determine the operation of air transport services and provides valuable insights for 
the analysis under Articles 101(1) and 101(3) TFEU. Without understanding these 
issues, the analysis would be distorted and the flawed outcome would increase 
administrative errors, thereby decreasing the efficiency of the enforcement system. 
The description of market definition in air transport cases sought to explain the 
nature of competition, and the products that have significant impact on competition 
between airlines. Finally, with the presentation of the more economic approach and 
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the idea of optimal and administrable enforcement systems, the thesis outlined what  
the design of an ideal enforcement practice would look like. 
Based on the above analysis, the thesis produced the following findings. Global 
airline alliances such as Star Alliance, oneworld and SkyTeam are a phenomenon of 
the globalised economy, a form of strategic alliances that serve the purpose of 
answering the challenges of the new economic environment. Larger and more open 
markets with increased domestic and international competition, changing consumer 
needs, and the gradually and partially dismantled regulatory barriers have all 
contributed to the increased pressure on network airlines to find an appropriate 
solution for business success. These strategic alliance agreements can be described 
as cooperations for mutual benefit, which is intended for a long period, as they 
pursue strategic aims whilst the partner companies remain independent. A degree of 
integration of activities is achieved via the contribution of assets or knowledge to the 
alliance.  
Strategic alliances act, in most cases, for the good of consumers in a globalised 
economy and such cooperation yields substantial benefits. These agreements have 
legitimate goals to pursue that are not in conflict with the goals of competition 
policy; on the contrary they can intensify competition and better serve the radically-
transformed needs of consumers. It is important to bear these circumstances in mind 
for the analysis of strategic airline alliances under Article 101 TFEU as they should 
explain why alliances are good candidates for Article 101(3) TFEU analysis. 
The assessment of airline alliances is no different from the general approach in most 
cases. They profess to facilitating numerous benefits including better flight 
connections, greater possibility for earning and redeeming miles on all members’ 
FFPs, more destinations, more flights, new and innovative fare products enabling 
global travel, and better airport experience. More importantly, through their 
cooperation, airlines also promise to realise various cost efficiencies. Economies of 
traffic density arise when unit costs decline as the traffic carried within an 
unchanged network rises. As traffic volume increases, larger aircraft can be used 
with lower unit costs which can be passed on in the form of lower prices. Economies 
of scope arise when it is cheaper to produce two products together, rather than for 
each product to be produced by separate firms. A hub-and-spoke system enables 
 267 
economies such as these when traffic is channelled through one transfer point. On 
the outbound and inbound flights, passengers to and from different destinations use 
the same aircraft and several products are produced together which lowers costs.  
Airline cooperation aims to create networks that build on these efficiencies. The 
creation of alliances usually utilises and reinforces exactly the aforementioned 
economic principles of air transportation. The logic of airline alliances should be 
understood against this generally positive background, which is not likely to undergo 
rapid change for at least the next decade. Alliance strategy appears to offer network 
airlines a way of addressing the challenges they face at a domestic level. Currently, 
the broadening and, in particular, the deepening of alliance relationships seems to be 
an essential part of the network airlines’ strategy, whereas in the 1990s entering into 
alliances seemed to provide little more than a good opportunity for additional 
revenue flow. If the aforementioned benefits are substantiated in line with the 
general experience, then strategic airline alliances also pursue legitimate goals and 
have the potential for creating not insignificant efficiencies, which is an important 
factor for any competition law discussion of their effects. 
Global airline alliances are generally based on a network of bilateral or multilateral 
agreements between the member airlines, covering most of their activities, including 
in the areas of code-sharing, network planning, scheduling, sales and marketing, 
ground handling, airport facilities, frequent flyer programmes, procurement, 
ticketing and information technologies. The level of integration and cooperation 
varies depending on the airlines involved, however, all three global airline alliances 
have created either revenue or profit- sharing metal-neutral joint ventures between 
core members concerning their key markets. oneworld’s joint venture includes 
British Airways, Iberia and American Airlines, Star Alliance’s A++ agreement was 
concluded originally by Air Canada, Lufthansa, United and Continental, while Delta, 
Air France/KLM and Alitalia form part of SkyTeam’s most integrated way of 
cooperation over the transatlantic. These highly integrated metal-neutral revenue-
sharing alliances eliminate competition between the partners in relation to all 
competition factors. These forms of cooperation provide examples for discussion of 
the competition law issues in this thesis. 
The legal background of air transport has largely contributed to the creation of the 
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aforementioned forms of strategic alliances, since notwithstanding considerable 
achievements in the liberalisation of global aviation, ownership restrictions still 
hinder certain business options, like mergers between airlines of different 
‘nationalities’. Partial liberalisation and dismantling of legal barriers on a regional 
basis has enabled the emergence of business forms (low-cost airlines) that induced 
the creation or deepening of alliances. In this environment, airlines often use 
alliances to mimic the effects of legally impermissible mergers. However, even 
revenue-sharing metal-neutral airline alliances cannot be equated with mergers, since 
the nature of these two types of transaction is still different. Therefore, it would be 
erroneous to analyse alliances pursuant to the merger standards within the 
framework of an Article 101 TFEU investigation. A stricter approach under Article 
101 TFEU seems legitimate. 
From a competition law perspective, strategic alliances in general receive a benign 
treatment under EU competition law which acknowledges the afore-mentioned 
globalised environment’s requirements for quick adaptation and more efficient 
operations from undertakings. EU competition rules do not apply special rules to 
strategic alliances. In contrast, revenue-sharing metal-neutral alliances warrant more 
scrutiny due to the intensity of cooperation involved, since incentives are completely 
aligned between partner airlines to make them completely indifferent as to who 
serves the customer. 
Against this background, the issue of the more economic approach of EU 
competition law and administrability of efficient enforcement systems was examined 
in relation to the interpretation of the object and effect dichotomy of Article 101 
TFEU. The more economic approach implies a strengthened role of economic 
analysis, thus a departure from the legalistic, form-based assessment to an effects-
based economic approach with an increased focus on consumer welfare. The 
question was raised of whether the wider interpretation of restriction by object and 
categorisation would be in conflict with the idea behind the more economic 
approach. It was concluded that the more economic approach does not exclude the 
application of categorising rules such as restriction by object. In fact, precisely 
because of the more economic approach and the attempts to minimise the total cost 
of false positives and negatives and the system itself requires that in certain cases 
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generalised rules are applied as opposed to a case-by-case assessment. Accordingly, 
an administrable and efficient enforcement system combines elements of these two 
methods (categorisation and case-by-case), and applies a flexible approach to 
accommodate the characteristics of different categories of potentially illegal conduct.  
Such a system would not require a detailed economic assessment in all cases, but 
rather applies filters, presumptions and informational shortcuts to preserve 
administrative or judicial efforts, and avoid losses in procedural efficiency and the 
costs of unnecessarily detailed investigations. Ideally, these filters, presumptions and 
informational shortcuts are elaborated on the basis of mainstream economic thinking 
and general experience of particular types of business behaviour. They should work 
as generalised conclusions of economics. The allocation of the burden of proof, and 
the standard of proof, required should reflect the authority’s perception and 
evaluation of potential false positives and negatives. The way the system is 
constructed is a policy matter.  
The bifurcated structure of Article 101 TFEU, and the consequence that restriction 
by object or effect forms part of Article 101(1) TFEU, while both forms of 
restriction can benefit from the legal exception under Article 101(3) TFEU, aligns 
the existing system with the aforementioned ideal system from an administrative and 
procedural efficiency point of view. The object/effect distinction of Article 101(1) 
TFEU provides flexibility to save administrative resources in certain cases. At the 
same time, it enables that whenever agreements with anticompetitive effects also 
demonstrate potential for substantial efficiencies, the cooperation may survive the 
scrutiny by competition authorities. The object classification reflects the policy 
choice that certain practices might be allowed only if accompanied by proven 
efficiencies. Otherwise, this category of practices is regarded as undesirable, even in 
the absence of actual effects, simply due to the fact that it is restrictive of 
competition by object (risk offence nature).684  
Therefore, classification as an object restriction initially shifts the burden of proof 
without analysis of effects to the parties to an agreement complained of. It does 
nothing more, however, than to change the usual order of adducing evidence. The 
consequences of any evidentiary failure in this respect should be attributed to the 
                                                
684  See the opinion of AG Kokott in case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands [2009] ECR I-4529 para 47. 
 270 
undertakings party to the agreement with the object of restricting competition. 
Should they discharge this burden, it shifts back to the party alleging the 
infringement, who in turn has to demonstrate an existing likelihood of negative 
effects rather than mere presumptions. The balancing of negative and positive effects 
occurs only after the successful fulfilment of this task. In sum, object classification 
under Article 101(1) TFEU provides more of an inconclusive burden-shifting 
presumption that can be rebutted by the demonstration of pro-competitive effects 
under Article 101(3) TFEU. The EU system in this form seems to serve the more 
economic approach and contribute to minimising false positives and false negatives 
at reasonable costs. 
However, this interpretation has to be complemented by a realistic application of 
Article 101(3) TFEU in order to achieve the desired outcome of an administrable and 
efficient enforcement regime that minimises error costs. Neither the role and proper 
interpretation of object restrictions nor the Article 101(3) TFEU analysis can be 
discussed without due regard to the symbiotic relationship between the two. The 
increased use of restriction by object should not distort the outcome of the analysis 
under Article 101(3) TFEU due to any prejudice against object restrictions or 
claimed difficulty of proving all four conditions of that provision.  
In relation to object restrictions, this translates into the requirement that benefitting 
from the application of Article 101(3) TFEU should not be just a theoretical 
possibility but rather a realistic outcome provided the four conditions of that 
paragraph are proven. The application of Article 101(3) TFEU should stand on its 
own and not be predetermined by any conclusions reached under Article 101(1) 
TFEU. The case law of the Union Courts and in particular the Court of Justice’s 
judgment in Glaxo supports this view. Accordingly, the wider interpretation of 
restriction by object would not place undertakings in any difficulty, since the 
appropriate argumentation of efficiency arguments would enable the cooperation to 
benefit from the application of Article 101(3) TFEU. 
Strategic airline alliances provide an excellent example and demonstrate the above 
conclusions thereby providing the answer to the thesis question. Despite the 
generally acknowledged pro-competitive advantages of strategic alliances, the ways 
airlines cooperate raise fundamental competition concerns. Within metal-neutral 
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revenue-sharing joint ventures, the partner airlines try to undertake all possible 
means to eliminate their own incentives on the market and focus on the common 
interest and benefit of the alliance, namely to behave as a single entity. They no 
longer determine independently the policy they intend to adopt on the market; 
indeed, all competition parameters are affected by coordination. The whole concept 
of metal-neutrality ‘conflicts patently with the concept inherent in the [TFEU] 
provisions relating to competition’ since they substitute full cooperation for the risk 
of competition that would occur due individual airlines’ different incentives.685  
The analysis of the legal and economic context demonstrates the pro-competitive 
potential of these agreements and the many advantages they can provide under 
certain circumstances. Metal-neutral cooperation may be necessary for achieving a 
particular level of efficiencies, however this would be an issue for consideration in 
relation to indispensability under the third condition of Article 101(3) TFEU at a 
later stage of the assessment. Therefore, in the case of metal-neutral revenue-sharing 
strategic airline alliances it is reasonable to shift the burden of proof onto the parties 
to present their efficiency claims first, so the Commission can work on the basis of 
only presuming negative effect in this first phase. 
This solution is especially appropriate since it was also demonstrated that the 
elimination of horizontal competition between alliance members leads to negative 
effects on prices and output. This is the effect on all hub-to-hub routes where 
alliance members were actual competitors before their cooperation. Furthermore, 
through an alliance, the existing strong position of member airlines can be further 
strengthened at their hub airports. This strong position at particular airports may lead 
to vertical foreclosure to the detriment of unallied airlines operating independently of 
alliances. Finally, the fact that three dominant alliance groups rule many of the most 
important markets may entail the risk of anticompetitive effects due to multimarket 
contacts. From a policy perspective, even if alliances present  potential for 
efficiencies, under these circumstances it seems legitimate to require the parties to 
demonstrate those benefits first before an effect analysis is required. Therefore, the 
Commission can work on the basis of only presuming negative effects in this first 
phase. 
                                                
685  See case C-209/07 Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd [2008] ECR 
I-8637 para 34. 
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However, despite the classification as a restriction by object, efficiencies may be 
realised. Here again airline alliances provide a good illustration of the issue. Deeper 
cooperation may create benefits for both the supply-side and demand-side. Supply-
side benefits include operational efficiencies like elimination of double 
marginalisation, economies of traffic density, scope, scale and increased output. 
Demand-side benefits increase consumer convenience and represent monetary value 
for passengers. These include new destinations, more and better spread frequencies, 
better connections, cooperation on frequent flyer programmes and mutual access to 
airport lounges. This also forms part of the alliances’ economic and legal context, 
where their positive pro-competitive aspects can be accepted, and these could 
eventually outweigh the potential negative effects on certain hub-to-hub overlap 
routes. 
As mentioned above, the wider interpretation of restrictive object has to be 
complemented by a realistic application of Article 101(3) TFEU. In the Glaxo case 
both the General Court and the Court of Justice represented a view that supports this 
argument. Consequently, undertakings are required to meet only reasonably possible 
requirements and show that efficiencies are sufficiently likely to be realised. Both 
courts have confirmed that any analysis of efficiency claims must be undertaken in 
the light of the legal and economic context of the sector in question.  
In the case of air transportation, this requires taking into account the specificities of 
airline operations, for example by applying a less restrictive approach to out-of-
market efficiencies. The overly restrictive paragraph 43 of the Article 101(3) 
guidelines on out-of-market efficiencies conflicts with this requirement and 
disregards the economic and legal reality of the environment airline alliances operate 
in. The Glaxo judgment of the Court of Justice also confirms that the object 
classification of a practice under Article 101(1) TFEU has no effect on the outcome 
of the efficiency analysis under Article 101(3).  
The airline industry provides the example that, even in the case of object restrictions, 
the benefit of 101(3) TFEU should, and based on case law can, be available 
whenever parties to an agreement present their efficiency claims convincingly, 
substantiated by detailed analysis of both quantitative and qualitative efficiencies. 
Most importantly, the more economic approach should not mean an endless debate 
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between economic experts, where the party arguing efficiency claims bears the 
burden of demonstration to unrealistically high standards. The analysis should take 
note of the economic and legal reality of the industry and require a realistic analysis 
which acknowledges the circumstances of the case. Therefore, whenever parties to 
an agreement convincingly present their efficiency claims substantiated by detailed 
analysis of efficiencies, the benefit of Article 101(3) TFEU should be available even 
for restrictions of competition by object. With the appropriate interpretation of 
restriction by object and a realistic application of Article 101(3) TFEU, an 
administrable and efficient enforcement of EU competition rules can be ensured. 
According to the answer to the thesis question the wider interpretation of restriction 
by object is correct in relation to metal-neutral revenue-sharing airline alliances and, 
as such, does not conflict with the more economic approach of EU competition law 
if complemented by a realistic application of Article 101(3) TFEU. This sector-
specific example and the answer given by the analysis may be interpreted also in a 
more general way. The conclusions can be relevant more generally for the whole of 
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